The Perception of Israeli Society as Sensitive to Casualties and Its Impact on the IDF’s Ability to Win

This paper focuses on the Israeli political and military leadership’s perception of Israeli society’s sensitivity to casualties and the influence of this perception on the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) way of war in recent decades — characterized by limited time frame, excessive caution, and avoidance of maneuver. These characteristics have made the decisiveness dimension, which traditionally constitutes one of the three foundations of the Israeli security concept, irrelevant. Since Israel’s early days, the necessity to minimize casualties has shaped decision-making in military affairs and foreign policy toward strategic threats. However, this consideration has served in recent decades to restrict Israel’s freedom of action during combat. Many shifts, external and internal, which occurred in the mid-1980s, made a decisive contribution to the increasing rooting of the perception that societal willingness to sacrifice is decreasing.

But is this the case? Perceptions of great societal sensitivity to casualties are undoubtedly widespread, but do these perceptions reflect an actual broadly-based societal reality, or are they, in fact, in the main elite misperceptions? This is the central issue this essay addresses. My main hypothesis is that the public’s fear of casualties is undoubtedly present, but civilian and military leaders have tended to overestimate the public’s unwillingness to sacrifice. When the public was convinced of the justification for and necessity of war, its willingness to make sacrifices increased. Thus, contrary to the received wisdom, societal sensitivity to casualties is less of a consistent, objective constraint than decision-makers in Israel have perceived it to be.

Understanding this misperception regarding Israeli societal sensitivity to casualties is of considerable practical importance. Often, the elites’ overestimation of societal sensitivity to casualties has adversely affected policy outcomes because unwillingness to pay the human price of war leads decision-makers to avoid war at almost any cost and to prefer minimizing losses over strategic effectiveness. This, in turn, conveys a message of weakness to Israel’s rivals, harming Israel’s deterrence power and, paradoxically, making endless conflicts and hostilities inevitable. The “Swords of Iron” war, following the murderous terror attack that Hamas executed on October 7, which is still ongoing, and its terrible human price so far, is demonstrating the failure of long-standing conceptions: first, that the Israeli society is not willing to pay the human price of war, and second — which results from the first — that it is possible to deter an aggressor without a demonstrated willingness to put “boots on the ground” at his territory.

Since the 1970s, researchers have documented a sharp decline in the legitimacy of using force in democratic societies. The prevailing argument is that demographic, economic, and cultural changes have increased the reluctance to use force and the sensitivity of democratic institutions to casualties. This societal sensitivity has significantly limited the state’s freedom of action in deploying its armed forces during combat. Also, in the Israeli context, postmodern transformations, which peaked during the 1980s, contributed to the deepening perception that Israeli society is not as willing to sacrifice as it used to be.

But is this the case? Widespread perceptions of great societal sensitivity to casualties exist, but do these perceptions reflect a genuine broadly-based societal reality, or are they, in fact, in the main elite misperceptions? This is the central issue that this research addresses. Studies examining the American case found that both civilian and military leaders tend to exaggerate the public’s unwillingness to sacrifice. Under certain circumstances, it appears that the public may be more willing to sacrifice than the decision-makers. This review examines whether there is a similar distortion of perception regarding society’s sensitivity to casualties among decision-makers in Israel. Below, I will present an overview of the leading military conflicts involving Israel since the 1980s, beginning with the First Lebanon War and ending with the ongoing “Swords of Iron” war. The main conclusion that emerges from this review is that although the Israeli public consistently shows a firm stance and a prolonged willingness to bear the burden of combat — when they see it as justified — decision-makers believe that casualties among IDF combatants will result in demoralization among the public. In doing so, they give disproportionate weight to the so-called sensitivity of Israeli society to losses and limit the IDF’s freedom of action in times of war, which results in limited achievements that are responsible for creating demoralization among the public.

The status of the IDF first began to show cracks in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which led the public to examine the IDF’s conduct in a critical light. The First Lebanon War (1982), the Intifada (1987), and multiple operational and training accidents resulting in fatalities during the 1990s all further reduced public trust in the IDF. However, the main reason for the change in the IDF’s status among the public has been the strengthening of individualism at the expense of collectivist ideology, beginning in the 1980s, as part of the decline of the socialist ethos of the state’s early years. This has been reflected, to some extent, in public demands to cut the defense budget and tighten the supervision of military spending. Additionally, the Israeli press developed a more critical approach toward the IDF, while military censorship weakened, and bereaved parents began to question the circumstances of their sons’ deaths vociferously.

As a continuation of this, in the 1990s, the rift between the Israeli society and the IDF deepened, among other things, due to accelerated demographic changes, geopolitical changes in the Middle East, and the weakening of the existential threats to the State of Israel. The weighty economic changes in the world did not escape Israel. They affected the deterioration of the “nation-in-uniform” concept as a mobilization model and the legitimization of war. Professor Stuart A. Cohen points to two critical manifestations of this: the decline in the status of military service as an expression of civilian fulfillment and the disintegration of the limitations that in the past gave the IDF immunity from public criticism. Other manifestations were constant cuts in the defense budget, an increasingly critical attitude towards the military in the press and weakening military censorship. The army’s autonomy level shrank as the state comptroller, the legal system, soldiers’ parents, and other civilian bodies increased their oversight.

