Israel’s strike on the Houthi-controlled Yemeni port of Hodeidah on July 20 appears to have had the desired effect, at least for now.
According to the Houthis, the attack struck an electricity generation station, an oil refinery, and fuel storage depots at the port. Israel, in its laconic statement taking responsibility for the operation, noted that “fighter jets struck targets of the Houthi terror regime.”
The Israeli operation came in response to a Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv a day earlier, killing one Israeli. Over 200 rockets and drones have been fired by the Houthis at Israel since October 2023.
The Houthis launched a missile at Israel on July 21, which was intercepted. Since then, however, Houthi attacks on Israel have tailed off. The lull will not necessarily last, but even a temporary decline would appear to vindicate the notion that the only way to cause the Houthis to desist from their activities is to set a price for them beyond a level that the organization is willing or able to pay.
Deterrence is not an exact science. But the Hodeidah bombing appears verifiably to at least have had a temporary effect of causing the Houthis to think again when contemplating attacks on Israel.
Deterrence is not an exact science. But the Hodeidah bombing appears verifiably to at least have had a temporary effect of causing the Houthis to think again when contemplating attacks on Israel.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE same cannot be said for the broader Western effort to cause the Houthis to desist from their campaign against shipping on the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea route to the Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea.
Here, indeed, the opposite dynamic appears to be currently prevailing. The limited, defensive effort to try to intercept Houthi attacks, along with occasional counter-strikes, has signally failed to stop the Houthi’s campaign.
Rather, over the summer months, the Houthis’s efforts have increased in their intensity. In the latest development, the Yemeni Shi’ite Islamist group attacked a Greek-flagged tanker, the Sounion, carrying 150,000 tons of Iraqi crude oil, on August 23. The tanker’s 25-man Russian and Filipino crew was rescued by a French destroyer acting within the framework of the EU’s Operation Aspides. The deserted tanker is now ablaze in the Red Sea.
In video material released by the organization, Houthi fighters can be seen boarding the vessel and rigging it with explosives. Environmental disaster would be the result of a large-scale spillage of the Sounion‘s cargo into the Red Sea.
The attack on the Sounion is just the latest in a series of similar attacks to have taken place since June. As a result of the Houthis’s campaign, shipping transiting the Suez Canal is down by 50%, the port of Eilat has been almost shuttered, and the cost for a shipping container has increased from $1,500 at the start of the current crisis to around $5,000 now. Ships are diverting around the Cape, adding 10 days to journey times.
A US-led naval operation dubbed Operation Prosperity Guardian got underway in December, in an attempt to protect shipping and bring an end to the attacks. From January, the US and British navies commenced Operation Poseidon Archer, which involved selected counter-strikes against Houthi targets.
It hasn’t worked. The attacks have increased in intensity. An article in The Daily Telegraph this week titled (hopefully prematurely) “The Houthis have defeated the US Navy” noted that the global shipping industry appeared to have accepted the blocked Gulf of Aden/Red Sea route as a “new normal,” with companies enjoying the profits made possible by increased charges.
In the case of European navies, a lack of capacity makes an inadequate response more or less inevitable. In the US case, however, the failure to cause the Houthis to cease their campaign against shipping is a result of conscious decision-making. US Central Command issues near-daily lists of Houthi drones and missiles successfully intercepted. But the undoubted tactical prowess on display is not bringing about the desired result.
Alessio Patalano, a naval expert quoted by Foreign Policy in a recent article on the Houthis’s campaign, noted that “This isn’t a failure of maritime security or sea power or naval power. The (aircraft carrier) Eisenhower and its strike group escorts have performed brilliantly.
What else can be done to deter the Houthis?
“This is about a disconnect between the policy and how you use that naval power... If we are trying to secure freedom of navigation, we are not achieving it... After months of doing that, if the Houthis haven’t changed their behavior and their stockpiles are still there and they’re mobile and they have support from Iran, it is time to ask, ‘Should we really be doing this?’”
Patalano’s comments sum up the situation succinctly. But two questions arise from his remarks. Firstly, why is the US persisting in its current stance vis-a-vis the Houthis; secondly, what is the alternative?
Regarding the first issue, it is fairly clear that Washington is determined to avoid any further deterioration of the Mideast situation in the run-up to the US presidential elections in November. The Houthis’s maritime campaign receives only sporadic media attention.
The current naval effort has so far proven able to prevent loss of life. The shipping industry, for now at least, is adapting to the new situation. For all these reasons, there appears to be no special sense of urgency to reverse the current reality in which an Iran-supported militia has effectively laid siege to and closed a vital global maritime route.
In the absence of any will in this direction, the Houthis’s and Iran’s domination of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea area, which is what the current status quo implies, looks set to continue.
THIS PREFERENCE for limited action derives from a broad perception of the region that does not see Israel’s fight against Iran and its proxies as part of a larger global struggle between the West and its adversaries. Rather, there is an absence of an overriding strategic view, along with a general desire for quiet.
From this point of view, what matters is to prevent any possibility of intensified conflict. The strategic implications of allowing an irregular military group to exercise a kind of veto power over a key shipping lane, in a way without parallel in recent history, are evidently not of primary importance.
Regarding what could be done, should this or a future US administration decide that the current status quo is not acceptable, the available option is fairly clear: Increase the scale, range, and severity of counter-strikes on both the Houthis and their Iranian backers until their attacks cease.
Israel’s Hodeidah raid shows the way in this regard. But it is worth remembering that the Houthis’s efforts are made possible because of Iranian support and armament. Any real effort to push back against them would require an acknowledgment of this reality and a willingness to act accordingly.
In the absence of any will in this direction, the Houthis’s and Iran’s domination of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea area, which is what the current status quo implies, looks set to continue.
