The world has been riveted by the “Al-Aqsa intifada,” an uprising that has filled the media with graphic images of violence. When the media mention “the Palestinians,” they mean West Bankers and Gazans. But at the same time, a different type of uprising has also been taking place in Israel. In fact, Israel is being challenged by two intifadas - one external, emanating from the Palestinian autonomous areas; the other, internal, emerging from within Israel. The former is conducted by an army of Palestinian security forces and bands of irregulars under the command of various terrorist organizations. The latter is conducted by a group of Palestinian Arab nationalists ensconced in Israel’s own parliament. This other revolt - a kind of “parliamentary intifada” - is not violent. But it does represent the tip of a looming challenge to Israel, and if left unattended, it could erode the strong Israeli tradition of parliamentary pluralism.

At the vanguard of this offensive are Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset). Here are just a few examples of some of their recent activities: pledging moral support for the intifada in Ramallah; calling on the Arab world to unite against Israel during visits to Syria; siding with Israel’s enemies at the United Nations (U.N.) Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa; taking part in an international symposium in Brazil on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People; and organizing an international “anti-apartheid” campaign against Israel together with Palestinian and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Needless to say, Jewish-Arab tensions in Israel were already evident before the Al-Aqsa intifada, which has had a strong impact on Israel’s Arab population. But the Arabs’ elected representatives to the Knesset gave new impetus to existing inter-ethnic hostility. Instead of using the legitimacy conferred upon them by the state to channel the frustrations of their constituents into constructive dialogue, they themselves became promoters of distrust and antagonism. Their deeds and words of the last year have done nothing to soothe wounded spirits. In many cases, they may have exacerbated an already dangerous situation.

The Knesset intifada took two principal forms: defamation of the state of Israel and its leaders, and expressions of praise and support for its enemies. These were two sides of the same coin - and two aspects of the emergence of a bloc that would probably be classified as a “fifth column” in any other democracy.

Murderous, Fascist Israel

The Israeli political arena is a rough-and-tumble place, as anyone who has watched Knesset proceedings can attest. Parliamentarians regularly hurl insults at one another - and then adjoin to make small talk over coffee in the Knesset cafeteria. Yet even in Israel, there are certain redlines. When criticism sounds as though it were formulated in Damascus or Baghdad, those lines have been crossed.

Many Arab parliamentarians have used just this tone. For example, the leader of the Balad party and member of Knesset (MK) ‘Azmi Bishara not only called Ariel Sharon “the murderer of Sabra and Shatila,”¹ but described the Likud leader as worse than Hitler and Mussolini.² Arab Movement for Renewal leader MK Ahmad Tibi termed Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz a “fascist” who is “responsible for murder,”³ and called Israel’s prime minister “a bloodsucking dictator.”⁴ United Arab List leader MK ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha not only compared Sharon to Slobodan Milosevic but called for Sharon to stand trial for war crimes. He even sent a letter to the Nobel Peace Prize Committee asking it to strip Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of his Nobel award after Peres joined Sharon in a national unity government.⁵

After Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert ordered the demolition of fourteen illegally built Arab homes in Jerusalem’s Shu‘ayfat refugee camp in mid-2001, Hadash MK ‘Isam Mahul called him a “fascist who committed a crime.”⁶ When, in a Knesset debate, Minister of Interior Uzi Landau accused Israeli Arab MKs of acting as Palestinian agents, United Arab List MK Hashim Mahamid called Landau “the minister of assassinations.”⁷ For his part, Mahul stated that Landau was the “minister of thugs, the minister of internal terrorism.”⁸ Ahmad Tibi joined in calling Landau a “terror-supporting fascist.”⁹ Even Salah Tarif, a Labor party MK and a cabinet minister in Sharon’s government, spoke on Palestinian television about the “fascist Right,” immediately naming, among others, the present minister of housing and construction Nathan Sharansky.¹⁰ He also told his Palestinian audience that Sharon had “defiled al-Aqsa Mosque” when he visited the Temple Mount in September 2000,¹¹ asking whether “he who desecrated Al-Aqsa can return and rule?”¹²

The army, the police, the government, and the Israeli state itself have not been immune to verbal assault. Thus Arab Democratic Party MK Talib as-Sani‘ has called on Druze and Bedouin soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to stop serving in what he termed the “army of occupation and Israel’s machine of oppression”¹³ and compared the Israeli security services to the Nazi police.¹⁴ ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha called Israeli policemen “murderers,” and Muhammad Baraka called Israel’s anti-terror unit an “execution squad.”¹⁵ Adding his voice to this litany of insults, ‘Issam Mahul termed the Israeli government the “Israeli Taliban government” and the “anthrax government.”¹⁶ Hashim Mahamid claimed that the present Knesset “could vote to annex Damascus and Cairo” any time soon.¹⁷ In the context of a Middle East so plagued by conspiracy theories about Israel and Jews, these words surely did not go unnoticed.