In the summer of 2021, the government’s announcement of a significant increase in pensions for officers and other professional soldiers of the IDF (popularly called the “chief of staff increases”) provoked widespread public criticism. The IDF’s justification for this move — to address the problem of retaining those trained in the IDF who were leaving for the private sector — did not register with the public. Instead, media articles noted that with the amount allocated to enlarging military pensions, the IDF could have doubled the salaries of its conscripts and increased motivation for recruitment.

Six months later, the IDF raised the salaries of conscripts by 50%. Still, the damage was done, leaving the public with the impression that the IDF was not sufficiently concerned about ordinary soldiers and their parents, who must provide their children with supplementary funding.

Other explanations for the erosion of public trust include a series of accidents and suicides involving soldiers over the past two years. In one case, a recruit committed suicide after the military police pressured him to serve as an informant. In another, commanders went unpunished for the killing of a soldier under their command by a terrorist at point-blank range along the Gaza border, despite the IDF’s investigation concluding that the commanders had been negligent. In both cases, harsh criticism from the bereaved parents received extensive media coverage. This criticism peaked in the fall of 2021 with the “Mothers March,” a new protest movement founded by combatants’ mothers, bereaved families, and disabled soldiers.

Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s announcement last January about his plan for extensive judicial reform led to many protests and deepened divisions in Israeli society. Disagreement also seeped into the ranks of the IDF. Last summer, reports multiplied that more and more reservists refused to continue volunteering for service unless the government halted the legislation. Besides the reservists, the crisis also threatened to influence conscripts and long-service members of the standing army. At the end of July, IDF Chief of Staff Hertz Halevi forwarded a document to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he warned of the possibility of a loss of cohesion in the IDF and a decline in the willingness of individuals to be recruited to the IDF. It is too early to assess the impact of this crisis, still in progress, on the IDF’s operational capability.

As a result of the above-described changes in the IDF’s status in Israeli society, it appears that in recent decades, Israeli decision-makers assumed that the public is not as willing to sacrifice as it once was. The following sections demonstrate that despite the growing criticism by various sectors towards the IDF, when threat perception rises sharply, the “rally around the flag” effect takes place, and the Israeli public shows high levels of resilience and willingness for sacrifice.

During the First Lebanon War, signs emerged that the legitimacy of using force was decreasing in Israeli society and among its leaders. The debate following Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s admission that the conflict was a “war of choice” raised questions about the circumstances justifying the proactive use of force. The lessons of the Lebanon War taught the IDF that the public would recognize the military intervention in Lebanon as legitimate, if framed as a war of choice, only if its human cost was low. Also, the harsh public criticism that the IDF had not acted to stop the massacre in the Sabara and Shatila refugee camps during the war led to the end of active IDF combat operations in the framework of the “Peace for Galilee” operation. It made it clear that Israeli public opinion would not be willing to accept unnecessary casualties — neither among IDF combatants nor among civilians.

Following the IDF’s deployment to the security zone in 1985, Israel’s policy became based on deterring Hezbollah and striving for cooperation with the region’s population. [1] The IDF’s way of war in the security zone became mainly defensive: Hezbollah established a chain of outposts along the “red line” (the northern line of the security zone), most of which were captured by the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and a minority by the IDF. This deployment, characterized mainly by its defensive nature, was intended to serve the highest purpose of the security zone — preventing damage to the northern settlements. Also, this deployment reflected Israeli military doctrine at that time, which preferred preventive action over offensive action because the latter potentially could escalate the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. [2] Additionally, Israel deployed special forces deep in Lebanon. However, starting in the late 1980s, the IDF began to reduce the use of special forces in Lebanon if air power could carry out the mission. The Air Force’s offensive activity doubled in those years. This was also due to the need to reduce casualties and reflected the Air Force’s growing ability to accurately hit terrorist targets in areas considered too risky for ground forces.

According to Moshe Tamir, who founded the “Egoz” unit and led it during the fighting in the security zone, “During the war in Lebanon, although the words were never explicitly said, the understanding slowly permeated among all levels of command that nothing is more important than the avoiding casualties. Public pressure against staying in Lebanon affected the IDF and penetrated the lowest ranks.” [3] Then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin even ordered IDF commanders in the North to reduce their activities, even at the expense of achieving military goals, to avoid casualties. [4] The IDF also strove to reduce its casualties in the security zone in various ways, such as reducing the number of troops in the security zone and limiting ground movement. This preference responded to public demands to avoid the risks inherent in more direct action by the ground forces. [5] During the early 1990s, inspired by the successful air campaign the United States conducted in Iraq during the first Gulf War, the Israeli military doctrine gave emphasis “on fire and not on maneuver, on neutralizing the enemy and not on defeating him through the occupation of territory.” [6] The new way of war, using counterfire as the primary and central activity, was implemented in 1993 during Operation “Accountability.” Also, in April 1996, during the “Grapes of Wrath” operation, the IDF conducted its main effort via the Air Force and the Artillery Corps. This operation exposed the limitations of using counterfire: Even though Hezbollah suffered heavy damage, at no point during the operation was Israel able to dilute the rate of Hezbollah fire toward the North of Israel.

