Turkey’s blackmail of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over Sweden’s accession is the latest episode to raise questions about whether Turkey’s belongs in the alliance. Certainly, NATO leaders and many in the White House will celebrate Turkey agreeing to Swedish accession after a 22-month delay but, while NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg lavishes praise on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the reality is Turkey subordinates NATO’s interests to its own material benefit. It plays Russia and the United States off each other, and it double-deals as Turkey arms Ukraine while helping Russia evade sanctions.
NATO defines its purpose “to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means” and says it “promotes democratic values.” Turkey today makes a mockery of such values: Freedom House ranks Turkey as NATO’s most undemocratic member.
For too long, NATO leaders and their Western counterparts have been in denial about Turkey. Some explain Turkey is simply too important, especially as it has the second largest military in NATO. This metric is deceptive, though. It is not the size of the army that matters, but rather the political willingness to use it.
The idea that the problem will resolve itself if Erdoğan leaves office or dies is fantasy given how he has shaped the education of 32 million Turks and how he molded the military into his own image during his 21-year dictatorship. The same is true with Turkey’s media and bureaucracy.
NATO’s value to Erdoğan, however, is that he can be a Trojan horse and block consensus on every decision until NATO members meet his price.
Turkey today is a liability. There is no mechanism within NATO to expel a wayward member. In the past, countries withdrew voluntarily. In 1966, for example, France left NATO’s integrated military command after a series of internal disputes, although Charles De Gaulle simultaneously reaffirmed France’s commitment to the alliance’s collective defense. Eight years later, Greece withdrew from NATO command after Turkey invaded Cyprus. Both countries ultimately rejoined.
NATO’s value to Erdoğan, however, is that he can be a Trojan horse and block consensus on every decision until NATO members meet his price. For Sweden, this means repressing free speech or extraditing dissidents. For the United States, this could mean giving Turkey F-16s.
If NATO cannot force Turkey out, could it compel it to leave? Yes.
Defense historian Kori Schake notes an example from the second Berlin Crisis in 1958. As the Soviet Union again challenged the status of West Berlin, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France implemented “Live Oak.” The idea was to involve in planning cells those NATO members most likely to fight, effectively creating a fait accompli for other NATO members. Such a concept today would mean privileging reliable NATO members over potential filibustering from Turkey.
John Maurer, professor of strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, speculates that NATO reformers could interpret France’s voluntary separation from NATO command in 1966 as indicating that being party to the NATO Treaty does not necessarily guarantee participation in all NATO structures, especially at the military level.
Rather than embrace wishful thinking and recognizing the impossibility of giving Turkey the boot, it is time to quarantine NATO’s Trojan horse.
NATO could also move its Land Command (LANDCOM) out of Izmir. Should Turkey veto transfer through its presence within the North Atlantic Council, NATO could respond by setting up a parallel command and then slowly letting LANDCOM whither. Either way, NATO might signal its displeasure with Erdoğan’s antics by assigning the new or relocated structure to Alexandroupoli or Stockholm.
NATO might make Turkey’s presence in NATO uncomfortable in other ways. NATO members could informally lock Turks out of certain organizations by refusing Turks appointments. Here, there is also precedent, as Turkey regularly uses its veto to forbid speakers critical of Erdoğan from attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Likewise, just as “Five Eyes” formalizes intelligence sharing among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, a “NATO Minus One” code might prevent regular intelligence sharing with Turkish officials. Such a move is prudent given both Turkey’s willingness to target dissidents across Europe and its support for the Islamic State.
Effective defense requires an appreciation of reality. Turkey no longer provides NATO the foundation or value it once did. Denial about Erdoğan’s ideology or his impact on the Turkish military can be deadly. Rather than embrace wishful thinking and recognizing the impossibility of giving Turkey the boot, it is time to quarantine NATO’s Trojan horse.