‘Azmi Bishara - in the Knesset plenum - described some Israeli soldiers as sexual deviants. “I am willing to bet that anyone who writes ‘Born to Kill’ on his helmet is at root a sexual deviant,” he said. “I am sure he has a tendency to sexual violence, which he has to express by shooting at small children. He can’t do it in a kindergarten, so he does it at a demonstration.”¹⁸ During an interview with Palestinian television from the U.N. Conference against Racism in South Africa, Bishara opined that the Palestinians would ultimately be victorious over “the cruel enemy,” referring to Israel.¹⁹ It is worth recalling that this conference, “a festival of hate” as Foreign Minister Shimon Peres then called it, was hijacked by Arab and Muslim states which - together with international NGOs and human rights groups - attempted to cast Israel as a genocidal state and equate Zionism with racism. A few months later, this MK characterized Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza as an “apartheid regime” and launched a global campaign against Israel: “Our goal is to reach the antiapartheid movements that were against South Africa to try to draw them, to attract them, to this struggle.”²⁰

But it is not just Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza that elicits such flamboyant gestures. As-Sani‘ invited parliamentary reporters into his Knesset office to witness him observe a minute of silence on May 15, 2001, Israel’s Independence Day. Among Israel’s Arab population as well as among Palestinians in the territories and elsewhere, the occasion is generally known as “Nakba (catastrophe) Day” and is marked with black flags. But to observe it in this manner in the Knesset itself, even in a private office, is to deny the legitimacy of the very state on whose authority the Knesset rests.

Praising the Enemy

More often than not, these same MKs have unabashedly sided with some of Israel’s most implacable foes, heaping praise upon Palestinian terrorists and Arab dictators alike.

For example, Labor’s Salah Tarif visited Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and wished him the best of health. “I remember when I have paid a visit to Sheikh Ahmad Yasin when his health was not well. I went to see him more than once, and I wish him [good] health,” Tarif told Palestinian television during an interview at the beginning of 2001.²¹ That the Hamas movement is responsible for killing dozens and maiming hundreds of Israelis in horrific suicide bombings seemed to have mattered not a bit to the would-be Israeli cabinet minister.

Talib as-Sani‘ has compared Yasin to the Dalai Lama and has expressed support for the Lebanon-based Shi‘ite group Hizbullah, calling for a Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded to its leader Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah: “Despite its military inferiority, Hizbullah forced peace on Israel and made her flee from Lebanese soil. Therefore, I reckon Sheikh Nasrallah is entitled to the Nobel Peace Prize, and I will write a letter to the Nobel commissioners on this matter. He forced peace on Israel, and Israel accepted it unwillingly.”²² In the same spirit, Hashim Mahamid has recommend that Arabs in Israel “learn from Hizbullah” and adopt the movement’s “spirit of sticking to the land and its loyalty to the land.”²³ In June 2001, Bishara’s Democratic National Union organized the “festival of freedom and dignity” in honor of the Lebanese Shi‘ites who fought the IDF in south Lebanon. The occasion was marked with a minute of silence in memory of “the martyrs who were killed during the war against the Zionist enemy.”²⁴ At that Hizbullah victory rally, which took place in the Arab-populated city of Umm al-Fahm, ‘Azmi Bishara said: “Hizbullah has won, and for the first time since 1967, we have tasted the sweet taste of victory.”²⁵

Praise for Syria among these MKs is universal. On June 10, 2001, Bishara attended a memorial service marking the first anniversary of the death of president Hafiz al-Asad. The event took place in Qardaha, in the north of Syria, with the participation of Hizbullah secretary-general Nasrallah, Lebanon’s president Emile Lahoud, Iranian vice-president Hasan Habibi, as well as Hamas militants and leaders of radical Palestinian organizations based in Syria. When his turn to speak arrived, Bishara stood up and urged the audience to “unite against the warmongering Sharon government.”²⁶ Bishara then said:

He also praised “the heroism of the Islamic struggle.”²⁸ His words elicited wild applause.