Starting in the mid-1990s, following a sharp increase in IDF casualties in the security zone, public pressure on the government and the IDF to leave Lebanon increased, coming mainly from the “Four Mothers” movement. [7] Its protests bore fruit with the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon in May 2000 when decision-makers could not justify publicly the sacrifice of life that staying in the security zone demanded. [8] The final stage of the withdrawal appeared to be a panicked escape out of a desire to withdraw without casualties. The IDF carried it out without losses but it led to severe public criticism in Israel, as reflected by the Israeli media. Hezbollah and the Palestinians perceived the withdrawal as a clear sign of Israeli society’s weakness and inability to withstand a prolonged struggle and absorb casualties. Hassan Nasrallah, the organization’s leader, expressed this sentiment in his “Spider’s Web” speech in May 2000. [9]

The “Peace for Galilee” War (1982) was the first time an Israeli leader openly demanded that the public recognize the need to use the IDF to prevent a non-existential threat. [10] This approach gave rise to a bitter internal debate about the war and its goals and revealed, for the first time in Israel, an erosion of the national consensus regarding going to war. [11] Therefore, this war was the first of Israel’s wars in which protest movements and actions broke out not after its end but during its occurrence. The scope of the public protest became apparent during the demonstration at Kings of Israel Square in September 1982, which the “Peace Now” movement led. Approximately 400,000 people protested, expressing their shock following the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Parallel to that, more radical groups arose, the most prominent among them being the “Yesh Gvul” movement, which encouraged its members not to serve in Lebanon. Another protest group that operated at that time was “Parents Against Silence,” which included soldiers and bereaved parents. This group protested in front of Prime Minister Begin’s house with signs bearing the updated number of IDF casualties in Lebanon. [12] The withdrawal to the security zone in 1985 from the IDF’s previous deployment deeper into Lebanon expressed a growing recognition of social and political constraints and their influence on military strategy. [13]

Between 1985 and 1995, the idea of a security zone in Southern Lebanon gained broad support in Israel. Following a chain of incidents at the end of 1995, however, voices favoring a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon began to be heard. Then, 1997 brought a significant turning point in Israeli public opinion regarding the withdrawal from Lebanon. The high number of casualties in a series of incidents — such as the helicopter crash on February 4, in which 73 soldiers were killed, and operational failures such as the fire in Wadi Saluki on August 28 and the incident on September 5, in which 12 combatants of the Naval Commandos were killed in an ambush on the Lebanese coast — increased public pressure for a unilateral withdrawal from the security zone. Until 1997, the average number of Israeli casualties in southern Lebanon was about 20-30 per year. In 1997, the ratio between the IDF and Hezbollah casualties reached 1:1, in contrast to the previous 1:3 balance to the detriment of Hezbollah. Against this background, a survey conducted between January and March 1999 found that the percentage of respondents who believed that the IDF’s efforts in Lebanon constituted a success dropped from 64% in 1998 to 53% in 1999. More evidence of the decrease in Israeli societal willingness to maintain the security zone can be found in the fact that in 1985 and 1987, most respondents preferred to respond to the bombing of communities in northern Israel by terrorist organizations through limited (ground) military operations; in 1998 and 1999 most respondents preferred to deal with such bombings only from the air. Regarding the possibility of withdrawal — in 1997, 41% of respondents supported this option; in 1998, 44%; and in 1999, more than half of the respondents (55%) favored this. [14] A survey conducted immediately after the withdrawal found that 72% of the respondents believed that withdrawing from Lebanon was the right move. [15]

In the years following the signing of the Oslo Accords (September 1993), terrorist attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad increased. For its part, Israel continued to pursue an inclusive policy towards the Palestinians, according to which “we will fight terrorism as if there is no negotiation and conduct negotiations as if there is no war on terrorism.” In the late 1990s, an increasing number of evaluations suggested that the Palestinians intended to initiate a conflict with Israel. Then Prime Minister Ehud Barak decided to hold a summit at Camp David to reach an agreement before the outbreak of the conflict, as well as to show the Israeli public that the government had taken all efforts to avoid war, thus ensuring the unification of Israeli society if a conflict with the Palestinians did break out. During the summit held in July 2000, Barak offered far-reaching concessions to the Palestinians, including the division of Jerusalem, but former Palestinian National Authority President Yasser Arafat rejected these proposals. About two months later, the Second Intifada broke out, during which the Islamic terrorist organizations increased suicide attacks and launched mortar bombs and Qassem missiles from the Gaza Strip toward Israeli cities. The IDF strove to contain the events and adopted a reactive policy towards the wave of terrorist attacks, mainly through targeted killings, which were perceived as measures with minimal risk to the forces. Targeted killings provided an additional advantage: the psychological effect that accompanied hitting Hamas leaders. Another measure designed to reduce the risk to combatants was the “neighbor procedure,” a method in which the IDF used Palestinians as “human shields” to protect IDF soldiers’ lives from gunfire or explosives. [16] Senior decision-makers repeatedly rejected entry to the refugee camps, from which many of the perpetrators came, fearing a lack of internal legitimacy and multiple casualties. In response to Minister Rehavam Zeevi’s assassination in early October 2001, the government ordered the IDF to raid Palestinian cities and large villages to arrest those suspected of terrorist activity. Still, no permission was given to enter the refugee camps, which were considered hornets’ nests. IDF senior officers and experts estimated that fighting in the refugee camps could cost hundreds of lives and wounded. These gloomy predictions appeared in intelligence assessments, war games, articles, and the media. [17]

At the same time, the message of “there is no partner for peace negotiations,” which began immediately after the failure of the Camp David summit, continued to be heard ever more loudly. PM Barak, the media, government ministers, and senior military officers (including then Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, and the head of the research division at IDF Military Intelligence, Amos Gilad) claimed that Arafat had planned the outbreak of the Second Intifada and that the Palestinian Authority intended to destroy Israel. This implied that Israel was fighting for its very existence. In addition, security and government sources continued to spread the message that Arafat was personally responsible for every act of terrorism and that the Palestinian leadership was not an appropriate partner for negotiations because of its members’ involvement in terrorism and their refusal to prevent it. The purpose of these statements was, among other things, to obtain internal and international support for a harsh Israeli response that might involve multiple casualties. [18]

