Sharp differences within Israel’s governing coalition have emerged into the open in recent days. On the face of it, the dispute centres on preferred post-war arrangements in Gaza. But the rival stances also reflect underlying, contrasting views concerning the conduct and aims of Israel’s now eight-month long military campaign in the Gaza Strip.
For his part, the prime minister and his supporters dismiss the notion of establishing any post-war arrangement until Hamas’s military capacity is destroyed.
The divisions have begun to receive attention in recent days because of Defence Minister Yoav Gallant’s public statement criticising the government for ‘indecision’ regarding the ‘day after’ in Gaza. But the dispute is not new. Gallant has for months been advocating in cabinet for a plan his ministry has developed, concerning how Gaza will be governed after the war. Details of this plan were published in March. It envisages the establishment of a self-governing authority in Gaza, assembled with the involvement of five to seven thousand Gazans loyal to the Ramallah Palestinian Authority. Israel would maintain freedom of action in the area of security, as it does in the West Bank. The list of Gazans to be involved in the plan was assembled with the assistance of Majed Faraj, the PA’s intelligence chief. The plan was envisaged to be implemented in stages. Israel would establish safe zones in areas of Gaza that it conquered. The new authority would then begin to operate in these areas, which would gradually be expanded.
Israeli media reported in March that Netanyahu rejected this plan. For his part, the prime minister and his supporters dismiss the notion of establishing any post-war arrangement until Hamas’s military capacity is destroyed. National Security Adviser Tsachi Hanegbi, in a recent interview with Israel’s Channel 12 news, noted that the allies did not set up a post-war government in Germany in World War 2 until the Nazi regime’s army had been defeated in its entirety.
Gallant, in his public statement, expressed concern that the current ‘indecision’ was leading to a ‘dangerous’ course that could result in ‘Israeli military and civilian governance in Gaza.’ Netanyahu, in response, declared that he would not allow a role for the Palestinian Authority in a post Hamas Gaza. He would not, he said, replace ‘Hamastan’ with ‘Fatahstan.’ (Fatah is the ruling party in the Palestinian Authority).
An interesting point to note in this exchange is that both Gallant and Netanyahu appear to be attacking straw men.
Netanyahu accuses Gallant of seeking to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. But the Defence Minister’s plan appears designed precisely to avoid any direct governing role for the Ramallah authority.
Gallant, meanwhile, accuses Netanyahu of seeking to establish a new Israeli military administration in Gaza. The defence minister finds the notion of Israeli military governance in Gaza to be ‘dangerous.’ But it is difficult to see how his own plan could be implemented without at least a preliminary period in which Israeli forces become the de facto governing force in the Strip.
Netanyahu declared that he would not allow a role for the Palestinian Authority in a post Hamas Gaza. He would not, he said, replace ‘Hamastan’ with ‘Fatahstan.’
More importantly, the reality on the ground in Gaza belies any suggestion of an emergent renewed military administration. Indeed, the current chaotic situation, in which the Hamas authority re-emerges as soon as the IDF departs any part of the Strip, is possible precisely because military control and governance has not been established. Israel’s 98th Airborne Division is currently engaged in fierce clashes in the Jabalya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces engaged in this area in late 2023, but did not seek to occupy it. As a result, Hamas re-entered the area. Israel is now fighting for it again.
There are elements within Israel’s governing coalition, certainly, which do seek the re-establishment of Israeli military rule in Gaza. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich of the Religious Zionism faction both openly advocate this outcome. They also want the re-commencement of Jewish settlement in the Strip. Netanyahu needs their support for his own political survival. He is therefore unlikely to publicly reject their preferred direction. But events on the ground do not suggest that he is seeking to implement it.
So if Netanyahu rejects any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, but also does not appear to be implementing a full Israeli military re-occupation of the Strip, what in fact is his preferred strategy?
So if Netanyahu rejects any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, but also does not appear to be implementing a full Israeli military re-occupation of the Strip, what in fact is his preferred strategy?
His stated goal, of course, is ‘total victory’ over Hamas. In reality, though, what appears to be emerging is a situation in which a truncated, half broken but still viciously repressive Hamas continues to be the de facto governing authority in Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, maintains freedom of operation throughout the Strip, striking Hamas and its leaders at will, with the involvement of only a limited number of forces. At the same time, an IDF zone of control along the Gaza border (on the Gazan side) prevents further October 7 style attacks on Israeli border communities.
Unless a clear decision is made in another direction, this looks to be the emergent reality for Gaza. If Netanyahu stated that he seeks the entry of the PA into Gaza, his coalition would be likely to collapse. If he expressed his support for military reoccupation of the Strip, the response of the US Administration would be immediate and harsh. Expressing support for neither enables the Israeli prime minister to get back to being the tactician and conflict manager that he likes to be and that he has always been (at least outside of his books and his speeches). He can’t openly commit to this policy either, however, because it constitutes much less than an Israeli ‘total victory’ over the Gaza Islamists. In fact, what this direction involves is something like the status quo ante bellum, with a much weakened but not destroyed Hamas. It is a return to what Israelis used to call ‘mowing the grass.’ Whether this is a wise route to take is an entirely different discussion. But away from the public declarations and the straw man arguments, this is where Israel appears to be headed.