Bishara, upon his return to Israel and amid calls by Israeli politicians that he be questioned by the police, defiantly declared, “I do not take back anything I said. I am not an Israeli patriot; I am a Palestinian patriot. Israel must understand that I cannot call Syria an enemy country, even if they crucify me!”²⁹ Bishara prides himself on being a “progressive” intellectual who speaks “truth to power,” but this did not prevent him from kowtowing to Syria’s new president Bashshar al-Asad - a man who, only a few weeks earlier, had accused the Jews of killing Jesus, in the presence of Pope John Paul II, then visiting the country. A month later, Bishara confided to an Israeli journalist how much he respects the young Asad:

This was the sort of sycophantic pulp offered ritually by official Syrian spokesmen - words hardly becoming of an independent intellectual, not to speak of an Israeli parliamentarian.

This MK also organized some nineteen trips transporting close to 800 Arab citizens of Israel to Syria via Jordan to meet relatives who have lived in that country since 1948. These visits are a criminal infraction punishable by imprisonment, given that they violate Israeli law forbidding Israeli nationals from entering enemy countries. Valid permits to visit enemy states can be obtained via requests to the interior ministry, but Bishara never bothered to undertake this basic administrative task, thus exposing hundreds of constituents to legal sanctions.

For this, as well as for his inciteful speech in Syria, Bishara was indicted in late 2001, leading the Knesset to strip him of his parliamentary immunity. The first indictment charged Bishara with incitement to violence and support for a terrorist organization, as defined by Israel’s Prevention of Terror Ordinance (1948). The second indictment charged him with violating Israel’s Emergency Regulations (1948) by abetting illegal exit from the country. In mid-2001, when calls for his prosecution began to emerge, Bishara reacted angrily, stating that “there is a dangerous racist atmosphere in Israel.”³¹ He later defiantly warned that if there were going to be a trial, he would bring witnesses “from the French resistance” and “people from South Africa” who would explain to Israelis what resistance and occupation mean.³² Bishara thus placed Israel somewhere along the spectrum between Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa - and placed Syria on a pedestal.

Expressions of support for Syria have become the stock-in-trade of other MKs. ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha sent a letter of condolence to the Syrian president over the deaths of three Syrian soldiers after an Israeli retaliatory attack on a radar position in south Lebanon. (The Israeli move followed a Hizbullah attack across the U.N.-recognized line between Israel and Lebanon.) In the letter, on Knesset stationary, Dahamsha labeled the Israeli government “fascist,” called the raid “an abominable attack,” and urged “Arab unification in order to bring an end to Israel’s radical actions.”³³ Dahamsha has never offered condolences to Israel for the loss of its soldiers. To add insult to injury, his letter showed the return address as “Nazareth, Palestine.” Dahamsha’s spokesman later comically attempted to justify the address his chief wrote, claiming that it was a courtesy to the Syrians who would otherwise not know where Nazareth was located.

It seems Dahamsha was too impatient to wait for the state that he represented in the Knesset to be destroyed, so he wrote to his Syrian friends from a virtual Palestinian state - so wrote Ha’aretz columnist Avraham Tal.³⁵

Predictably, Dahamsha’s letter got a reaction, and unsurprisingly, Arab MKs came to his defense. Talib as-Sani‘ and Ahmad Tibi justified Dahamsha’s letter, Tibi pointing out that “it’s only natural to commiserate with the Syrian people.”³⁶ Appearing on a television interview, “Palestinian patriot” Bishara refused to express a word of sympathy for the death of the Israeli soldier killed by the Hizbullah raid that prompted Israel’s retaliation in the first place.

Romancing the Radicals

And so it goes. Every Palestinian radical who abets or is himself engaged in anti-Israel terror enjoys the automatic moral support of these Arab MKs. Consider, for instance, Mustafa Zibri, also known as Abu ‘Ali Mustafa. He co-founded, together with George Habash back in 1967, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In September 1999, after decades in exile, Mustafa Zibri was allowed to return and take up residence in the Palestinian Authority (PA). He became PFLP leader when Habash resigned in April 2000. With the onset of Al-Aqsa intifada, Zibri reverted to form and became involved in the type of activities that had earned him exile in the first place. The PFLP under his leadership turned again to terrorism against civilian targets, reflecting Zibri’s determination not to be outdone by Islamic radicals. Israel settled the score in late August 2001, striking him down in his Ramallah office. (The PFLP is on both the United States’ and Israel’s lists of terrorist organizations.)

