History, it is said, does not repeat itself, or revisits tragedy as farce. This is not so in the Palestinian case, where tragedy has been followed by tragedy. A critical look at modern Palestinian history reveals that the current crisis, driven by the so-called “Al-Aqsa intifada,” fits a recurring Palestinian pattern of miscalculation, fratricide, religious radicalism, economic despair, and self-destruction. By comparing the recent violence with Palestinian uprisings in the 1930s and the 1980s, and now, a clear pattern can be discerned. This is the third time in seventy years the Palestinians have orchestrated a nationalist uprising, and the third time it has led them to disaster.

Patterns of the Past

In 1990, Emory University professor Kenneth Stein published a much-cited study comparing the 1987 intifada with the 1936 Arab revolt.¹ His work is a useful point of departure for any comparative study of political violence in Palestinian history.

Indeed, Stein found remarkable similarities between the two uprisings. Further, many of his observations can be applied to the current uprising:

Most of Stein’s observations still hold true today. There are striking similarities across all three uprisings. But while his work addresses some of the detrimental effects that the two uprisings had on the Palestinian nationalist movement, he neglects to note the clear self-destructive pattern that emerged out of the first two uprisings and that is still salient today.

I. The Arab Revolt, 1936-39

From 1936 to 1939, Palestinian Arabs rose against the colonial British and the Jewish community (Yishuv) in protest against the increase of Jewish immigration to the British mandate of Palestine. In the name of independence, they staged strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations. Thousands left their jobs, and scores of businesses were shut down. As a result, the Arab economy was devastated.

But the economic cost was only the beginning. Spiraling violence left 5,000 Palestinians dead, 15,000 wounded, and 5,600 incarcerated.³ Coordinating much of the violence was the mufti of Palestine and head of the Higher Arab Committee, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. He regarded violence as the most effective answer to Jewish immigration and British imperial rule. As the uprising continued, a rift developed between Husayni’s radical faction and the moderate Nashishibi family,⁴ which sought a diplomatic solution that would partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. This was unacceptable to the Husayni clan; they launched a campaign of intimidation and murder against moderate Arab mayors and officials who opposed them.

The result was a civil war for the very soul of the Palestinian people. Writes historian Yehoshua Porath, “a terrible blood feud between two Palestinian camps … resulted in a mutual hatred and dissidence so intense that a return to the show of unity … became impossible.”⁵ In fact, the Husayni-Nashishibi rift sparked the beginning of a trend recognizable today as collaborator killings. As a result of this civil feud, write political scientists Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, “rebels abducted a sizeable number of village chiefs—mukhtars, who were on the British payroll. They also assassinated others suspected of collaboration or against whom grudges were held, creating all sorts of new grievances on the part of their kin.”⁶

“Organized Arab resistance had collapsed by early 1939,” writes historian Charles Smith, “reduced to acts of retribution against other Arabs considered to be traitors.”⁷ Indeed, as Palestinian society deteriorated into a state of lawlessness, some Palestinians used collaboration charges as a way of exacting revenge in old vendettas. Collaboration killings accounted for 494 deaths,⁸ or about 10 percent of all Palestinians killed during the Arab “revolt.”

The situation deteriorated further as Palestinians recruited young children—below conscription age—to fight for their cause. Youth units, known simply as shabab, were formed to enforce compliance with Husayni’s policies and to prevent moderates from “collaborating” with the enemy. Husayni, however, took things a step further in forming “youth troops” fashioned after the Hitler Youth in Germany. As Kimmerling and Migdal point out, “Palestinians had the young, brown- and black-shirted fascists to emulate.”⁹ This disregard for the lives of children was yet another indication of how the first uprising tore at Palestinian society.

The uprising also prompted Islamic radicalism. For example, Christian women were forced to veil themselves with a hijab in many cities during the revolt, as ordered by Husayni. But Christians and Druze also endured much worse. In 1936, Muslim radicals called for a boycott of the Palestinian Christians for allegedly undermining the revolt. Further, Christians and Druze faced regular and organized attacks by Muslim radicals.¹⁰

The influence of Islamic radicalism ran deep. In early 1935, radical Palestinian cleric ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam organized guerrilla units in northern Arab villages to attack the British. He was instantly regarded as an important symbol in the Palestinian uprising. Ironically, his first squads of holy warriors were largely ineffectual on the battlefield, and the British killed Qassam that same year. Still, he was responsible for a new trend in Palestinian history: the resort to organized terror and guerrilla tactics. After Qassam’s death, his legacy lived on. The fighting shifted to the countryside, where thousands of paramilitary fighters mined roads and battled against British and Jewish personnel.