According to Ya’alon, “The fear of casualties became a severe limitation in the IDF’s use of force during the Second Intifada.” [19] At the beginning of 2002, groups of the Tanzim (a paramilitary body associated with the Fatah movement) began to act alongside Hamas and Islamic Jihad in organizing violent demonstrations and carrying out actual attacks, including suicide attacks. Given this situation, the General Staff continued to wrestle with whether to remain in defensive readiness or to allow a massive entry of forces into the refugee camps. In March 2002, soldiers of the IDF’s Golani infantry brigade operated in Jenin, and soldiers of the Paratroopers and Nahal Brigades operated in Nablus. Those operations aimed to examine the optimal method of fighting in a dense urban area filled with terrorist positions. In retrospect, these operations had greater significance than their tactical achievements might have suggested: They gave decision-makers confidence that it was possible to operate in the refugee camps without large-scale casualties to IDF forces. The success of these raids brought this modus operandi back into the IDF’s toolbox. Later, and as part of its offensive approach, the IDF carried out many more attacks in area A in the Palestinian Authority (the part of the West Bank and Gaza under the exclusive civil and security control of the Palestinian Authority).

Then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon internalized the main lessons of the First Lebanon War — that a continuous military operation will likely fail if the public does not support it and that the Israeli public finds it difficult to reconcile itself with war casualties unless it is a war of “no choice.” Therefore, Sharon delayed Operation “Defensive Shield” until he was convinced of guaranteed wall-to-wall national support for the operation. The severe terror attacks that took place in March 2002, which reached their peak in the attack on the “Park” hotel on Passover eve, illustrated the sharp increase in the threat posed to Israel by Palestinian terrorism and provided the justification for decision-makers to launch Operation “Defensive Shield.” Following the “Black March” of 2002, public pressure to act grew stronger — even at the cost of casualties. [20]

The Second Intifada that broke out in September 2000 had a stunning effect on Israeli public opinion. After the failure of the Camp David summit, a majority of the Jewish public in Israel placed the responsibility for the summit’s failure on Arafat and the Palestinians. [21] At the beginning of the violent conflict, the Jewish public in Israel recognized that Arafat initiated the conflict and that his goal was to obtain further concessions from Israel through violent means that left Israel no choice but to fight. [22] In the Israeli discourse, the intifada created disappointment with the peace process. Public opinion polls in Israel showed that most of the public saw the intifada as conclusive proof that the “Partner for Peace” did not recognize the sovereignty of the State of Israel and did not want to reach a peace agreement. Therefore, the internal legitimacy to use force to stop terrorist attacks increased. [23]

The Peace Index survey conducted in April 2002 found that 90% of respondents believed that the decision to launch Operation “Defensive Shield” was correct, and only about 7% believed it was incorrect. [24] This broad support can be explained by the fact that the operation began only after a series of deadly attacks, which led to the feeling that it was a “war on the Homefront.” Public support was reflected in the arrival to serve of about 98% of reservists mobilized. According to Ya’alon, “The first significant achievement of the operation stood out even before the first shot was fired: the full mobilization of the reservists and the full public support of the IDF.” [25] Even when some soldiers expressed displeasure at harming Palestinian civilians during the operation, they admitted that they continued to follow orders because they felt that their mission was to prevent attacks on the Homefront. [26]

Like Operation “Defensive Shield,” Operation “Determined Path,” which was launched in the West Bank at the end of June 2002, gained broad support among the Jewish public, with the explicit knowledge that the goal was to maintain a military presence in Palestinian cities for the long term, despite widespread assessment that this presence would reduce terrorism only for a short period. Thus, that month’s “Peace Index” data revealed that 80% of respondents supported entering Palestinian cities. The conclusion that emerges from this is that, against the severe terrorist attacks that occurred in the months preceding the survey, the Israeli public apparently was ready to support almost any course of action if it led to eradicating terrorism. [27]

During the Second Lebanon War, decision-makers gave unprecedented significance to avoiding casualties. The primary expression of this was their reluctance to carry out a large-scale ground operation against Hezbollah. Such an operation had the chance of removing the missile threat to Israel’s North. Instead, they decided to focus on air strikes, massive artillery fire, and only “close-to-the-border” ground operations, even though they knew beforehand that this would not be enough to remove the threat of short-range missiles. But the trauma of the “Lebanese quagmire,” as many senior political and military leaders called it, shaped the response. They did not discuss in depth any other alternative, including contingency plans explicitly designed for an escalation scenario in the North. As a result, Israeli decision-makers over-relied on air power out of the belief that it would solve the missile threat Hezbollah posed. When it became clear that the aerial campaign was ineffective in reducing the firing of short-range rockets, the decision-makers decided to slightly expand the nature of the ground activity into raids limited in time and space, which were intended to reduce casualties yet bring an image of victory. However, multiple combat limitations imposed on the forces prevented them from completing their missions successfully and as quickly as possible. Indirectly, the result was that combat restrictions meant to protect the troops caused more casualties. Additionally, the combat restrictions decreased the motivation level of the combatants, who argued against the limitations imposed on an offensive activity and even demanded to expand it. Moreover, frequent changes in the missions and unclear orders cast doubt among the field ranks about their importance and necessity. As a result, field commanders occasionally preferred not to endanger soldiers by carrying them out. Even in cases where they perceived the mission as vital and valuable, they gave priority to reducing casualties over adherence to the task. [28]

