Khaled Abou El Fadl, a Professor of Law at UCLA, has been widely upheld as an enlightened paragon of liberal Islam. Even conservative and neoconservative publications have praised him as a champion of "…thoughtful, pluralist traditions…" 1, who is engaged in "..tireless efforts to spark an Islamic Reformation…" 2. These endeavors have aroused the anger of a few radical Islamists or their sympathizers, apparently resulting in some violent threats3 to the Professor. However, in contrast to the experiences of outspoken Muslim advocates of truly profound institutional change in Islam, such as Salman Rushdie 4, Taslima Nasrin 5, and Anwar Shaikh 6, no public death fatwas have been issued against El Fadl.
Recently El Fadl elucidated his “construction” of the tolerant tradition in Islam as part of an essay collection 7. He focused this presentation, appropriately, on two of the most obvious challenges to any such construction, i.e. jihad, and the poll tax (jizya) levied on non-Muslims under Islamic rule. El Fadl’s arguments regarding both jihad and the jizya in this essay merit close scrutiny, as these institutions are integrated into the corpus of the Shari’a, or sacred Islamic law. I believe his omissions of evidence in this essay, combined with an excessive reliance on sacralized, whitewashed historiography, refutes the prevailing notion that El Fadl is engaged in a sincere effort to instill fundamental change in Islam.
El Fadl states categorically:
"..Islamic tradition does not have a notion of holy war. Jihad simply means to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause...Holy war (al-harb al-muqaddasah) is not an expression used by the Qur’anic text or Muslim theologians. In Islamic theology war is never holy; it is either justified or not...” 8
This contention cannot be supported on either theological-juridical, or historical grounds, and in fact contradicts the conclusion of an earlier essay by El Fadl 9. The basic pattern of the jihad war is captured in the great Muslim historian al-Tabari’s recording of the recommendation given by Umar b. al-Khattab to the commander of the troops he sent to al-Basrah (636 C.E.), during the conquest of Iraq. Umar (the second “Rightly Guided Caliph”) reportedly said:
“Summon the people to God; those who respond to your call, accept it from them, (This is to say, accept their conversion as genuine and refrain from fighting them) but those who refuse must pay the poll tax out of humiliation and lowliness. (Qur’an 9:29) If they refuse this, it is the sword without leniency. Fear God with regard to what you have been entrusted.” 10
Jihad was pursued century after century, because jihad, which means “to strive in the path of Allah,” embodied an ideology and a jurisdiction. Both were formally conceived by Muslim jurisconsults and theologians from the 8th to 9th centuries onward, based on their interpretation of Qur’anic verses 11 (for e.g., 9:5,6; 9:29; 4:76-79; 2: 214-15; 8:39-42), and long chapters in the Traditions (i.e., “hadith”, acts and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, especially those recorded by al-Bukhari [d. 869] 12 and Muslim [d. 874] 13). The consensus on the nature of jihad from all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (i.e., Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi’i) is clear:
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 996), Maliki jurist14
“Jihad is a precept of Divine institution. Its performance by certain individuals
may dispense others from it. We Malikis [one of the four schools of Muslim
jurisprudence] maintain that it is preferable not to begin hostilities with the
enemy before having invited the latter to embrace the religion of Allah except
where the enemy attacks first. They have the alternative of either converting
to Islam or paying the poll tax (jizya), short of which war will be declared
against them.”
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Hanbali jurist15
“Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought. As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their likes, they shall not be killed unless they actually fight with words (e.g. by propaganda) and acts (e.g. by spying or otherwise assisting in the warfare).”
From the Hanafi school (as given in the Hidayah) 16
" It is not lawful to make war upon any people who have never before been called to the faith, without previously requiring them to embrace it, because the Prophet so instructed his commanders, directing them to call the infidels to the faith, and also because the people will hence perceive that they are attacked for the sake of religion, and not for the sake of taking their property, or making slaves of their children, and on this consideration it is possible that they may be induced to agree to the call, in order to save themselves from the troubles of war… If the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor agree to pay capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do.”