But Qassam’s legacy extended well beyond the Arab revolt. Qassam’s influence, write Kimmerling and Migdal, “extend[ed] to the concerted attack by the fedayeenon the state of Israel after 1948.”¹¹ To take their assertion a step further, it can be argued that Qassam’s guerrilla fighters set the precedent for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Qassam’s mujahideen, however, were not the only guerrillas to emerge in the Arab revolt. Dozens of fighter groups emerged as the uprising dragged on, directed by mutually suspicious leaders, further reflecting the fragmentation of Palestinian society. That there was never a clearly delineated leadership meant that Palestinian fighting forces were decentralized and thus largely ineffectual. These numerous rural fighting bands often battled each other, leaving the Palestinian paramilitary in a state of disarray and vulnerable to the more organized Jewish and British militaries. Their defeat was a foregone conclusion.

In the final balance, the first uprising was deeply damaging to the Palestinian cause. First, the uprising caused the Zionists to rethink their long-term strategy and prepare for military struggle against the Arabs rather than the British. The shift was instrumental to their ultimate victory against the Arabs in the 1948 war.¹²

Second, the uprising alienated the British from the Palestinians. The Arab “revolt” had the British, who held the fate of Palestine in their hands, seeing red. In their subsequent campaign to quash all Palestinian violence, the British banned most political parties, restricted the press, incarcerated radicals, and deported Palestinian leaders. This campaign effectively dismantled Palestinian civil society, which took decades to rebuild. Indeed, it can be argued that Palestinian civil society never recovered.

Finally, while the Zionists fought for their independence against the British following World War II, one Palestinian notes that his people “proved too exhausted by the efforts of rebellion between 1936 and 1939 to be in any condition to match [them].”¹³ This vacuum encouraged surrounding Arab countries to intervene on the Palestinians’ behalf, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq, in order to represent the impotent Palestinian population during and after World War II.¹⁴Unfortunately for the Palestinians, these Arab governments were motivated by self-interest, and their designs on Palestine only contributed to the Palestinian nakba, or disaster, that ensued. The cause of Palestine was championed by those who rejected the 1947 United Nations General Assembly partition plan, which would have endowed the Palestinians with a state in an expanded Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and much of the northern territory. It was all lost when the invading Arab armies failed to crush the new state of Israel. Egypt and Transjordan occupied what was left of mandatory Palestine, leaving the Palestinians without a state of their own.

II. Intifada, 1987-93

The intifada, or “shaking off,” began in 1987 as a response to a feeling of helplessness among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli rule since 1967. With a renewed sense of purpose, Palestinians felt encouraged by the initial solidarity between the territories and their exiled leadership in Tunisia.

The Israelis attempted to quell the uprising via economic sanctions. Many Palestinians living in the territories were banned from entering Israel where they had earned their livelihood. In May 1989, all citrus imports from Gaza to Israel were cut off—a move described by the Citrus Union Association as a “noose around the Gaza Strip’s neck.”¹⁵

But Israel was not the only country to come down hard on the Palestinians. With the rise of the intifada, anti-Jordanian sentiment also rose. As a direct result, Jordan’s King Husayn retaliated in 1988 by dropping Jordan’s claims to the West Bank, leaving it to its own destiny. This was particularly damaging since between 1980 and 1988, the king had invested millions of dollars into the West Bank economy, including funds for religious foundations, clinics, schools, and other social services. For four decades, West Bankers had been considered Jordanian subjects, complete with Jordanian passports and rights to vote. Now, those rights were gone.

However, as was the case in the 1930s, economic problems were just the beginning. Intra-Palestinian rivalries soon reemerged, and paranoia swept the territories, leading to an epidemic of violence. As political scientistDon Peretz writes, “Although the PLO and the UNLU [United National Leadership of the Uprising] in the territories adopted a calculated policy refraining from the use of arms against Israelis, this did not apply to collaborators.”¹⁶ About one-fifth of the 730 attacks during the first four months of the intifada were the result of intra-Palestinian violence.¹⁷

Fittingly, one writer noted the emergence of an “intrafada.”¹⁸ While much of the killing was politically motivated, writes terrorism expertBard O’Neill, “a good deal of the violence [had] little or nothing to do with collaborators and much to do with local feuds and blood debts.”¹⁹ In the end, Palestinian radicals killed at least 800 of their own for supposedly providing Israel with intelligence.²⁰ In several cases, collaborators were lynched or assassinated.