Parallel to that, fearing demoralization, the Israeli leadership during the Second Lebanon War executed a broad cognitive campaign to convince the Israeli public of the rightness of the war and its achievements. This effort is expressed first and foremost in the political echelon’s declarations regarding far-reaching war aims, even though the military echelon clarified that these aims were impossible to reach, considering the preference for an aerial campaign. Likewise, the military and political echelons fostered the illusion of victory, glorified battlefield achievements, and mentioned the steady resilience of Israeli society at every opportunity. However, instead of creating a sense of accomplishment, those statements increased the public expectations regarding the war’s achievements. When the military could not achieve the declared goals, the public expressed disappointment through decreased support for the war during its later stages. [29]

As the war dragged on, the decision-makers’ need to demonstrate actual achievements became more urgent. Military actions of symbolic importance were carried out, some involving substantial risk to the troops. These actions also failed to create a sense of victory, and some cost multiple casualties. The lack of achievements led to a public mood of disappointment, and the human toll was unjustified. As a striking example, consider the repeated battles in Bint Jebal for the symbolic act of hanging Israel’s flag on the building where Nasrallah delivered his famous “Spider’s Web” speech. The most controversial decision during the war was to launch a wide-scale ground campaign after the decision on a ceasefire had been made. Many saw this decision as a last attempt to bring the desired image of victory that the public expected because, at that stage, the decision-makers knew that the IDF could not achieve the goals of the ground campaign in the short time allocated to it. [30]

At the beginning of the war, the Jewish population expressed overwhelming support, and hardly any disagreements on the issue of going to war. [31] Public opinion polls consistently showed strong public support for a harsh response, support for the justice of the war, for its political leaders — and above all, for the IDF. [32] Throughout the war, there was a solid consensus (90% or more) regarding the justification of the aerial attack on Lebanon. This stability remained firm despite mounting battlefield and Homefront casualties. Even the first civilian casualties from Hezbollah rocket attacks and the first casualties among the combatants from ground fighting in southern Lebanon did not change the overwhelming support for the war. A survey conducted on July 31 and August 1 revealed that 93% of Jewish citizens believed the campaign in Lebanon was justified, and 79% of Jewish citizens supported the continuation of the fighting until all its goals were achieved. Even bereaved parents expressed their support for the continuation of military action. Moreover, public opinion polls conducted during the war showed that the public even supported using greater force than that employed by the IDF. [33]

During the war, which lasted for over a month, many citizens were forced to live in shelters under challenging conditions. Others were left without protection from the rockets. Surprisingly, even the residents of the North, who were the primary victims of the war, showed willingness for a prolonged conflict. [34] A survey conducted by the IDF’s Home Front Command on July 19 showed that 80% of the residents of the North thought that the IDF should continue the military campaign in Lebanon. The survey also found that 94% of the North’s residents said they could continue demonstrating resilience, even if the war in Lebanon were to last a long time. [35] Also, the mayors of northern settlements did not urge the IDF or the Minister of Defense to end the war. They clarified that residents would be willing to tolerate the discomfort associated with sitting in shelters if the reality along the northern border would change because of the war. [36]

Even after the war ended, it was evident that most of the public would have preferred to continue the war despite the risk of further casualties, given its poor achievements at its close. A survey conducted on August 16, a day after the ceasefire took effect, found that 81% of respondents were satisfied with the IDF’s performance during the war, 62% backed the decision to initiate a ground operation in Lebanon, over 50% supported the continuation of the war without accepting the ceasefire, and 67% of respondents would have liked Israel to have eliminated Nasrallah, even at the cost of resuming the war. [37] This picture began to change during the last week of the war. At the end of the first week of August, there were clear signs of disillusionment among the Israeli public with the war’s results, accompanied by a decrease in support for the IDF, and especially for the political leadership. The belligerent atmosphere that characterized the media and Israeli public, and the support they gave the government, were replaced in the last days of the war with a feeling of concern, given the IDF’s inability to defeat Hezbollah and the government’s failure to end the war with political achievements that indicated victory. [38]

As part of the lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War, Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi stated that maneuver warfare once again would be a central value for the IDF, and this statement was anchored in a new fundamental concept approved by the ground arm headquarters. However, even though during Operation “Cast Lead” (2008-2009) limited ground fighting took place in the Gaza suburbs, the lack of determination among the decision-makers to achieve a decision through a ground maneuver deep into the Gaza Strip was still evident. Operation “Cast Lead” was carried out in a pattern like that of the Lebanon War in 2006. However, they had learned a particular lesson: the objectives defined as part of “Cast Lead” were limited from the beginning — attacking the military arm of Hamas and deterring it from continuing to fire rockets toward Israel. The ground attack phase began only after the Israeli Air Force (IAF) exhausted its bank of targets after a week of aerial bombardment on Gaza. In 2010, the IDF initiated a study led by the head of the human resources division of the IDF, Major General Aharon Zamir, to examine the linkage between sensitivity to casualties and the use of military force. This study found that the desire of Israeli decision-makers to avoid casualties was translated into widespread use — beyond an acceptable softening opening strike — in standoff fire before the ground phase to minimize the number of casualties among IDF combatants. It was also found that sensitivity to casualties affected the patterns of using force during “Cast Lead.” [39] When the attacks from Gaza escalated again, Israel initiated Operation “Pillar of Cloud” (November 2012), which was limited to airstrikes. [40]