al-Mawardi (d. 1058 ), Shafi’i jurist 17
"…The mushrikun [infidels] of Dar al-Harb (the arena of battle) are of two types: First, those whom the call of Islam has reached, but they have refused it and have taken up arms. The amir of the army has the option of fighting them…in accordance with what he judges to be in the best interest of the Muslims and most harmful to the mushrikun… Second, those whom the invitation to Islam has not reached, although such persons are few nowadays since Allah has made manifest the call of his Messenger…it is forbidden to…begin an attack before explaining the invitation to Islam to them, informing them of the miracles of the Prophet and making plain the proofs so as to encourage acceptance on their part; if they still refuse to accept after this, war is waged against them and they are treated as those whom the call has reached…"
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), jurist (Maliki), renowned philosopher, historian, and sociologist, summarized these consensus opinions from five centuries of prior Muslim jurisprudence with regard to the uniquely Islamic institution of jihad:
“In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force... The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defense... Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.” 18
Indeed El Fadl wrote the following in 1999:
“There is no doubt that Muslim jurists do equate just war with religious war (jihad)” [parenthetical insertion of the word jihad by El Fadl himself] 19
His footnote for this quote cites the classical Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya, as well as two authoritative modern scholars of jihad, Professors Majid Khadduri 20, and Rudolph Peters 21. Appropriately elaborated, the contents of El Fadl’s quote reflect exactly what another respected contemporary Sunni Muslim scholar, Professor Bassam Tibi, maintains:
"...The Western distinction between just and unjust wars linked to specific grounds for war is unknown in Islam. Any war against unbelievers, whatever its immediate ground, is morally justified. Only in this sense can one distinguish just and unjust wars in Islamic tradition. When Muslims wage war for the dissemination of Islam, it is a just war (futuhat, literally “opening”, in the sense of opening the world, through the use of force, to the call of Islam); when non-Muslims attack Muslims, it is an unjust war (‘idwan). ...” 22
By the time of the classical Muslim historian al-Tabari’s death in 923, jihad wars had expanded the Muslim empire from Portugal to India. Subsequent Muslim conquests continued in Asia, as well as on Christian eastern European lands. The Christian kingdoms of Armenia, Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Albania, in addition to parts of Poland and Hungary, were also conquered and Islamized. When the Muslim armies were stopped at the gates of Vienna in 1683, over a millennium
of jihad had transpired 23.
These tremendous military successes spawned a triumphalist jihad literature. Muslim historians 24 recorded in detail the number of slain infidels, the enslavement of the populations, the booty in captives, cattle and movable goods, the cities which were destroyed, razed or spared and taken by treaty, and the countryside pillaged or set on fire. Christian sources 25 (Coptic, Armenian, Jacobite, Greek, Slav, etc.), in particular, independently validate this narrative, and complement the Muslim perspective by providing testimonies of the suffering of the non-Muslim victims of jihad wars. Thus, it is astonishing and disturbing when this entire well-characterized historiography is ignored, or dismissed by an esteemed Muslim intellectual such as El Fadl in his contemporary “re-evaluation” of jihad! Professor Walid Phares, in a frank, astute commentary entitled “Jihad is Jihad” (Palestine Times November, 1997), noted:
“In the Christian world, modern Christians outlawed crusading; they did not rewrite history to legitimize themselves. Those who believe that the jihad holy war is a sin today must have the courage to de-legitimize it and outlaw it as well.” 26
It would behoove El Fadl to adopt the overall approach suggested by Professor Phares including a sincere acknowledgement of the suffering of the millions of non-Muslim victims of jihad wars conducted over a millennium, across three continents.
El Fadl’s discussion of jihad is rendered meaningless by a blatant historical negationism of both Muslim and non-Muslim sources. In his analysis of the poll tax (jizya), he relies exclusively upon the sacralized early Muslim historiography of this institution. El Fadl thus attempts to uphold the “virtuous” aspects of the jizya, omitting any reference to the consistent, intentionally humiliating character of its application. El Fadl begins by asserting correctly that "..it was common inside and outside of Arabia to levy poll taxes..” 27, while ignoring, in contrast, the unique sacred, Qur’anic obligation of the Muslim jizya as expounded in 9:29. He then mentions the frequently cited apologetic scenario regarding the imposition of the jizya under Umar b. al-Khattab, based on Muslim sources:
“If the Muslim state was incapable of extending such protection to non-Muslims, it was not supposed to levy a poll tax. In fact, Umar…, the second Rightly Guided Caliph and close companion of the Prophet, returned the poll tax to an Arab Christian tribe that he was incapable of protecting from Byzantine aggression.” 28
The actual historical record is more complex, contentious, and less salutary 29 . “Byzantine aggression” is El Fadl’s subjective characterization of the efforts of Heraclius to re-capture the (predominantly) Christian city of Hims in the late spring of 636. Hims had been recently conquered by the Muslim Arabs after their third expedition against the city, in December-January of 635-6. The Byzantines under Heraclius advanced on Hims with overwhelming force, prompting the Arabs to evacuate. Regardless of the validity of the claim of a “tax restoration” by the fleeing Arabs, the jizya was fully re-imposed (according to Muslim chroniclers) after the decisive Arab Muslim victory at the battle of Yarmuk in August 636, and the re-occupation of Hims 30. Moreover, a contemporary Syriac chronicle emphasizes the destruction of Hims and its environs during this Muslim re-conquest 31.