Perhaps the most infamous lynching was the one that took place in the West Bank village of Qabatiya. Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari describe it:

Not all suspected collaborators were killed, however. Some collaborators woke up in the morning to find coffins standing under their windows.²² Some got off easy by taking an oath of contrition on the Qur’an or the Bible in a mosque.²³ Hundreds of other suspects were brought to “trial,” where they confessed, relinquished their weapons, and asked for forgiveness over mosque loudspeakers. Those who refused to admit collaboration might have their houses burned.²⁴

This violence was in no small way exacerbated by the popular emergence of Islamism, of the extreme sort pioneered by ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam a half-century earlier. When the uprising began, many Palestinians saw fundamentalist Islam as a way to mobilize popular discontent against Israel. The Islamists refused to negotiate with Israel, opting instead to wage jihad or “holy war.” The best-known Palestinian manifestation of this ideology came in the form of Hamas.

An offshoot of the Muslim Brethren, Hamas offered a popular alternative to secular rule. The group published its own covenant in August 1988, intended to offset the influence of the secular PLO charter. The emergence of their radicalized ideology, and the subsequent debate over the religious future of Palestine, prompted Islamists to violence against secular Palestinians and against Israeli civilian and military targets. It is no coincidence that Hamas’s military wing was named the “‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades,” after the original Palestinian jihad warrior of the 1930s.

As the popularity of Islamism rose in the territories, Islamists often vandalized liquor stores, movie theaters, and video stores. They also carried out attacks against women whom they perceived as immodestly dressed, as well as weddings that allowed Western music and dancing.²⁵ The Palestinian Christian population once again suffered. And while some historians argue that Christians willingly joined the orchestrated violence and strikes of the intifada, the more convincing argument is that their involvement was the response of a frightened minority accommodating itself to an increasingly hostile environment.²⁶

As the intifada continued, another familiar trend emerged: children used as soldiers. “Children of the Stones,” they were often called,²⁷ with innumerable poems written to glorify their deaths. Both Islamists and secularists encouraged thousands of young Palestinian children to fight Israeli soldiers on the front lines. Children were assigned tasks according to their age. According to Palestinian journalist Da’ud Kuttab,

Palestinian children were often put in very dangerous positions, writes Israeli journalist Makram Khuri Makhul:

Don Peretz writes:

Accordingly, of the estimated 1,100 Palestinians killed in the second uprising, more than 250 were children.³¹ One study puts their average age at ten.³² Another study estimates that children were responsible for as much as 85 percent of the incidents during the intifada‘s first two years.³³

But the real cost of the intifada would only become evident later, after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), pursuant to the Oslo accords in 1993. Not only did the uprising fail to prepare the Palestinians for statehood. It left behind a culture of violence that militated against the success of state building. In particular, it celebrated each man’s (and woman’s) right to strike out violently in anger or revenge—not just against Israel, but against Palestinian dissenters and moderates. Within a decade, intra-Palestinian violence returned with a vengeance.

III. Intifada II, 2000-Present

The Al-Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000. The seeds were sown in May 2000, when Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon after sustaining years of heavy casualties in a conflict with the Iranian-backed Hizbullah guerrilla group. This was the first time in history that Israel withdrew from conflict with an Arab foe. This retreat emboldened the Palestinians, who flatly rejected the Camp David II peace plan—Israel’s historic offer of a Palestinian state in nearly all the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. In all likelihood, Palestinian Authority chairman Yasir Arafat reasoned that if the Lebanese could force an Israeli withdrawal without negotiations, so could he. Thus began the “Lebanonization” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.³⁴ Within weeks, the Palestinians launched a unilateral war of attrition with ill-defined aims. The scenario is sadly familiar.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society puts the total number of Palestinian deaths in the West Bank and Gaza since September 29, 2000, and through April 15, 2002, at 1,427, with more than 18,977 injured.³⁵ One year into this uprising, approximately 161 children were killed and some 6,000 injured.³⁶This, according to one study, constitutes a 27-percent increase in the rate of child deaths from the previous uprising.³⁷