During Operation “Protective Edge,” which took place in 2014 and was the IDF’s most extensive military operation since the Second Lebanon War, Israel also strived to avoid using ground forces and, at first, limited the operation to airstrikes. But ten days later, the Israeli government was forced to order ground forces to destroy the Hamas attack tunnels, which turned out to be immune to airstrikes. Even then, Israeli decision-makers carefully defined the ground phase as limited. Operation “Protective Edge” was the last time (until now) that the IDF sent troops into ground combat in Gaza. [41]

Like the Second Lebanon War, it is evident that even during the operations in Gaza, the Israeli public gave credit to decision-makers far beyond the “rally around the flag” effect — a well-known characteristic of public opinion when going to war. Also, it is not apparent that casualties led to a drop in public support during “Cast Lead” and Operation “Protective Edge.” Thus, in a survey conducted on the fifth day of “Cast Lead” (December 31, 2008), 79% of respondents “very much supported the operation.” This support continued even after the beginning of the ground phase — in a survey conducted on January 6, 2009, approximately 80% of respondents answered that the operation should continue. Moreover, continuation of the ground phase led to increased support. In a survey conducted on January 9, approximately 90% of respondents answered that the operation should continue. Also, 70% believed that sending ground forces into Gaza was necessary. Regarding the evaluation of the operation’s results, a survey conducted on January 13 found that 78% of the public believed that “the operation is a success.” Moreover, in a survey conducted the day after the ceasefire went into effect, 50% of respondents opposed the ceasefire and believed that the operation should continue. [42]

As for Operation “Protective Edge,” a survey conducted on July 22 found that 73% of respondents believed that “Israel had achievements in the operation.” Another poll conducted on July 27 found that 65% of respondents believed Israel was winning. However, a particular drop in this survey finding occurred at the end of the ground phase. A survey conducted on August 6, the day after the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, found that only 51% of respondents believed that Israel had won this conflict. Dissatisfaction with the results of the operation peaked in a survey conducted on August 27, which found that 59% of respondents believed that Israel did not win the conflict. [43] Public support throughout most of the operation can be explained by the fact that the operation’s objectives were justified — even after the end of the ground fighting, there was still broad agreement (92%) that it was warranted. Another explanation for support for the operation’s ground phase is that it was limited, lasting only two weeks. Therefore, the number of casualties was also relatively low. If the ground phase had lasted longer and the number of casualties had increased, combined with the lack of achievements, there would have been more potential for decreased public support. Additionally, activating the “Iron Dome” system in 2011 substantially reduced casualties on the Homefront, affecting the high and prolonged public support for the operation. The high interception rates not only increased the sense of personal civilian security and public trust in the IDF, and reduced the economic consequences of the operation, but also provided the political echelon with freedom of maneuver in decision-making regarding the operation.

On October 7, 2023, following a murderous and unprecedented terrorist attack carried out by Hamas, during which Hamas forces invaded Israeli settlements, murdered approximately 1,400 people and kidnapped 241, Israel’s political-security cabinet approved a state of war called “Iron Swords.” Accordingly, the government ordered an extensive recruitment of reserve men and women.

Until the terrorist attack of October 7, there was almost a consensus regarding the futility of a wide-scale ground campaign in Gaza, in light of the expected severe international criticism towards Israel and the challenging fighting, given that the Gaza Strip is the densest urban area in the world. Considering that, the prevailing attitude among Israeli decision-makers towards Gaza was to avoid at all costs a wide-scale ground campaign in Gaza. Thus, for example, parallel to the plans for Operation “Defensive Shield” in the West Bank, the General Staff also formulated a plan called “the House Defender,” which was intended to be the equivalent version of “Defensive Shield” for the Gaza Strip. Still, they decided not to implement it because of the fear that the risk to the soldiers was higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. The decision-makers estimated that a wide ground operation in the Gaza Strip would take six to seven months, during which between 200 and 300 deaths among IDF forces would occur.

As shown above, the least harmful alternative, as the decision-makers perceived it, was responding to Hamas/Islamic Jihad aggression through fighting rounds from time to time, conducted almost exclusively from the air, during which Israel would damage terror capabilities and infrastructures, show — seemingly — determination to use force and thus, hopefully, renew deterrence. They considered this course of action sufficient in the absence of a better solution that would buy a “Hudna” for a longer time. Between the rounds of escalation, Israel was trying to appease Hamas by allowing millions of dollars from Qatar to finance the organization out of the misperception that Hamas would use the money to bring prosperity to the population in the Gaza Strip, and the desired result would be an erosion in the public willingness to support terror.

That was the prevailing attitude towards Gaza until October 7, which constituted a watershed that ended the misperception that Hamas could be deterred by the “mowing the grass” course of action. Israeli decision-makers learned the hard way the price of the conceptions regarding Israeli policy towards Gaza, and the need — this time — to destroy Hamas was made clear beyond any doubt.