El Fadl then stresses that,
"...the Prophet did not collect a poll tax from every non-Muslim tribe that submitted to Muslim sovereignty, and in fact, in the case of a large number of non-Muslim but non-hostile tribes, he paid them a periodic sum of money or goods. These tribes were known as ‘those whose hearts have been reconciled'…" 32
A strikingly different interpretation of "..those whose hearts have been reconciled..” was provided by the renowned Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). He observes:
“If they are infidels, it is hoped that by these gifts an advantage may be obtained: for example, to induce them to convert, or avoid some misfortune, on condition that it is impossible to act otherwise…These gifts, granted to the powerful and withheld from the lowly…are to serve the common interest of the Muslim religion and of Muslims…" 33
Regardless of these differences in interpretation, the more typical imposition of the jizya on non-Muslims by Muhammad is captured in his letter to the Christians and Jews of Eilat:
“Thou hast to accept Islam, or pay the tax, and obey God and His Messenger and the messengers of His Messenger, and do them honor and dress them in fine clothing, not in the raiment of raiders…for if you satisfy my envoys you will satisfy me. Surely the tax is known to you. Therefore if you wish to be secure on land and on sea, obey God and His Messenger…But be careful lest thou do not satisfy…for then I shall not accept anything from you, but I shall fight you and take the young as captives and slay the elderly…Come then, before a calamity befalls you…" 34
A last anecdote intended to portray the benign nature of the poll tax is related by El Fadl as follows:
“Umar entered into a peace settlement with Arab Christian tribes pursuant to which these tribes were obligated to pay the Islamic annual tax known as the zakah (almsgiving), and not the poll tax. Reportedly, although they refused to convert to Islam, the Christian tribes contended that paying the jizyah was degrading, and instead asked to pay the zakah, and Umar accommodated their request.” 35
In this final example, El Fadl’s narrative omits key details from the authoritative Muslim account by al-Tabari. These omissions produce a misleading, sanitized version of the events captured in their fuller context below:
“When the time of Umar had come, those Taghlib [Arab Christian] tribesmen who had become Muslims said, ‘Do not alienate them [i.e., the other remaining non-Muslim Taghlib tribesmen] by imposing the kharaj [often used interchangeably with the jizya ; see below] upon them so they go away, but double the amount they have to pay as alms tax, which you levy from their wealth. In this way, it will have become jizya…So a Taghlib delegation traveled to Umar concerning this matter…Umar said to them, ‘Pay the jizya'. But they said to him, ‘Send us to a place where we can be safe. By God, if you impose upon us the jizya, we will certainly enter Byzantine territory, for by God you have brought disgrace upon us among the other Arab tribesmen…Then Umar said to them, ‘…But by God, I insist you pay it, you are contemptible nobodies. If you seek refuge with the Byzantines, I shall certainly write to them about you and I shall come and lead you away into captivity.’ They said, ‘Then take something from us, but do not call it jizya'. Then Umar replied, ‘As for us, we shall call it jizya, you call it whatever you want’. ..[Then] Ali b. Abi Talib said to him [Umar], ‘ Did Sa’d b. Malik not double the amount they had to pay as alms?’ ‘Yes’, Umar admitted…So he [Umar] contended himself with the jizya (which they were already paying), whereupon…tax matters [were] drawn up in this way…" 36
Curiously, El Fadl’s presentation excludes discussion of how the jizya was viewed by classical Muslim jurists. There was in fact a basic consensus among the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence regarding the intimate relationship between the institutions of jihad against the infidels, and jizya. El Fadl ignores these extensive writings, and instead asserts whimsically,
"…there are various indicators that the poll tax is not a theologically mandated practice, but a functional solution that was adopted in response to a specific set of historical circumstances. Only an ahistorical reading of the text could conclude that it is an essential element in a divinely sanctioned program of subordinating the non-believer.” 37