That nearly all of these children were on the front lines of the conflict and encouraged to fight by their families and the PA-owned media should come as no surprise. After all, the PA for several years has been training its youngsters in the use of automatic rifles and other military-style weaponry.³⁸ Additionally, in the first months of the uprising, families were offered incentives of $2,000 per child killed and $1,000 for each child wounded.³⁹

The killing of “collaborators” also reemerged. According to one report, “families are exerting a more powerful influence than ever before in solving feuds, whether through vigilante killings or the judgments of the clan’s leader.” Further, “diplomats, aid workers, and families have noted two major feuds between families in the northern and southern Gaza Strip in which several people died.”⁴⁰

Indeed, scores of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have been killed or injured by vigilantes since the uprising began.⁴¹ One particularly gruesome and recent event involved the killing of three men who had just been convicted by a Palestinian military court when Palestinian gunmen killed them and then threw their bodies out into the street. The three defendants had been found guilty of killing a member of the Palestinian security forces; the attack was thought to be a revenge killing carried out by members of his clan. Ironically, during the Palestinians’ first intifada, one victim had himself killed several suspected collaborators with Israel.⁴²

One journalist writes, “as collaboration fever spread across the West Bank and Gaza, many paramilitaries used it as an excuse to settle scores. One man was nearly killed for a debt of $250.”⁴³ Other killings were the product of political disagreements and love triangles. The result says Bassem Eid, director of Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, is “a witch hunt,”⁴⁴ resulting in “a huge social crisis.”⁴⁵

Religious zealots and ultra-nationalist radicals have exacerbated the crisis. According to Palestinian analyst Mahdi ‘Abd al-Hadi, this uprising has produced a “new, unknown, faceless generation of leaders, and nobody knows where they are going.”⁴⁶These leaders hail from radical groups including the Tanzim, Palestinian Hizbullah, Al-Aqsa Brigades, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

According to Khalil Shiqaqi, the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, a Palestinian civil war is now underway. Young zealots have effectively hijacked the intifada and are now exploiting Palestinian instability “to weaken the Palestinian old guard and eventually displace it.”⁴⁷ This young guard, according to Shiqaqi, “has assumed de facto control over most PA civil institutions [and] penetrated PA security services.”⁴⁸ They have chosen “not to create new national institutions but rather to work for control of the existing ones.”⁴⁹

They are steadily reaching their goals. Support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad today is said to be higher than ever, with polls showing nearly 31 percent popularity in the West Bank and Gaza.⁵⁰ The radical Tanzim, under the leadership of Marwan Barghuti (now in Israeli custody), has repeatedly ordered Palestinians to ignore calls for cease-fires with Israel—and the Tanzim hails from the Fatah party, a faction under the leadership of Arafat himself.

In November 2000, an unprecedented 3,000 protestors clashed with PA police over the arrest of Mahmud Tawalbi, a leader of the Islamic Jihad. More recently, in February 2002, Palestinian police clashed with more than 200 demonstrators at a jail in Hebron, where sixty members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad were set free. Similar clashes are regularly reported, prompting one Israeli intelligence official to predict that PA rule in the Gaza Strip “will disintegrate and that … Arafat will be replaced by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.”⁵¹

The PA is in financial crisis, too. While financial records are nearly impossible to track in Arafat’s regime, the PA’s annual revenue has reportedly fallen from more than $600 million to just $27 million.⁵² By some estimates, the PA’s collective net worth is down by more than two thirds, due to corruption, a decline in productivity, and the drying up of foreign aid.⁵³

These financial woes have forced the PA to cut administrative salaries. Not surprisingly then, the Arabic daily al-Hayat al-Jadida reported in September that presumably unpaid “senior figures in the PA are … leaving the area that is their responsibility without permission from above.”⁵⁴

Writes Tom Rose, publisher of The Jerusalem Post:

These desperate conditions have taken their toll. An increasing number of Palestinian Christians have left because of economic reasons and because their place in the predominantly Muslim Palestinian society is less certain. But Christians are only one segment of society in flight. According to the Israeli Ha’aretz daily, one year into the intifada, there was “a dramatic rise of hundreds of percent in the number of Palestinians who want to leave the territories and move to a Western country. They are Palestinians who have no way to keep going in the present situation, so they decide to leave.”⁵⁶With unemployment estimated at approximately 70 percent, this should come as no surprise. Still, as this “brain drain” continues, the Palestinian people lose the valuable moderates who could contribute greatly to a future state.

