In reaction to the Revolutionary Guards’ rocket attack on Pakistani territory on January 16, in which Tehran claimed to have targeted separatist Baluchis, Pakistan retaliated on January 18 by bombarding what it said to be Baluchi separatists deep into Iranian territory. As such, Pakistan became the first foreign country to openly attack Iran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.
The attacks, although ostensibly against the opposing Baluchis in the neighboring country, are in fact a reflection of the larger conflict in the Middle East. They closely correlate with the Israeli war against Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the American and British attacks on the Houthis, and can prove the harbinger of a larger invasion of Iran by its age-old enemies. In this article we will see how that might turn out.
More than anything else, Iran-Pakistan relations have been influenced by the divisions in international order that were created after WWII, and although both countries have almost always been on the same side in this world order, they have never been completely friendly as close neighbors.
During the Cold War, Tehran and Islamabad were both part of the Western anti-communist coalition on the southern margin of the Soviet Union. Their mutual membership in the Western-initiated CENTO and Regional Cooperation for Development was to ensure their alliance against the threat of communist infiltration or invasion.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which separated Iran from the West, the centrality of Islam to the new regime’s discourse persuaded Tehran to stand by the side of Pakistan and the West to fight against the Soviet Union that had occupied the “Islamic nation” of Afghanistan.
Pakistan later unofficially and secretly helped develop Iran’s military nuclear program. Western intelligence agencies believe that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called “Father of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” who was tried and placed under house arrest near the end of his life, had provided Iran with nuclear know-how and technology in the late 1980s.
In recent years, both Tehran and Islamabad have warmed up to Beijing, joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, expanded their economic and strategic relations with China, and put ports and other facilities at the Chinese’ disposal in their respective Baluchistan provinces.
At the same time, Iran and Pakistan have been constantly at loggerheads over the Baluchi Question, although they had never come to blows until recently. Tehran keeps accusing Islamabad of giving shelter to Baluchi separatists of Iranian origin and occasionally using them against the Islamic Republic, with Islamabad recriminating.
Beyond the issue of Baluchis, since Pakistan is a longstanding ally of Saudi Arabia and the United States, the Islamic Republic has always treated it with suspicion. Tehran is perennially on the alert lest the Pakistani security apparatus facilitate or carry out American, or under the cover of that even Israeli, plots against the Iranian regime.
Regarding the Kerman cemetery explosions, which took place near the grave of the IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on the anniversary of his assassination and left many killed and wounded, although ISIS eventually claimed responsibility, the Revolutionary Guards remained skeptical and asserted that Israel was the “prime mover.”
According to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, some of the “foreign nationals” involved in the “suicide attack” in Kerman had slipped into the country from the “southeastern border.” This claim is in line with Tehran’s security attitude that Islamabad is in league with Washington and Tel Aviv and wanted to target the regime’s “symbol of the authority.”
In addition, these days Iran is under a lot of pressure by its supporters to make a move while its allies and proxies across the Middle East are under heavy fire from Israel, the US and Britain. Tehran is in dire need of staging a show of force without provoking major enemies to directly attack Iran. As such, it seems that the IRGC’s missile strikes on Pakistan were meant for Tehran to flex its military muscles as well as claiming that the Kerman cemetery explosions were avenged.
The Guards correctly calculated that since the US and Israel are in an offensive mood, any direct assault on them could lead to a reprisal that would exceed Tehran’s pain threshold. So they chose Pakistan as a target. At the same time, they might have tried to send the message to the world that Iran has also gone nuclear like Pakistan and reached parity.
However, what Tehran overlooked or did not take too seriously was that Islamabad would reciprocate with a counter attack and give it a wide media coverage. Pakistan is a top nuclear power with a strong military, and none of Iran’s other neighbors are quite like it. This makes it very dangerous for Tehran to provoke Islamabad.
If the conflict with Pakistan escalates, Iran will be more prone to sabotage and attacks originating from outside. It will not be able to fight on several fronts, especially with one against a particularly powerful foe close to home. That is why Tehran immediately sought to deescalate and even in the domestic media claimed that the mutual attacks were “coordinated.”
Beyond all that, the Pakistani attack can be seen as a test of Tehran’s will to respond to any strike on Iranian soil. It exposed the regime’s psychological, intelligence, strategic, and security weaknesses to its regional and global enemies who carefully studied Tehran’s nonresponse and drew the necessary conclusions for their own future actions.
The Islamist regime’s failure to foil or respond to the first highly publicized foreign attack on Iranian soil in over thirty years forever shattered the myth of its invulnerability and paved the way for stronger attacks by more serious enemies.