Despite the high legitimacy — both domestically and internationally — of a broad military operation in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military response was measured and cautious, to the point of domestic criticism resulting from public impatience: The IDF devoted about three weeks to a broad reserves mobilization, the equipping and training of forces, and for executing an unprecedented aerial bombing campaign on Gaza, to “clean” the terrain as much as possible before the IDF’s ground maneuver. Additionally, those three weeks were also designated to loosen the readiness among Hamas forces, who were waiting for the IDF to enter and had prepared beforehand a huge warren of underground tunnels, storerooms, command posts, fighting positions, etc. [45] Before the massive entry into the Gaza Strip, the IDF carried out limited raids into the territory, which helped to disguise the beginning of the maneuver at the end of October. All of this was intended to reduce the risk to the maneuvering forces, now moving in the Strip with close air and artillery support.

Since the beginning of the war, which the Israeli public perceives as a “no choice” war following the horrific massacre on October 7, public support for the war has been extensive and has crossed sectors, as well as political opinions. For example, a series of polls conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies once a week since the war’s outbreak found that, consistently (as of November 22), approximately 90% of respondents believed that the IDF will win the war in Gaza. A similar figure also appeared regarding the degree of public trust in the IDF. As to the IDF’s ability to achieve war goals, during November, there was an increase in the number of respondents who believed in that (76% as of November 22, compared to 70% on November 15 and 56% on November 8). [46] This trend also appears in a survey the Israel Democracy Institute conducted on November 20. According to that survey, 94% of the Jewish public in Israel believed that destroying Hamas is an essential goal of the fighting, and 93% believed that returning the abductees is a crucial goal. [47] This can be attributed to the IDF’s achievements in the Gaza Strip, with a relatively low number of casualties, together with the execution of hostage deals throughout the second half of November. Correspondingly, it is evident that since the last hostages deal at the end of November, the public’s faith in Israel’s chances of returning the hostages alive is decreasing, as appeared in a survey by the IDI from December 19, which found that about 55% of the respondents believed that the chances of returning the hostages alive are low. However, the same survey found that most of the public (65%) believed that Israel has a high chance of achieving the second goal of the war — destroying the military and political infrastructure of Hamas. [48]

As to the Homefront resilience, more than 90% of respondents estimated the national resilience to be high. [49] A survey the Israel Democracy Institute conducted on October 18 found that although most of the respondents (64%) feared for their physical safety or that of their immediate family members, about 84% gave a high score to the civil resilience. [50] A survey the IDI conducted about three weeks later showed a certain increase in this figure (90%). [51] More evidence of high civilian resilience can be found in three surveys the Israel Democracy Institute carried out from October 15 to November 6, which found the common opinion is that Israel should hold negotiations with Hamas on the release of hostages but not to stop the fighting. The percentage of those who support this opinion has steadily increased over time. [52] Furthermore, another survey the Israel Democracy Institute conducted on October 23 found that approximately 48% of Jewish respondents supported a pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah. [53] As of early January, this trend maintained, as reflected in a later Israel Democracy Institute survey. [54]

Therefore, public support for the war has not eroded — and it even strengthened slightly after about three months of war. This can be explained because the Israeli public perceives the goals of the war — to destroy Hamas and return the hostages — as essential and justified. Also, public support over time can be explained by the fact that the public perceives the IDF’s operational activity in the Gaza Strip as successful, and until mid-December, perceived it as serving the purpose of returning the hostages. The release of the soldier Uri Megidish in a military operation, and later, the hostages’ deals executions, helped strengthen the perception that this was possible thanks to the IDF’s achievements.

The tragic incident on December 15, during which three hostages who managed to escape from captivity were accidentally killed by IDF fire, as well as the halting of hostages’ deals, led to an increasing number of voices calling for stopping the military operation until the return of the hostages. However, it appears that those voices are not dominant among the Israeli public. A survey conducted on January 2 found that, still, the public perceived the best method to achieve the hostages’ release is the war’s continuation. [55]

However, this broad support shouldn’t be taken for granted. For the most part, the beginning of a war — any war — is characterized by the “rally around the flag” phenomenon and high public support. But if a war drags on, and as a result there is an increase in casualties, there is a high potential for demoralization. It appears that the “Swords of Iron” will be a prolonged conflict with multiple fronts. Therefore, to prevent a drop in the Israeli public’s support for the war, as well as a decline in public trust in the IDF and the state, which was severely damaged in the face of the October 7 attack, the decision-makers must strive to make significant achievements in the context of the war’s goals and to tighten the pressure on Hamas — even at the cost of continuing and worsening international criticism. That’s what the Israeli public wants, and it gives all the credit necessary in that regard.

Throughout the history of the State of Israel, the fear of the low absorptive capacity of Israeli society has been a significant consideration in the decision-making process in military matters. This concern intensified in the mid-1990s when a combination of a series of incidents with multiple casualties, and the growing feeling that there was no purpose to the continued presence of the IDF in the security zone, increased public pressure for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. From the review above, decision-makers in recent decades have believed that casualties among combatants will negatively affect public opinion and lead to pressure to stop fighting. They gave this concern weight in making their decisions, which was reflected both in the effort to reduce the number of casualties in operational activity and in a conscious attempt to frame the fighting as justified and with high chances of victory, thus helping the public to digest casualties during war more quickly. All this, despite the existence of broad public backing and even though war inherently involves victims, both civilian and military. The review above proves that decision-makers did not use the credit given them by the Israeli public. Instead, they chose to act cautiously, which may have prevented the possibility of real achievements. In the end, the lack of achievements led to a decline in public support at the end of conflicts involving Israel since the 2000s, and led to the public’s disappointment and failure when the public often had demanded victory, even at the cost of casualties. Ariel Sharon insisted on this during the “War of Attrition” when he claimed at a meeting of the General Assembly at the end of April 1969 that “people are ready to accept losses in a war in which there are achievements, but the losses as a result of maintaining the status quo... the meaning of this type of losses will be tough.”