Finally, nineteen months of Palestinian violence have taken its toll in one other important way. After a string of Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombings in December 2001 and again in April 2002, Israel reached its breaking point. Fingering the PA for not doing enough to prevent terror, Israel’s defense forces began a methodical campaign that has since destroyed key PA security and governmental targets. In several Palestinian cities and refugee camps, Israel cut a path of destruction in its effort to root out terrorists. The setback to the Palestinian cause has been incalculable. At the same time, if events cast Arafat aside, there is no clear successor, and analysts increasingly predict a civil war.

Balance Sheet

To the argument that these uprisings were self-defeating, there are those who claim that the Palestinians did benefit from the resort to violence. After all, following the first uprising, the British issued a White Paper in 1939 that reneged on the policy of supporting a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. The intifada of the late 1980s also resulted in the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, which put the Palestinian Authority on the map. And even today, there are those—Palestinians and others—who believe that the present uprising will culminate in statehood. In Hamas, uprisings are seen as essential steps toward the destruction of Israel. After that, said Hamas leader Mahmud az-Zahar, the Jews could remain, living “in an Islamic state with Islamic law.”⁵⁷

But the fact is that despite this uprising and its two predecessors, the Palestinians still have no state, and the cost of the uprisings to Palestinian society is indisputable.

The first uprising effectively destroyed the Palestinian nationalist movement. After the Arab revolt, the movement was rendered leaderless, ineffectual, and paralyzed. When the surrounding Arab states declared war on the newly established state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians could do little to control their own collective destiny. Those who fought the Israelis were disorganized and often disarmed by the organized Arab armies. Untold numbers of others simply fled their homes in fear or despair. When the belligerent Arab states acknowledged that they had lost the war through various armistice agreements in 1949, this was the final nail in the coffin for the Palestinian movement. It was not to be reincarnated, arguably, until Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement gained momentum in 1965—a full sixteen years later.

The second uprising also led Palestinian society to the verge of collapse—until Israel and the United States intervened with initiatives for Palestinian statehood. The Palestinian economy was decimated; Palestinians were increasingly engaging in internecine conflict; radicalism was on the rise; and while there was cooperation among the UNLU, there was no clear vision for a future Palestinian state. Only by artificially resuscitating Yasir Arafat from Tunisian exile did Israel and the United States steer the Palestinian people toward an interim state. And because no Palestinian leader (including Arafat) could produce a true forward-looking vision for a future state, the United States and Israel set the parameters of the West Bank-Gaza proto-state during its formative years.

While strange turns cannot be ruled out in the Middle East, the current “intrafada” also has the odor of a defeat. The violence has again destroyed the Palestinian economy, while radicalism, fratricide, and internal squabbles continue to erode society at an alarming rate. Worse, perhaps, is that this current round of violence has undermined the confidence of supporters of the “peace process” in the United States, Israel, and the Arab world. The result, in Israel and the United States, has been a swing to the right of the political spectrum and a general distrust of Palestinian objectives. It will now take years for former moderates to believe again in the concept of rapprochement and perhaps even longer for Israeli-Palestinian relations to rebound.

More important, as a direct result of the intra-Palestinian violence that accompanied these uprisings, the Palestinians are arguably no more prepared for statehood today than they were in 1936. They are simply more destitute, more fragmented, and more radical. Wrote Don Peretz in 1990:

Peretz was on target. Throughout Palestinian history, conflicts between the diverse but staunch political and religious factions have often erupted into open warfare when “fundamentalist groups battled secularists, and when secularists fought among themselves, with makeshift weapons such as chains, iron bars, clubs, and Molotov cocktails. Since the intifada most of these violent clashes have halted, but ideological tensions continue.”⁵⁹ As Khalil Shiqaqi recently noted, the Palestinians are once again feuding over the future of a Palestinian state, and it is leading them to the brink of civil war.⁶⁰

If we are to learn from history, one lesson is glaringly obvious. For the Palestinians to end their misery, they must articulate a forward-looking vision of a Palestinian state built upon the creation of a Palestinian civil society, rather than the destruction of Israel and obsession with the mistakes of the past. Only when Palestinians abandon their resort to uprisings will it be possible to establish a viable Palestinian state, living in peace alongside Israel. The sooner Palestinians are made to acknowledge the error of the Al-Aqsa intifada, and the uprisings that came before it, the sooner legitimate Palestinian national aspirations can be addressed.