Based on their truly voluminous works, one must conclude that seminal jurists from all four classical Muslim schools of jurisprudence are guilty of the scholarly offense El Fadl terms “ahistorical” text reading 38. For example, the famous Shafi’i jurist of Baghdad, al-Mawardi (d. 1058), highlights the most salient aspect of this consensus view of the jizya in classical Islamic jurisprudence: the critical connection between jihad and payment of the jizya. He notes that “The enemy makes a payment in return for peace and reconciliation.” 39 Al-Mawardi then distinguishes two cases: (I) Payment is made immediately and is treated like booty, however “it does, however, not prevent a jihad being carried out against them in the future.” 40 . (II). Payment is made yearly and will “constitute an ongoing tribute by which their security is established.” 41. Reconciliation and security last as long as the payment is made. If the payment ceases, then the jihad resumes. A treaty of reconciliation may be renewable, but must not exceed 10 years 42. In the chapter “The Division of the Fay and the Ghaneemah” (booty), al- Mawardi examines the regulations pertaining to the land taken from the infidels. With regard to land taken through treaty, specifically, he indicates two possibilities: either the infidels convert or they pay the jizya and their life and belongings are protected 43.
Another important aspect of the jizya that El Fadl ignores is the widely upheld, although not unanimous view of the classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence about the “humiliating” imposition and procurement of this tax 44. Here is a discussion of the ceremonial for collection of the jizya by the 13th century Shafi’i jurist an-Nawawi:
"…The infidel who wishes to pay his poll tax must be treated with disdain by the collector: the collector remains seated and the infidel remains standing in front of him, his head bowed and his back bent. The infidel personally must place the money on the scales, while the collector holds him by the beard, and strikes him on both cheeks…" 45
El Fadl also fails to discuss how the “contract of the jizyah”, or “dhimma” encompassed other obligatory and recommended obligations for the conquered non-Muslim “dhimmi” peoples 46. Collectively, these “obligations” formed the discriminatory system of dhimmitude imposed upon non-Muslims- Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists- subjugated by jihad. Some of the more prominent features of the system of dhimmitude include: the prohibition of arms for the vanquished non-Muslims (dhimmis), and of church bells; the restrictions concerning the building and restoration of churches and synagogues; the inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims with regard to overall taxation, and penal law; the refusal of dhimmi testimony by Muslim courts; the obligation for Jews and Christians to wear special clothes; and their overall humiliation and abasement 47.
El Fadl’s presentation, furthermore, does not acknowledge that important Muslim chroniclers of the Abbasid period (750-1258), in characterizing the jihad conquests, use the terms jizya and kharaj interchangeably to describe the collective tribute levied on the vanquished, indigenous dhimmi peoples 48. Finally, he also fails to include any references to non-Muslim sources regarding the jizya-kharaj, and its implementation. The eminent scholar S.D. Goitein highlighted the serious limitations to this exclusivist approach in studying the jizya(-kharaj):
"...There is no subject of Islamic social history on which the present writer had to modify his views so radically while passing from literary to documentary sources, i.e., from the study of Muslim books to that of the records of the Cairo Geniza as the jizya..or the poll tax to be paid by non-Muslims. It was of course, evident that the tax represented a discrimination and was intended, according to the Koran’s own words, to emphasize the inferior status of the non-believers. It seemed, however, that from the economic point of view, it did not constitute a heavy imposition, since it was on a sliding scale, approximately one, two, and four dinars, and thus adjusted to the financial capacity of the taxpayer. This impression proved to be entirely fallacious, for it did not take into consideration the immense extent of poverty and privation experienced by the masses, and in particular, their persistent lack of cash, which turned the ‘season of the tax’ into one of horror, dread, and misery.” 49
Jewish, Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, and Serbian sources provide copious evidence that the jizya-kharaj was demanded from children, widows, orphans, and even the dead 50. Indeed these testimonies simply confirm what was prescribed at any rate by the Shafi’ite jurists, as expounded by an-Nawawi:
" Our religion compels the poll tax to be paid by dying people, the old, even in a state of incapacity, the blind, monks, workers, and the poor, incapable of practicing a trade. As for people who seem to be insolvent at the end of the year, the sum of the poll tax remains a debt to their account until they should become solvent.” 51