The Arab MKs reacted with rage. Muhammad Baraka called his elimination a “criminal act” that would only stir up more hatred and urged the government to “immediately abandon warfare.”³⁷ Ahmad Tibi warned that whoever approved the killing of the Palestinian militant would be responsible for the deaths of dozens of Israelis that would follow.³⁸ A statement issued by the leadership of the Arab Israeli community, which includes Arab MKs, read:

Shortly afterwards, Ahmad Tibi, Muhammad Baraka, and Talib as-Sani‘ announced that they would attend Zibri’s funeral, joining the tens of thousands of Palestinians, including members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah who paid respect to the “martyred” leader.⁴⁰

A few months later, the PFLP murdered Israeli minister of tourism Rehavam Ze’evi at a Jerusalem hotel. Arab MKs condemned the assassination, but some qualified their stand. Baraka, for example, said that Israel’s “same policy” of assassinations “has hurt one of its members, too,”⁴¹ thus equating the selective killing of a leader of a terrorist organization with the murder of one of his own parliamentary colleagues. A short time later, Baraka and Tibi met with deputy PFLP secretary-general ‘Abd ar-Rahim Malu‘ah in the Ramallah offices of Arafat. When Israeli MKs strongly protested against the meeting, Tibi replied that Malu‘ah - a leader of an organization that had claimed credit for killing an Israeli minister - “is an important political leader and intellectual” and that he “was glad to have him as a friend.”⁴²

The political extremism of the Arab MKs is most blatant when it comes to Palestinian nationalism. Before the intifada, they sided with the PA on virtually every single issue - a habit that changed not a whit once the PA effectively declared war on Israel.

At the beginning of 2001, Palestinian television interviewed Salah Tarif. He began with these words (at a time when the Palestinian intifada was in full swing):

Baraka, too, came out vocally in favor of the Palestinians’ intifada. As early as November 2000, he encouraged Arab participation in the violence: “Israeli Arabs bless the intifada and must take part in it.”⁴⁴ In January 2001, the PA daily Al-Hayat al-Jadida reported that Baraka attended a meeting at Orient House in east Jerusalem, on “Jerusalem and Independence.” There, Baraka blessed the Palestinian relatives of those killed in the clashes with Israel, a minute’s silence was observed in their honor, and the Palestinian anthem was played.⁴⁵ In May he stated that the intifada should continue concurrent with diplomatic negotiations between the parties.⁴⁶ A few months later, he said, “I support and agree to all action that is in opposition to the occupation.”⁴⁷

But when it comes to identification with the PA and its “president,” Yasir Arafat, no one can surpass Ahmad Tibi. He enjoys the distinction of being listed as an “Israeli affairs advisor” to Arafat in the yearly directory of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), the closest thing to an official directory of Palestinian officialdom. When Likud MK Michael Kleiner cited this in calling for Tibi’s resignation from the Knesset, Tibi explained that it was an old, uncorrected list. Yet Tibi was first listed as an advisor in 1999 (and not in the 1996,1997, and 1998 listings) and his name has appeared since then in the 2000 and 2001 editions.⁴⁸

In May 2001, Tibi - together with Baraka, Mahul, and as-Sani‘ - attended the funeral in Gaza of a four-month old Palestinian infant accidentally killed by IDF shelling. Some served as pallbearers. After meeting Arafat, Tibi declared, “The blood that has been shed is our blood,” and added, “the mother of Iman [the dead child] and other children are asking [Israeli Chief of Staff] Mofaz, killer of children, why?”⁴⁹ Yet neither Tibi nor any of the other Palestinians in attendance participated in the funeral of even one of the many Israeli children killed by Palestinians. That it would be difficult, even bizarre, to imagine these MKs paying a visit of solidarity to any of Israel’s Jewish victims is indicative of how thoroughly isolated they have become from the vast majority of their fellow citizens.

In fact, if one removes their names from the texts of their interviews and speeches, the discourse is indistinguishable from general Palestinian rhetoric, particularly from the radical end of the spectrum. In an interview with Jerusalem Post Radio, ‘Issam Mahul termed an Israeli closure of Ramallah tantamount to putting people in “a concentration camp.” He called Israel’s measures “fascist” and argued Israel was committing “war crimes against the Palestinian people.”⁵⁰ “There will not be security in Tel Aviv without security for the residents of Jenin, Nablus, and Qalqilya,” intoned Hashim Mahamid at a rally, sounding more like PA preventive security chief Muhammad Dahlan than a member of the Israeli legislature. He also claimed that “throwing rocks or blocking roads” was a valid form of protest when an “existential” issue is involved.⁵¹

As-Sani‘ went so far as to publicly celebrate a terrorist attack against Israelis. After a Palestinian emptied a salvo against soldiers waiting at a bus station near a major intersection in downtown Tel Aviv, as-Sani‘ told Abu Dhabi television:

As a result of the public outrage prompted by his statement in Israel, as-Sani‘ claimed his words were taken out of context and warned against “a crusade of delegitimization” of Arab MKs.⁵³ The standard retort of Arab MKs is that their words have been taken “out of context,” even though they themselves chose to speak them in contexts (such as the foreign Arab media) that are habitually hostile to Israel.

