The exchange of fire last week in eastern Syria between Iran-supported militias and U.S. forces cast a light on a process usually shrouded in darkness. It should serve as a reminder that, far from the world’s attention, Iran’s slow buildup of power in Syria continues.
The March 23 Iranian drone strike, claimed by a Tehran-linked militia, Liwa al-Ghalibun, on the al-Omar oil field (which has an American facility on it), wasn’t a random attack. It was the latest move in a process of escalation that has become more apparent in recent weeks.
Insofar as Syria receives world attention these days, it is usually in reports detailing the slow return of the Assad regime to international legitimacy. Egypt, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates have all re-established relations with Syria, and Saudi Arabia looks set to do the same. Yet the Assad regime’s attempts to project an image of postwar normality are belied by the situation on the ground.
After 11 years of civil war, Bashar al-Assad controls only around 60% of the country. The Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces hold the area east of the Euphrates, comprising around 30% of Syria. The clashes last week took place along the tense fault line between the SDF and the regime forces, which runs largely along the river’s path. The Turks, along with their proxy Syrian National Army and other Sunni jihadist forces, hold the remaining 10% of territory, in Syria’s far northwest.
Crucially, authority in Syria isn’t neatly divided among these three entities. The regime area, even as Mr. Assad flies to Arab capitals presenting himself as the country’s ruler, is penetrated by an independent Iranian power structure that operates outside the regime’s authority.
This structure maintains its own bases, weaponry and areas of control into which Mr. Assad’s forces cannot enter without its approval. The border crossing between al-Qaim, Iraq, and Abu Kamal, Syria, is under its exclusive sway. The Imam Ali base close to the crossing is the largest of many facilities under exclusive Iranian maintenance in this area. The road system, from Al Bukamal to the town of Mayadin and then westward toward the borders with Israel and Lebanon, is similarly controlled by this structure. It was this independent Iranian power structure that attacked the U.S. facility at the Al-Omar oil field last week.
Israel seeks to disrupt this structure, in its war between wars. A former Israeli national-security adviser, Yaakov Amidror, told me that Israel has destroyed up to 80% of Iran’s military and weapons capacity in Syria. But despite Israel’s successes, the Iranian project continues to entrench itself.
The Iranian method, followed also in Lebanon and Iraq, is to insert a kind of deep state, controlled from Tehran, within the official structures of the targeted state. At a certain point, it becomes difficult to locate exactly where the Iranian project begins and the official state ends.
An example of how pervasive this process has become may be found in the identities of some of the men killed in the U.S. retaliatory bombing of recent days. The Iraqi-British researcher Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi examined the biographies of two of the men killed by the American counterstrike last week. Radwan Asi and Iyad Khasaki were both Syrians, and both had joined Iranian-associated militias as part of their compulsory military reserve service as required by Syrian law. But were these men serving the Syrian regime or the Iranian project in Syria at the time of their deaths? The impossibility of answering this question reveals the essential nature of Iran’s project: establishing a structure operating deep within the Syrian state but always under the control of Iran.
This project broke cover for a moment last week, apparently to seek revenge for the targeting of a revolutionary guard facility in Deir ez-Zur city, in eastern Syria. Mostly, however, Iran prefers to work in silence. Iran’s method of hollowing out Arab countries and inserting an Iran-controlled deep state is perhaps the central tool in Tehran’s bid for regional hegemony.
The unusual decision to strike at the U.S. presence at the Al-Omar oil field appears to reflect a growing confidence for Iran. The return of fire from America probably concludes this round. But the next round may be along soon.
