Turkey and the UAE Fight It Out by Proxy in Libya

Originally published under the title “Libya’s Proxy War Comes Out in the Open.”

A destroyed tank at a captured LNA camp in Gharyan, Libya.

In forty hours of momentous fighting in Libya’s civil war, the forces of the government in Tripoli re-took a strategic city and captured sophisticated anti-tank weapons from the eastern Libyan government leader’s forces. Increasingly the two sides, one backed by Turkey and its allies and the other backed by the United Arab Emirates and its allies, is seen as an important battle that could decide the future of the Middle East’s power blocs. The transfer of weapons and armored vehicles by both sides to their local allies now risks a wider escalation.

For many years, after Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown and killed in 2011, the country sank deeper into crises and civil conflict that were largely misunderstood and reported only in fragments. When it came into the spotlight, as with the murder of US ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi in 2012 or the 2015-2016 battles for Sirte between ISIS and Tripoli’s forces, Libya was seen as momentarily important, then largely forgotten again.

Libya is increasingly seen as particularly important by two alliances in the Middle East, one centered around Ankara and another around Abu Dhabi. This was only loosely understood for many years because many countries sought to get influence in Libya. The UAE, Qatar, Russia, France, Italy, the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia all played a role since 2011.

The transfer of weapons and armored vehicles by Turkey and the UAE to their local allies now risks a wider escalation.

... The Brotherhood in Egypt was seen in a positive light by Qatar and the ruling party in Turkey. But the Middle East was shifting. The UAE and Saudi Arabia began to see Brotherhood-linked groups, as well as Iran, as the chief challenge in the region.

Khalifa Haftar, a former general who had returned to Libya to support rebels in the east, soon found himself leading what he termed Operation Dignity to root out Islamist groups in Benghazi. With backing from Egypt he was able to retake eastern Libya in 2014. For Egypt this made sense. Haftar was a military man, like those who had pushed the Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi out in 2013. He also had brought stability to eastern Libya.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (right) with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in April 2017.

Egypt wanted to stop the terrorists and weapons trafficking that were penetrating its southern desert from Libya. Haftar was the key. But it took him years to consolidate control until in February 2019 he took the strategic oil crescent cities on the coast. He visited Russia in November 2018 and met the French president in May 2019. Turkey’s state TRT network accused Russia of arming Haftar’s forces and sending mercenaries in March 2019.

In April Haftar’s forces, called the Libyan National Army (LNA), launched a major offensive hoping to take the capital of Tripoli. Ostensibly this is a battle between the LNA and the Government of the National Accord (GNA) which is often posited to be the “UN-Recognized” or internationally recognized government. That internationally recognized government controls only a small part of Libya. The LNA and its backers hoped to seal its fate in April and present what was left of its backers with a fait accompli.

Dozens of Turkish-made BMC Kirpi armored vehicles in the port of Tripoli, May 2019.

Turkey had other ideas. According to reports it sent Kirpi armored vehicles to Tripoli to bolster the GNA’s flagging forces. Would this lead to a crisis with the countries backing Haftar, including Egypt and the UAE? Middle East Eye and The Arab Weekly reported the transfer of the vehicles as Ankara’s way to “balance” the UAE and other allies of Haftar. Turkey had acquired 529 of these Kirpi vehicles from BMC in 2017. In May, it seems, dozens of them were sent to Libya from Turkey.

The support that the GNA got in May helped it launch counterattacks in June and push some of Haftar’s forces back. The LNA was pushed out of Gharyan, a strategic city south of Tripoli. LNA forces suffered casualties. But the LNA said it was a tactical withdrawal. Al-Jazeera in Doha claimed the LNA has “mercenaries” from Chad and Sudan fighting in its ranks.

US-made Javelin anti-tank missiles captured by GNA forces in Gharyan.

The GNA also captured weapons in Gharyan, including photos of the US-made Javelin anti-tank missile. Four of them were found and the Libyan Express accuses the UAE of supplying them to Haftar’s forces. They were allegedly sold to the UAE in 2008 from the US. ...

Now the LNA is angry. It has slammed Turkey’s involvement in Libya. The Javelin weapons may have been given to the LNA after the armored vehicles were provided to the GNA as a way to balance Ankara’s involvement. But it is embarrassing that they fell into the wrong hands. Now the LNA is threatening Turkish flights and ships that arrive in Tripoli, arguing that they are bringing weapons. According to Reuters, Turkey has supplied drones and trucks to the Tripoli government.

Western powers have largely abrogated responsibility in Libya, even though it was Western intervention that removed Gaddafi.

The battle is now reaching a more international scope because of the weapons flowing from various Middle Eastern countries into this proxy war. If before the cash and weapons were small, now they are out in the open.

The Western powers have largely abrogated responsibility in Libya, even though it was European and US intervention that helped remove Gaddafi.

European countries have sought to stop the flow of migrants and Italy’s government particularly does not want humanitarian boats picking up African migrants off Libya’s shores. This means that the European Union has an interest in keeping the GNA in power or at least working out some kind of deal. Haftar has come a long way from Benghazi but there is pushback against him because he is not “internationally recognized” and because he is supported by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The transfer of the armored vehicles in May was largely ignored, but now the conflict is coming out of the shadows and it will impact both Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other regional powers.

Seth Frantzman is The Jerusalem Post’s op-ed editor, a Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum, and a founder of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis.

A journalist and analyst concentrating on the Middle East, Seth J. Frantzman has a PhD from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was an assistant professor at Al-Quds University. He is the Oped Editor and an analyst on Middle East Affairs at The Jerusalem Post and his work has appeared at The National Interest, The Spectator, The Hill, National Review, The Moscow Times, and Rudaw. He is a frequent guest on radio and TV programs in the region and internationally, speaking on current developments in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. As a correspondent and researcher has covered the war on ISIS in Iraq and security in Turkey, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, the UAE and eastern Europe.
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I recently witnessed something I haven’t seen in a long time. On Friday, August 16, 2024, a group of pro-Hamas activists packed up their signs and went home in the face of spirited and non-violent opposition from a coalition of pro-American Iranians and American Jews. The last time I saw anything like that happen was in 2006 or 2007, when I led a crowd of Israel supporters in chants in order to silence a heckler standing on the sidewalk near the town common in Amherst, Massachusetts. The ridicule was enough to prompt him and his fellow anti-Israel activists to walk away, as we cheered their departure. It was glorious.