Gregg Roman: Defining U.S. Policy Toward the Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict

Gregg Roman, director of the Middle East Forum, spoke to an August 18^th Middle East Forum Webinar (video) upon his return from a recent trip to Armenia sponsored by the Philos Project. Roman discussed U.S. policy towards the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. The following is a summary of his comments:

The impetus for the September 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia was the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which is rooted in the ethnic and territorial clash between the two countries. The conflict dates to the 1920s, when Azerbaijan and Armenia were republics of the former Soviet Union. Under the Soviets, Azerbaijan ruled over Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh. As the Commonwealth of Independent States emerged from the dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s, an Armenian independence movement erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh and demanded in 1991 that Azerbaijan unify the region with the “newly declared independent Armenia.”

The subsequent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992 ended when Russia negotiated a peace agreement in 1994, with guarantees by Western countries in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group. This agreement led to Armenian control over Nagorno-Karabakh and “swaths of Azerbaijani territory.” However, in 2020, “the regional politics of the Caucasus ... historical grievances and issues relating to ethnic and national identity” resulted in Azerbaijan, with weaponry supplied by both Türkiye and Israel, launching a surprise attack against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. After several weeks of intense fighting, Russia interceded in November of that year and brokered a ceasefire, leaving Azerbaijan in control of the territory it lost in 1994 as well as portions of Nagorno-Karabakh proper.

Armenia’s loss of the territory it had controlled since the Minsk Group negotiations in 1994 was a consequence of changes in that country during 2018. In March of that year, the corrupt post-Soviet autocrats who had ruled in the nation’s capital of Yerevan were ousted during the Velvet Revolution. The Armenian opposition, preoccupied with internal reforms in a move towards a “modern-day democracy,” neglected the country’s military. Ill-prepared to defend its control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, Armenia ceded the territory, with two factions emerging in Armenian politics. One faction, which called for closer relations with the U.S. and creation of a “bridge to Israel,” sought to reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, while the other succeeded in its call for an increase in Russian troops on Armenian soil.

Despite the presence of Russian forces and bases in the country, a final status agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains elusive, particularly now that Russia has redeployed to Ukraine the bulk of its forces that guaranteed Armenia’s security. As Russia reduced its presence, Azerbaijan increased its troop count in Nagorno-Karabakh and invaded Armenian territory over energy resource disputes. Conditions between the two countries have deteriorated to the point that, despite Azerbaijan’s lack of full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, it is perilously close to expelling the one hundred and twenty thousand ethnic Armenians there.

In a first for the Caucasus, Armenia’s second faction, seeking a new source for weaponry, is now calling for Iranian intervention to provide it with drones and has floated the prospect of requesting Iranian forces. Were this to occur, Iran would project its military closer to Türkiye, a NATO ally, and to the democratic countries of Armenia and Georgia. Armenia’s possible drift towards Iran should worry the U.S.

Should Armenia draw closer to Iran, it would also draw closer to Russia, which would pose a “significant threat to Western interests in Azerbaijan” since it “is acting as a northern buffer against Iranian aggression and preventing the Iranians from creating a land bridge to Russia.” Azerbaijan supplies gas and oil to Europe to offset its energy losses resulting from the boycott of Russia. If the West does maintain its close relations with Azerbaijan, it has the option of turning towards Russia, China, other Caspian countries, and even a “détente with Iran.” Despite its other options, Azerbaijan “may fear isolation by the West” and loss of access to its goods, similar to what Russia is experiencing under the West’s sanctions.

These mounting challenges present an opportunity for the West to “double down” by engaging with Armenia while acknowledging that Azerbaijan is under diplomatic pressure from human rights and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to allow Armenians a modicum of self-rule in Nagorno-Karabakh. Beyond the strategic issues, there are three indicators of how the West can succeed in the Caucasus, despite the patronage of Iran, Russia, and perhaps China looming large.

First, Azerbaijan has blocked the Lachin corridor land bridge between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, although it permits Armenians to leave as a strategy to reduce the Armenian population. The remaining Armenians’ access to gas and food will be severely curtailed in the coming harsh winter as Azerbaijan enforces the blockade and presses for capitulation. Circumstances are ripe for a resumption of the conflict, but a potential resolution to the Lachin corridor access issue is for Armenia to grant Azerbaijan “territorial continuity and recognition” in exchange for the latter granting “ethnic representation” to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. If those Armenians can practice their religion and live freely under Azerbaijani control, the possibility of freedom of movement back to Armenia proper may occur as tensions abate.

Second, a deal could be negotiated with Armenia to permit Azerbaijan a land bridge over Armenian territory via the Zanzegur corridor to enable greater trade between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, both Turkic nations. Armenia would collect taxes on the flow of goods and services, with the guarantee of safety for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh as the offset. In exchange, Azerbaijan would grant Armenia access to the Lachin corridor.

Third, beyond the issue of corridor access between the two combatants is the greater U.S. national security interest of “creating a buffer on Iran’s northern border” that would also serve as a southern buffer in the Caucasus from which the West could “start prodding” the Russians. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia share a border with Iran. Should Washington redeploy its assets and even peacekeepers to both countries, it would send a significant message to the Iranians that the U.S. will have “a footprint in the region.” Iran will not have the freedom to move its goods or illicit military supplies through Armenia to either Russia or from Armenia to Iran.

The diplomatic opportunity is for the U.S. to make both Armenia and Azerbaijan “neutral parties towards one another,” similar to the U.S. diplomatic accomplishments after the Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel, both of which remain U.S. allies. Egypt, a Soviet satellite during that conflict, has been an American ally for more than fifty years. There is also an opportunity to end the “stasis” in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict which has existed since the ceasefire three years ago.

Armenia is oriented towards Europe and wants a Western-style liberal democracy. Non-democratic Azerbaijan is nonetheless “secular in nature” and respects all religions practiced there “so long as they don’t violate Azerbaijani territorial continuity.” America and Europe can function as a guarantor of peace for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. If those three choose instead to align with “illiberal democratic ... communist, and dictatorial countries,” they will lose access to the West and meet the same fate as Russia. However, if the U.S. increases its diplomatic engagement in the region, “Türkiye could be influenced, Iran could be negatively affected, Russia could be pushed out of the Caucasus, and both ... [Armenia and Azerbaijan] may be able to have a stable, steady peace with American security backing for the foreseeable future and hopefully in the long run.”