Tax collectors were accompanied by soldiers, inspectors, surveyors, and money changers paid, fed, and lodged for several days at the taxpayers’ expense 52. Although theoretically prohibited, the tax collectors used punishments and torture to complete their task 53. The Armenian chronicler Ghevond describes this bleak situation in Armenia under Abbasid rule, during the 8th century:
“One saw…horrible scenes of every sort of torture; nor did [they] forget to tax the dead; the multitude of orphans and widows suffered the same cruelty; priests and ministers at the holy sanctuary were forced by the vile punishments of flogging and whipping to disclose the names of the dead and their parents; in short the whole population of the country, smitten with enormous taxes, after having paid large sums of zuze [silver coins], also had to wear a lead seal around their necks…as for the lower classes of the population, it had been exposed to different sorts of torture: some suffered flagellation for being unable to pay exorbitant taxes; others were hanged on gibbets, or crushed under presses; and others were stripped of their clothing and thrown into lakes in the depths of an extremely cold winter: and soldiers spaced out on the banks prevented them clambering ashore and forced them to perish wretchedly…" 54
Endemic to Muslim-controlled Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, such brutal practices lead to an indelible process of expropriation of the dhimmi peasantry, in particular. Onerous taxation, combined with indebtedness to Muslim creditors, forced Christian (and Jewish) peasants to abandon their mortgaged lands to their Muslim overlords, and go into exile, or become slaves 55. The later Turkish Muslim conquests and Islamization of Anatolia and the Balkans continued these processes from the 11th through the 16th centuries 56. Finally, a remarkable account from 1894 by an Italian Jew traveling in Morocco, demonstrates the humiliating conditions under which the jizya was still being collected within the modern era:
"…The kaid Uwida and the kadi Mawlay Mustafa had mounted their tent today near the Mellah [Jewish ghetto] gate and had summoned the Jews in order to collect from them the poll tax [jizya] which they are obliged to pay the sultan. They had me summoned also. I first inquired whether those who were European-protected subjects had to pay this tax. Having learned that a great many of them had already paid it, I wished to do likewise. After having remitted the amount of the tax to the two officials, I received from the kadi’s guard two blows in the back of the neck. Addressing the kadi and the kaid, I said” ‘Know that I am an Italian protected subject.’ Whereupon the kadi said to his guard: ‘Remove the kerchief covering his head and strike him strongly; he can then go and complain wherever he wants.’ The gurads hastily obeyed and struck me once again more violently. This public mistreatment of a European-protected subject demonstrates to all the Arabs that they can, with impunity, mistreat the Jews.” 57
It should be abundantly clear that Professor El Fadl’s disingenuous revisionism hardly qualifies as a sincere effort to promote a meaningful Islamic “Reformation”. Intended or not, his whitewashed, “ahistorical” presentation is dangerous, and serves to justify alarming contemporary Muslim assessments of dhimmitude, and its appropriate application, even today! For example, Palestinian Authority (PA) Undersecretary for Awqaf [Religious Endowment], Sheik Yussef Salamah, representing the PA at a May 1999 “Inter-Cultural Conference,” in Tehran, praised the 7th century system of Ahl Al-Dhimma (i.e, the system of dhimmitude), as the proper paradigm for relations between present day Muslims and Christians 58. Palestinian Authority employee, Sheik Muhammad Ibrahim Al-Madhi later reiterated these sentiments with regard to Jews during a Friday sermon broadcasted live on June 6, 2001 on PA TV, from the Sheik ‘Ijlin Mosque in Gaza:
“We welcome, as we did in the past, any Jew who wants to live in this land as a dhimmi, just as the Jews have lived in our countries, as dhimmis, and have earned appreciation, and some of them have even reached the positions of counselor or minister here and there. We welcome the Jews to live as dhimmis, but the rule in this land and in all the Muslim countries must be the rule of Allah.” 59
One needs simply to contrast El Fadl’s meager revisionist approach 60 with the unequivocal statements of a Muslim academic such as Professor Bassam Tibi. Professor Tibi possesses the insight and courage to acknowledge that a meaningfully reformed Islam must embrace the pluralistic spirit of the Western Enlightenment:
"..In the context of religious tolerance-and I write this as a Muslim- there can be no place in Europe for Shari’a …Shari’a is at odds with the secular identity of Europe and is diametrically opposed to secular European constitutions formulated by the people… I hold out for the superiority of common sense over religious faith (i.e., absolute religious precepts); individual human rights (i.e., not collective human rights); secular democracy based on the separation of religion from politics; a universally accepted pluralism; and a mutually accepted secular tolerance. The acceptance of these values is the foundation of a civil society..” 61
Professor Tibi’s comments underscore basic truths that apologists for the Shari’a such as El Fadl refuse to acknowledge. For example, the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam maintains that the Shari’a has primacy over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and includes the specific proclamation that God has made the umma (Islamic community) the best nation, whose role is to “guide” humanity 62. This statement captures the indelible influence of jihad ideology on the Shari’a, rendering sacred and permanent the notion of inequality between the community of Allah, and the infidels. Thus we can see clearly the differences between the Shari’a-inspired Cairo Declaration, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 63 which does not refer to any religion or to the superiority of any group over another, while stressing the absolute equality of all human beings. Indeed a Senegalese jurist (and Muslim), Adama Dieng, then serving as secretary-general to the UN Commission on Human Rights, courageously declared in 1992 that the Cairo Declaration introduced an intolerable discrimination against non-Muslims and women 64.
Despite serious death threats, other truly intrepid Muslim intellectuals, such as Ibn Warraq, Taslima Nasrin, Salman Rushdie, and Anwar Shaikh support a profound Reformation of Islam 65. These individuals openly acknowledge the ugly living historical legacy of jihad and dhimmitude 66, as well as the incompatibility of the Shari’a with the principles of equality embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 67. Along with Professor Tibi 68, Ibn Warraq, Taslima Nasrin, Salman Rushdie, and Anwar Shaikh are the true reformers of Islam, and their views need to be aired and discussed widely in the media and academia. As Ibn Warraq keenly observed within a month of the 9/11 attacks:
“It is perverse for the western media to lament the lack of an Islamic reformation and willfully ignore…rational discussion of Islam… what will emerge [then] will be the very thing that political correctness and the government seek to avoid: virulent, racist populism. If there are further terrorist acts then irrational xenophobia will be the only means of expression available. We also cannot allow Muslims subjectively to decide what constitutes “incitement to religious hatred”, since any legitimate criticism of Islam will then be shouted down as religious hatred.” 69
Andrew G. Bostom, MD, MS is an Associate Professor of Medicine at Brown University Medical School, and freelance writer on the history of jihad and dhimmitude.
References
1 Franklin Foer, “Moral Hazard: The Life of a Liberal Muslim”, The New Republic, November 14, 2002.
2 Rod Dreher, “Inside Islam. A brave Muslim speaks.”, The National Review Online, January 8, 2002.
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10 Al-Tabari, “The History of al-Tabari (Ta’rikh al rusul wa’l-muluk)”, vol. 12, The Battle of Qadissiyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine, translated by Yohanan Friedman, (Albany, NY.: State University of New York Press, 1992).
11 The Noble Qur’an
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/
12 Translation of Sahih Bukhari http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/
13 Translation of Sahih Muslim
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muslim/
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19 El Fadl, Muslim World 1999.
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26 Walid Phares, “Jihad is Jihad”, The Palestine Times, November, 1997.
27 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, p. 21.
28 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, p. 21.
29 Daniel C. Dennett, Jr. “Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam”, (Boston, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Gil. “A History of Palestine, 634-1099", p. 46.
30 Dennett, “Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam”, Pp. 55-58
31 Gil. “A History of Palestine, 634-1099", p. 46.
32 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, Pp. 21-22.
33 Bat Ye’or, “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Documents I. 2. The Theory of Jihad, p. 298.
34 Gil. “A History of Palestine, 634-1099", p. 28.
35 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, p.22.
36 Al-Tabari, “The History of al-Tabari”, vol. 13, Pp. 90-91.
37 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, p.22.