¹ Kenneth Stein, “The Intifadah and the 1936-1939 Uprising: A Comparison,” The Journal of Palestine Studies, 76 (1990): 64-85.
² Kenneth Stein, “The Intifadah and the Uprising of 1936-1939: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Intifadah: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 3-11.
³ Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 123.
⁴ Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 94.
⁵ Yehoshua Porath, “The Political Organization of the Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate,” in Moshe Ma’oz, ed., Palestinian Arab Politics (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1975), p. 17.
⁶ Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p. 115.
⁷ Smith, Palestine, p. 101; Porath “Political Organization,” p. 18.
⁸ Stein, “The Intifadah,” in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 25.
⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p. 101.
¹⁰ p. 116.
¹¹ p. 104.
¹² p. 97.
¹³ Ibid., quoting W.F. Abboushi.
¹⁴ Stein, “The Intifadah,” in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 19.
¹⁵ Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 99.
¹⁶ p. 91.
¹⁷ Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel’s Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 257.
¹⁸ David Pollock, “The American Response to the Intifada,” in Freedman, The Intifadah, p. 130.
¹⁹ Bard E. O’Neill, “The Intifada in the Context of Armed Struggle,” in Freedman, The Intifadah, pp. 57-58.
²⁰ Associated Press, Aug. 20, 2001, at http://detnews.com/2001/nation/0108/21/a07-273442.htm.
²¹ Schiff and Yaari, Intifada, p. 148.
²² Ibid.
²³ p. 256.
²⁴ Peretz, Intifada, p. 91.
²⁵ p. 103.
²⁶ p. 96.
²⁷ p. 83.
²⁸ p. 84.
²⁹ p. 86.
³⁰ p. 84.
³¹ “Minors Killed Since 9 December 1987,” at http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_Killed.asp.
³² Justine McCabe, “Sowing Seeds of War,” The Hartford Courant, Jan. 1, 2000, at http://www.ctgreens.org/articles/sowing_010101.html, summarizing the 1990 report by the Swedish Save the Children, “The Status of Palestinian Children during the Uprising in the Occupied Territories.”
³³ Stein, “The Intifadah,” in Freedman, p. 17, quoting Yitzhak Rabin interview, Dec. 15, 1989.
³⁴ Ronen Sebag, “Lebanon: The Intifada‘s False Premise,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2002, pp. 13-21.
³⁵ At http://www.palestinercs.org.
³⁶ “Minors Killed Since 9 December 1987,” at http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_Killed.asp.
³⁷ At http://www.dci-pal.org/english/dcipress/releases/2001/0024.html.
³⁸ The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 10, 2001.
³⁹ Yedi’ot Aharonot(Tel Aviv), Dec. 13. 2000.
⁴⁰ Agence France-Presse, Oct. 17, 2001.
⁴¹ A list of collaborator killings is at http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/collaborators.htm.
⁴² CNN, Feb. 5, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/02/05/trial.shooting/index.html.
⁴³ The National Post, Sept. 4, 2001.
⁴⁴ Time Magazine, Aug. 27, 2001
⁴⁵ The Austin American Statesman, Aug. 7, 2001.
⁴⁶ The Jerusalem Report, Apr. 25, 2001.
⁴⁷ Khalil Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided,” Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2002, p. 89.
⁴⁸ p. 90.
⁴⁹ p. 93.
⁵⁰ p. 92.
⁵¹ The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 19, 2001.
⁵² The Toronto Star, Nov. 11, 2001.
⁵³ The Weekly Standard, Jan. 21, 2002.
⁵⁴ Hasan al-Kashif, cited in Ha’aretz, Sept. 5, 2001.
⁵⁵ The Weekly Standard, Jan. 21, 2002.
⁵⁶ Ha’aretz (magazine), Oct. 5, 2001.
⁵⁷ The New York Times, Apr. 4, 2002.
⁵⁸ Peretz, p. 100.
⁵⁹ p. 101.
⁶⁰ Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided,” p. 90.