Uzi Rubin, senior researcher at both the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), spoke to a March 11 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
The Islamic regime advances its goal of bringing the Middle East under its sphere of influence through it missile force. “The Iranians managed to build themselves into a world-class, world-level missile country from zero capability during the [time of the Shah]” to full capability today. It circumvented international sanctions and Western trade restrictions to build its power.
Two of the regime’s military forces work in parallel to this end: the “legacy” Iranian Armed Forces (Artesh); and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), set up by the ayatollahs and known to Iranians colloquially as the Sepah (Corps). Both have navies, air, and ground forces. However, the IRGC’s responsibilities include the ideological Basij militias, internal and border security, the ballistic missile force, missile research and development, the space program, cyber security, and “exporting the revolution.”
The regime’s Supreme Leader prioritized precision missile power after Saddam Hussein’s missile offensive in the Iran-Iraq War convinced the mullahs that conventional missiles can determine a war’s outcome. By investing in training human resources and pursuing military technology rather than the more costly procurement of combat aircraft, the regime leverages the “industrial-military complex” to conserve capital.
The regime claims it has two self-imposed limitations: its missiles are non-nuclear, and their range does not exceed 2000 kilometers (1,243 miles). The range limitation communicates a political statement to the U.S. and to Iran’s oil customers in Central and Western Europe that they are not the targets. On the other hand, the regime’s avowed enemies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, are within this 2000-kilometer range.
Furthering the regime’s missile capabilities are a quarter million annual graduates of the dozen or so Iranian technological universities. These freshly-minted engineers and technicians “enrich the human resources pool” of an Iranian population close to 100 million. Approximately a quarter of the students study abroad, many in the U.S., with more than 60 percent enrolled in technology and computer science programs. Most return to Iran.
The regime tasks the IRGC’s Quds Force with “support [for] the revolution by missiles.” The brigade is under the command of Ismail Ghaani, the brigadier general who replaced Qassem Soleimani after a U.S. air strike killed him in 2020. With an operational budget of approximately $2.5 billion, Ghaani also has a 24/7 direct line to the Supreme Leader. Iran bases its massive stockpile, launchable via integrated firing chambers, in a huge tunnel system of “underground missile cities.” Tehran recently unveiled its locally-produced anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile system. Parades showcasing missiles project power to the populace and intimidate Iran’s adversaries and enemies.
The cost of transferring missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the regime’s Middle East proxies is in addition to Ghaani’s generous budget. In Syria, proxies include Assad’s Syrian Armed Forces, Syrian militias, and pro-Iran Syrian militias; in Lebanon, Hezbollah; in Gaza, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad; in Iraq, pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias; and in Yemen, the Ansar Allah, a.k.a. Houthis.
Iran intends to surround Israel with a “ring of fire” that also threatens Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. To counter this, Israel must “develop more resources from our offensive capability to defensive capability against” Iranian missiles. Overall, the regime’s strategy allows Tehran to order attacks by its proxies while maintaining plausible deniability.
Furthering the regime’s missile capabilities are a quarter million annual graduates of the dozen or so Iranian technological universities.
Iran’s two-phased method for transferring weaponry requires that it first smuggle all the “rockets, missiles and UAVs” to any new proxy waiting to be activated. This method is not foolproof, since shipments can be interdicted. Phase two involves smuggling the machinery and “customized” missile design to a proxy. Proxies send their members to Iran to be trained to assist the “proxy’s own military industry,” achieved by the production of ordnance and UAVs via “local cells.”
For systems too complex to manufacture locally, Tehran “transfer[s] a complete system” as part of its “Chameleon Scheme.” Thus, in order “to hide the Iranian origin,” Tehran changes the color and name of the same missile, long-range rocket, or UAV exported from Iran to each separate proxy. The Chameleon system works with the ballistic missiles and UAVs the regime supplies to Yemen that the Houthis use to attack Saudi Arabia and Israel. Despite Iran’s denial, the U.S. government confirmed that Iran provides precision “suicide” UAVs used by Russia to attack Ukraine.
Iran’s space program – Tehran’s “unsung hero” overlooked by the media – has two parallel programs. The first, the Iranian space agency, or the “Iranian NASA,” while purportedly a civilian program, is run by a government agency. The second, the IRGC’s military Aerospace Forces, uses several types of “space launchers.” In 2009, Iran succeeded in orbiting its first satellite.
In January 2024, the IRGC launched its latest satellite using the solid-fueled Qaem 100 space launcher. Designed to instantly launch “from some hideout” similar to ballistic missile launches, the satellite launched by the Qaem 100 can be replaced with a warhead, increasing its range to 4,000 kilometers (about 2,500 miles). Should Moscow win the war against Ukraine, the “UAVs and missile that Iran supplied to Russia” will be located “on the border of Poland and Romania.”
Should Moscow win the war against Ukraine, the “UAVs and missile that Iran supplied to Russia” will be located “on the border of Poland and Romania.”
Regarding its potential to threaten the U.S. with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Iran is careful to say it is not developing ICBMs, which require a range of more than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles) and are designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. However, North Korea is a “precedent.” Although Pyongyang did not have long-range rockets, once its regime obtained the technology, it developed the capability to become a “direct threat” to the U.S.
In 2014, Majid Mousavi, then-deputy commander of the IRGC’s National Guard and Space Force, revealed that the missile program’s “real purpose” was to gain technological advances and “circumvent the self-limitation [of] 2,000 kilometers [footnote 363].” This “is the seed” of long-range missile/ICBM capability. The Iranian regime has achieved that goal with its North Korean-supplied missile, the Khoramshahr, which is highly precise. Trading weight for range, Tehran can “lighten the warhead” to reach 4,000 kilometers. Iran’s status of missile power has become “irrevocable.” For now, Iran does not pose a direct threat to the U.S., but in the future, the Iranian regime “is building the capability to become a threat if and when they want to.”