Some Arab MKs have not only favorably viewed Palestinian terror but have actually incited violence and expressed their own disposition to become martyrs. After the outbreak of Al-Aqsa intifada, in the context of a speech against land expropriations, ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha told the inhabitants of Nazareth and vicinity that the

Months later, an Islamist suicide bomber - an Arab citizen of Israel - killed three people in Nahariya. Just three days later, Dahamsha said he himself was willing to be a holy martyr, although he clarified he didn’t justify the recent attack.⁵⁵ (Ironically, Ma‘ariv published his remarks on September 11 - the day on which Muslim fundamentalists committed the worst terror attack in history.) Nor was this the only time Dahamsha came out publicly for martyrdom. When Jerusalem’s future was on the table at the final status talks at Camp David in mid-2000, Dahamsha expressed his readiness “to be the first martyr in defense of Al-Aqsa.”⁵⁶

Fifth Column?

Analogies are imperfect. But let us attempt to construct a parallel between Israel’s Arabs and, say, the Arabs of the United States. The differences between the cases are so obvious that they do not even warrant mention. But this simple (and perhaps also simplistic) analogy might nonetheless convey the gravity and absurdity of the positions taken by the elected leaders of Israel’s Arabs.

Were these imaginary Arab-American members of Congress to organize solidarity trips to Afghanistan of the Taliban; were they to issue a call to arms to “unite against the warmongering Bush"; were they to call America’s president a “bloodsucking dictator,” its administration an “anthrax government,” its soldiers “sexual deviants,” and its policemen “murderers"; were they to wish the “best of health” to Usama bin Ladin and to suggest that the Nobel Prize Committee should award al-Qa‘ida a peace prize; were they to term the September 11 atrocity an “attack of special quality"; and were they at the very same time to protest real or imagined state discrimination, they would enrage the American public, and would probably come under investigation by the attorney general and the FBI.

Israel’s Arab members of parliament, as well as their voters, have yet to internalize the fact that minority rights are premised on loyalty to the state. Yes, it is only natural that they identify with the Palestinians, that they care about their grievances, and that they support the establishment of a Palestinian state. But it is one thing to identify with their brothers and quite another to openly call for the state where they live and from which they receive their salaries to be destroyed, or to praise those who commit terrorist attacks against their fellow citizens, or to denigrate the state’s officials and symbols. Former minister of education and member of the left-wing Meretz Party, Amnon Rubinstein, pointed to the ludicrousness of the present situation:

The real challenge for the state of Israel lies not so much in how to control the mounting lawlessness of the Arab MKs - the recent decision to lift Bishara’s immunity is but one example of Israel’s ability to react effectively, if belatedly - but in how to convey Rubinstein’s point clearly and emphatically to Israel’s Arab voters. The Arab MKs compete among themselves in political radicalism. And yet, with only a few exceptions, these MKs are never repudiated by their constituents, leaving many Jewish Israelis to wonder whether the legislators’ extreme speech is a deliberate effort to pander to their Arab voters.

When these Jewish Israelis overhear the elected leaders of the Arab community, they hear Bishara stating, “I am an Arab and a Palestinian. Israel’s victory is my tragedy.”⁵⁸ They hear as-Sani‘ saying that “just as the Turks and British were here and are gone, the Zionists will pass.”⁵⁹ And they hear Dahamsha tell them, almost by way of assurance, that only “20-25 percent of Israeli Arabs want to destroy Israel and kill the Jews.”⁶⁰ All of this has a profoundly corrosive effect on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, since the statements by parliamentarians are believed to reflect the growing radicalization of their constituents.

