The tense wait in Israel since the assassination of senior Hezbollah leader Fouad Shukr in Beirut’s Dahiya, and the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, continues for two reasons. First, as Nasrallah said, the very tension and anticipation of a blow are part of the punishment for Israeli society. Second, since Haniyeh’s assassination, an internal struggle has been waged in Tehran over the heart, mind, and image of the “Rahbar,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Until a few days ago, even on August 7, there was complete unanimity among the Iranian leadership and media. Even the new president, defined as a “pragmatic” or “reformist,” Masoud Pezeshkian, adamantly rejected French President Emmanuel Macron’s appeal for Iran to show “restraint.” Still, he also said that a regional war would be prevented if Israel stopped the war in Gaza. In other words, a ceasefire in Gaza could prevent or at least limit an Iranian response, but without that a major assault will come.
The Iranian leadership knows that what Israel has done to the Houthi oil harbor and reserves in Hodeidah it can do on a tenfold larger scale to Iranian oil facilities.
Suddenly, on August 9, leaks began that Pezeshkian, the new president, had made an astonishing appeal to Khamenei to reconsider the attack on Israel. According to the report, Pezeshkian fears an Israeli response that could “collapse the Iranian economy.” As an alternative he proposed attacking secret Israeli installations in Iraqi Kurdistan or Azerbaijan. If the leak is true, the president is probably concerned about a serious Israeli blow to Iran’s oil industry. The Iranian leadership knows that what Israel has done to the Houthi oil harbor and reserves in Hodeidah it can do on a tenfold larger scale to Iranian oil facilities. Almost the entire Iranian budget, the luxuries for the rulers, military spending, imports, arms aid, and money to the allies, is all fueled by the sale of oil and gas. If it burns, Iran and its partners will sink into a deep pit.
How dare a president that was elected by the grace of the Supreme Leader who is not considered a revolutionary leak a revolutionary opinion such as not attacking Israel? This is enormous chutzpah, which can even be considered an affront to national honor. The most likely explanation is that in their August 8 meeting, Khamenei himself instructed the president to leak that he, the president, had asked for a recalculation of the route. By Sunday, August 11, many senior officials had called for revenge and reported that Khamenei had ordered it, but he himself had not yet said so in his own voice. He seems to be undecided. The main reason seems to be that Iranian intelligence reported that the U.S. Navy was gathering on the Iranian and Lebanese shores and that Israel was planning a painful response. Although Sergei Shoigu, head of Russia’s National Security Council, made an urgent visit to Tehran on the 5th, and there are reports of the shipment of new Russian anti-aircraft technology to Iran, there is also international political pressure to avoid escalation. Even Russia and Turkey are pressing to refrain from taking action that would ignite an all-out war.
If Khamenei decides not to respond, the official media will report that he did so in response to a request from the president and others. Indeed, the impression is that most of the Iranian public does not want war to avenge a Palestinian.
There is no certainty that Khamenei wanted the direct attack on Israel last April. The Supreme Leader is cautious and calculating; he is like cold fire. The American intention to help Israel defend itself (and perhaps more, if the crisis escalates) was well known to him. He may have been pushed into the direct attack then because he could not appear to be a defeatist. The former extremist president, Raisi, and his allies, the Revolutionary Guards and the Steadfast Front Party, Jabha Paydari, which is the largest and most extreme party in parliament, were pushing for war. Had it not been for the helicopter crash in which Raisi and his extremist foreign minister died, Khamenei might have been pushed immediately for a direct attack on Israel even now. But at least this time he has a pragmatic president and an acting foreign minister who is both a close associate and a relative. There are no moderates in the Iranian leadership, but there are pragmatists, extremists, and ultra-extremists. Khamenei himself is radical enough, but his fear of the former president and his alliance with the ultra-extremists was known in Iran. Therefore, to this day, many Iranians believe that the helicopter accident that killed former President Raisi was not an accident at all.
What, then, is happening in Tehran right now? Today, the ayatollahs’ regime has no interest in a major confrontation with Israel and the United States. The disagreement is over the question of whether to respond now, and if so, with what intensity. Most of the voices heard from official Tehran at the moment demand direct, significant, and immediate revenge. The pragmatic side is mainly represented by President Pezeshkian. The Supreme Leader supported his election, albeit without enthusiasm, because he needed him. After attacking Israel in April and encountering an American coalition, Khamenei realized that in the next crisis, if he decided not to respond directly against Israel, he would need an alibi. Pezeshkian was elected to improve the economy, but no less so to sit on the fence for the Supreme Leader in a moment of crisis. If Khamenei decides not to respond, the official media will report that he did so in response to a request from the president and others. Indeed, the impression is that most of the Iranian public does not want war to avenge a Palestinian. All claims of abandonment of sovereignty and national honor will be directed at President Pezeshkian, and Khamenei will hover over the criticism. The ultra-extremists, for their part, could justify that they demanded a direct, harsh and immediate response against Israel, regardless of the consequences, but were forced to give up because the constitution states that the supreme leader is the final arbiter. If he decides to attack Israel, Khamenei will be able to say that he listened to both sides, weighed their arguments, and concluded that Iran’s national interest necessitated a forceful response. At the time of writing, Khamenei has not yet decided, but even if he decides to postpone the Iranian response, Iran has not given up on revenge.