It is important to emphasize that even though the Israeli public demonstrates impressive resilience during wartime and is ready to make sacrifices on the condition that it is seen as the obligation of reality and will yield achievements, they expect this to occur with as few casualties as possible. The decision-makers strive to maintain a delicate balance between the two requirements. Still, sometimes the balance is decided considering the public’s mood, who, throughout the entire period of hostilities, measures its goals and achievements against the number of casualties. I should also point out that the decision-makers’ excessive fear of casualties has many negative consequences for the conduct of war and its results. A persistent reluctance to ground maneuver (when it is clear that there is no escape from it) and combat limitations placed on the forces to reduce casualties, such as avoiding fighting in daylight, prevent them from completing their missions successfully, and sometimes the result was a significant number of casualties and a decrease in motivation of the combatants, who frequently argued against limiting offensive activity. In recent decades, Israeli decision-makers considered the lack of casualties an achievement, and their striving to reduce casualties led to a lack of achievements. The aspiration to minimize casualties is desirable and required, and even constitutes a moral obligation the government owes to its citizens. However, when the consideration of casualties includes a constraint from which strategic and military considerations retreat, it becomes a “casualties-phobia” with problematic consequences.

Since the end of Operation “Protective Edge,” we have witnessed several rounds of escalation against Hamas, during which decision-makers frequently discussed the issue of embarking on another campaign in Gaza. Undoubtedly, it is not an easy call to make, but the lessons of history show that postponing dealing with a military threat — even though it is an understandable tendency of decision-makers — could lead to a more difficult confrontation in the future, as demonstrated by the ongoing “Swords of Iron” war. In any case, decision-makers must remember that protecting civilian lives precedes the safety of soldiers’ lives and that Israeli society is rational and resilient, as has been proven in the frequent conflicts that it has experienced, including the current one. Of course, if possible, one should strive to reduce the number of casualties, but not make avoiding casualties a war objective by itself.

Dr. Pnina Shuker is a postdoctoral fellow at the school of Political Science, Government and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University, and is a deputy editor for the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. She also is a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and the Academic College for Law and Science.
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[26]: Raviv Drucker and Ofer Shelach. (2005). Boomerang: The Leadership’s Failure during the Second Intifada. Jerusalem: Keter, p. 215.

[27]: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. (June 2022). The Peace Index for June 2002, available at: http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonth.aspx?num=98&monthname=%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99

[28]: Pnina Shuker. (2013). The Perception of the Democratic Society as Sensitive to Casualties and its Impact on War Management: The IDF during the Second Lebanon War. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the master’s degree in political science. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, the Political Science Department, p. 6.

[29]: Ibid, p. 7.

[30]: Ibid, p. 8.

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[32]: Uri Ben Eliezer. (2012). Israel’s New Wars: An Historical-Sociological Explanation. Tel-Aviv: The Haim Rubin Tel Aviv University Press, p. 394.

[33]: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research. (July 2006). The Peace Index for July 2006.

[34]: Stuart A. Cohen. (2008). Israel and its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion. London: Routledge, p. 60.

[35]: Arik Bender. “The North Residences are Demonstrating Resilience,” NRG — Ma’ariv (July 19, 2006).

[36]: Amir Rapaport. (2006). Fire on Our Forces. Tel-Aviv: Ma’ariv, p. 118.

[37]: “The War had ended, and the Earthquake is on its way,” NRG -Ma’ariv (August 19, 2006).

[38]: Meir Elran. “The Civil Front during the Second Lebanon War,” in: Meir Elran and Shlomo Brum (Eds.), The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions. Tel Aviv: Miskal, p. 107.

[39]: David Duchan. (2019). Urban Warfare in the Post-Modern Age. Tel Aviv: Resling, p. 51.

[40]: Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir. (2017). Medium-Intensity Threats Report Subtitle: The Case for Beefed-Up IDF Ground Forces. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, p. 29.

[41]: Ibid.

[42]: Yehuda Ben Meir. (2009). “Operation ‘Cast Lead': Political Aspects and Public Opinion,” Strategic Assessment, 4 (1), p. 28.

[43]: Yehuda Ben Meir. (2014). “‘Protective Edge': The Demon Train of Public Opinion,” in: “‘Protective Edge’ — Implications and Lessons,” Anat Kurtz and Shlomo Brum (Eds.), Tel-Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, pp. 115-116.

[44]: Eitan Shamir and Efraim Inbar. (2014). “Mowing the Grass in Gaza,” BESA Center Perspectives, 255, pp. 1-3; Eitan Shamir. “The End of Mowing the Grass — if Israel Wants Life, it must dislodge Hamas from Gaza,” BESA Insight (October 22, 2023)

[45]: Eado Hecht, “Gaza Terror Offensive,” October 15-18, BESA Center for Strategic Studies.

[46]: “Public trust in the IDF during ‘Swords of Iron’,” Insight, 1791 (November 22, 2023), available at: https://www.inss.org.il/he/publication/idf-support/

[47]: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51616

[48]: Ibid.

[49]: Tamar Herman and Or Anavi. “Iron Swords” survey: a 20-year record in the sense of belonging to the country among both Jews and Arabs,” IDI (November 10, 2023), available at: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51391

[50]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51145

[51]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51391

[52]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51391

[53]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/51144

[54]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/52071

[55]: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/52071