Much will have to change if Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are to improve. But in the short term, the most practical step forward must be the cessation of the parliamentary intifada. Until the next elections, Israel’s Knesset majority can contain its worst manifestations through the use of its legal prerogative of lifting immunity. Israel’s many institutions of civil society also must express their abhorrence of the conduct of these MKs, by refusing to offer them the legitimate public platforms they crave. But ultimately, only Israel’s Arab voters can bring the parliamentary intifada to an end. If they return the same cast of characters to the Knesset on the next ballot, they will have cast their votes for their own marginality - precisely the cause of their many laments. It would be an ironic twist of fate: Israel’s Arabs are just about the only Palestinians who cast ballots that their state actually bothers to count.

¹ The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2001.
² Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Gaza), Feb. 2, 2001. (All translations from Palestinian media courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch).
³ The Jerusalem Post, May 17, 2001.
⁴ Ibid., Nov. 21, 2001.
⁵ Ibid., Apr. 17, 2001.
⁶ Ibid., July 11, 2001.
⁷ Ibid., Nov. 14, 2001.
⁸ Ibid., Nov. 15, 2001.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2000.
¹¹ The Jerusalem Post, Mar. 12, 2001.
¹² Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
¹³ The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 13, 2000.
¹⁴ Ibid., Dec. 6, 2001.
¹⁵ Ibid., Feb. 22, 2001, and Feb. 23, 2001.
¹⁶ Ibid., July 5, 2001, and Oct. 25, 2001.
¹⁷ “Interview: MK Hashem Mahameed - No Danger of Regional War If No Negotiations before Elections,” Nov. 29, 2000, in Independent Review Media Analysis (IRMA), at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=374.
¹⁸ The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2001.
¹⁹ Ibid., Aug. 31, 2001.
²⁰ “Interview: MKL Azmi Bishara on Upcoming Campaign against ‘Israeli Apartheid,’” IMRA, Oct. 16, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=8549.
²¹ Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
²² “‘Hizbullah’s Leader Deserves Nobel Peace Prize': Israeli Arab Reactions to Israel’s Withdrawal from South Lebanon,” Special Dispatch No. 105, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), June 21, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP10500.html.
²³ Ha’aretz, Nov. 8, 2001.
²⁴ Fasl al-Maqal (Nazareth), June 9, 2001, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 105, MEMRI, June 21, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP10500.html.
²⁵ Ha’aretz English Edition, Nov. 13, 2001.
²⁶ The Jerusalem Post, June 11, 2001.
²⁷ Ha’aretz English Edition, Nov. 13, 2001.
²⁸ Ibid., June 11, 2001.
²⁹ The Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2001.
³⁰ Ha’aretz English Edition, July 12, 2001.
³¹ Ha’aretz, June 12, 2001.
³² Ha’aretz English Edition, July 12, 2001.
³³ Ha’aretz, Apr. 19, 2001.
³⁴ “Interview: Spokesman for MK Dahamshe - ‘Nazareth, Palestine’ address,” IRMA, Apr. 23, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=6157.
³⁵ Ha’aretz, Apr. 19, 2001.
³⁶ Ibid.
³⁷ The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 28, 2001.
³⁸ Ibid.
³⁹ Ibid.
⁴⁰ Ibid., Aug. 29, 2001.
⁴¹ Ibid., Oct. 18, 2001.
⁴² Ibid., Nov. 23, 2001.
⁴³ Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
⁴⁴ Ma‘ariv, Nov. 5, 2001.
⁴⁵ Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Jan. 16, 2001.
⁴⁶ The Jerusalem Post, May 17, 2001.
⁴⁷ “Interview Hadash MK Mohammad Baraka: ‘I support and agree to all action that is in opposition to the occupation,’” IMRA, Nov. 7, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=8808.
⁴⁸ “MK Tibi responds to report, listed as ‘Israeli Affairs Advisor’ to Arafat,” IMRA, June 28, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=7041.
⁴⁹ The Jerusalem Post, May 9, 2001.
⁵⁰ Ibid., Mar. 12, 2001.
⁵¹ Ha’aretz, Nov. 8, 2001.
⁵² Ibid., Aug. 6, 2001.
⁵³ Ibid., Aug. 7, 2001.
⁵⁴ The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 6, 2000.
⁵⁵ Ibid., Sept. 12, 2001.
⁵⁶ As-Sinara, July 15, 2000, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 132, MEMRI, Oct. 6, 2001, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP13200.html.
⁵⁷ Special Dispatch No. 96, MEMRI, May 26, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP9600.html.
⁵⁸ In a letter sent to the Knesset, IMRA, June 21, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=6954.
⁵⁹ Ha’aretz English Edition, July 26, 2001.
⁶⁰ Ma‘ariv Weekend Supplement, Oct. 20, 2000.