38 Bat Ye’or, “The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam”, Translated by David Maisel, Paul Fenton, and David Littman. (Cranbury, NJ.: Associated University Presses, 1985, Pp. 52-54; Documents I, Jurists Texts, Pp.167-180); “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Documents II. 2. Jurists’ Opinions, Pp. 322-330.
38 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p.77.
39 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p.77.
40 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p.77.
41 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p.77.
42 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p.78.
43Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, Pp. 200-201.
44 Bat Ye’or, “The Dhimmi”, Pp. 53-54; “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Pp. 77-79; “Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide”, Translated by Miriam Kochan and David Littman, (Cranbury, NJ.: Associated University Presses, 2001, Pp. 65-71).
45 Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p. 70.
46 Al- Mawardi, “The Laws of Islamic Governance”, p. 211; Bat Ye’or, “The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam”, p. 169; Lal, “The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India”, p. 237.
47 Bat Ye’or, “The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam”, Pp. 52-67; “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Pp. 71-99; “Islam and Dhimmitude”, Pp. 50-122; Lal, “The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India”, Pp. 119-120.
48 Dennett, “Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam”, p. 3; Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p. 65.
49 Goitein, “Evidence on the Muslim Poll Tax from Non-Muslim Sources” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1963; Vol. 6, Pp. 278-279.
50 Goitein, “Evidence on the Muslim Poll Tax from Non-Muslim Sources”, Pp. 281-282; Bat Ye’or, “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Documents II.1, Pp. 305-321.
51 Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p. 70.
52 Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p. 65.
53 Dennett, “Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam”, p. 80; Goitein, “Evidence on the Muslim Poll Tax from Non-Muslim Sources”, p. 279; Bat Ye’or, “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Documents II.1, Pp. 305-321; Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p. 65.
54 Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, p.68.
55 Gil, “A History of Palestine”, p. 151; Bat Ye’or, “The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam”, Documents II.1, Pp. 305-321.
56 Vryonis, “The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor"; Ivo Andric, “The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule”, Translated by Zelimir Juricic and John F. Loud, (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1990, Pp. 20-38).
57 Bat Ye’or, “Islam and Dhimmitude”, Pp. 70-71.
58 MEMRI, “Muslim-Christian Tensions in the Israeli-Arab Community”, August 2, 1999, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP4199
59 MEMRI, “A Friday Sermon on PA TV: … We Must Educate our Children on the Love of Jihad…' ", July 11, 2001, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP24001
60 El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam”, Pp. 3-23.
61 Bassam Tibi, “A Plea for a Reform Islam”, in “The End of Tolerance?”, Editors: Susan Stern and Elisabeth Seligmann, (London.: Nicholas Brealey, 2002, Pp. 238-45)
62 David Littman, “Universal Human Rights and Human Rights in Islam”, Midstream 1999; Vol. 45 (February-March): Pp. 2-6.
63 A Compilation of International Instruments. Volume I: Universal Instruments (Part 1 and Part 2), New York/Geneva: UN (Centre for Human Rights), 1993-94, 5th rev. (ST/HR/I/Rev.5), pp. 418 and pp. 950.
64 Adama Dieng, Press Release (Geneva, 5 December 1991). E.CN.4/1992/SR.20, paras. 17-20.
65 Ibn Warraq, “Why I Am Not a Muslim” (Amherst, NY.: Prometheus Books, 1995);
Anwar Shaikh, “Islam and Human Rights”, http://www.hindutva.org/AnwarShaikh/HumanRights/foreword.html ;
Salman Rushdie, “Yes This is About Islam”, The New York Times, November 2, 2001
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/opinion/02RUSH.html
Thulani Davis, “Taslima Nastrin Speaks (Still)”, The Village Voice, November 13-19, 2002 http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0246/davis.php
66 Warraq, “Why I Am Not a Muslim”, Pp. 197-240.; Anwar Shaikh, " Islam: The Arab Imperialism” (Cardiff, Wales: Principality, 1998)
67 Warraq, “Why I Am Not a Muslim”, Pp. 172-197; Shaikh, “Islam and Human Rights"; Rushdie, The New York Times, November 2, 2001; Davis, The Village Voice, November 13-19, 2002
68 Tibi, “A Plea for a Reform Islam”
69 Ibn Warraq, “Honest intellectuals must shed their spiritual turbans”, The Guardian, November 10, 2001.
