Gregg Roman, director of the Middle East Forum, spoke to a February 24 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
I’ve just returned from participating in a fact-finding mission to Israel. Our group found a nation grappling with the aftermath of its largest-ever “military and intelligence failure,” a series of errors that resulted in Hamas’s incursion, massacre, and kidnap of civilians in Israel’s southern communities on October 7, 2023. A country at war, Israel is determined to achieve victory. Although its people exhibit a resilience and unity of purpose toward that end, the security and political establishments face a day of reckoning.
A third of the returnees to one of the affected towns, with its destroyed police station now “hallowed ground,” exhibit “grit” and a “steely determination in their eyes. They demand that their army and their government do not stop in Gaza until Hamas and every other Palestinian faction no longer provides a threat both to the city and to the nation.”
The signs of war become even more apparent when approaching the remnants of the attacked kibbutzim, some a mere half kilometer from the Gaza border. Closer still is the Nova Music Festival site, where 300 Israelis were brutalized, raped, and murdered. Scores of survivors recounted being hunted as they hid or fled.
Seeing firsthand the destruction of the homes, knowing the cruelty perpetrated on their inhabitants, and meeting with the families of hostages and those who have lost loved ones in the Gaza War is “heart-wrenching.” Some families of hostages still captive in Gaza call for “a deal at almost any cost, including the release of thousands of Palestinian security prisoners from Israeli jails.” Some fear a deal will incentivize another October 7, while others remain silent so as not to endanger their relatives serving as senior Israeli intelligence officials or high-ranking officers.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which mobilized hundreds of thousands of reservists, are engaged in a campaign to search out and destroy Hamas. The military has reached the south of Gaza and is poised to take over Rafah, Hamas’s stronghold at the Egyptian border. Israel is a “nation that is indeed hardened and remain[s] on edge,” speaks with one voice, and is determined “to achieve victory” so that such a catastrophe can never recur.
Security experts engaged in debate are “overhauling intelligence and operational readiness” and instituting reforms to achieve a heightened level of “transparency.” They are reevaluating the security failures of October 7 with “a mix of skepticism and cautious optimism.” A consensus was reached in the Knesset opposing Israel’s recognition of a two-state solution because “the days of Oslo are over. Oslo died on October 7.”
Israel’s policy towards the Palestinian Arabs post-October 7 has undergone a “complete rethink” among the army and politicians. Appeasing Hamas after each round of violence repeated the pattern of an Israeli military response followed by a negotiated ceasefire. The IDF’s practice of “mowing the grass” lulled Israel into complacency, mistakenly believing Hamas could be deterred. Although Jerusalem’s carrot-and-stick approach permitted Qatari money to placate Hamas, any thought that the demands of governance in Gaza would temper the terrorists was a fallacy.
The Israelis ignored warning signs. Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, for years threatened an attack. “Tawfan al-Aqsa/The al-Aqsa Flood” was a plan leaked to the Israeli Ministry of Defense that Israel’s “red teams” warned could happen. What’s more, a Shin Bet warning to Israel’s senior military leadership that “something was [amiss] on the Gaza-Israel border” was issued mere hours before the breach occurred. Plans to revisit the warning hours later instead of immediately sending reinforcing troops to the border were ill-conceived, for by then the massacre had begun.
The IDF’s practice of “mowing the grass” lulled Israel into complacency, mistakenly believing Hamas could be deterred.
The realization that “the Palestinians aren’t just something that can be delayed and appeased but have to be dealt with” has penetrated every Israeli’s mind, from the political left to the right. Going forward, Israel’s strategy will include: deterrence in the form of increased IDF strength to “demilitarize” growing threats before they occur; dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA); dissolution of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); and elimination of Hamas’s threat now and in the future. These aims are pursued “while still seeking pathways to limited Palestinian local governance.”
Ultimately, the urgent need to address “the root causes of the conflict rather than merely its symptoms” requires a “policy of deradicalization” of both Palestinian self-governance and the Palestinian education system. The curriculum in every school in Gaza and the West Bank must be screened by Israel, and every teacher needs to be vetted and monitored. This approach applies as well to Israel’s allies and partners who fund Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank. “Israel should not do business with any Palestinian or international entity which allows their organizations to be a conveyor belt for Palestinian radicalization.”
Dismantling Palestinian rejectionism needs a “strong man” leader who, much like those in Egypt and Jordan, realizes it is prudent to establish good relations with the Israeli government. Even if there will not be “true peace” between the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli people, “peace between [Gaza and West Bank] Palestinian leadership and Israeli leadership” is a probability.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is facing a challenge of leadership in balancing his political career with the “long-term geopolitical strategies that Israel requires.” For now, there is little motivation among the Israeli public to change a wartime government, as any attempt to do so would result in “political deadlock.” Once the war is over, a commission of inquiry will likely hold Netanyahu responsible for the October 7 failure.
If Hezbollah were to unleash its missiles, Israel would exact a price Nasrallah is hesitant to pay, namely suffering a fate similar to Hamas’s.
Against the backdrop of the Gaza war, Hezbollah’s threat at Israel’s northern border with Lebanon still looms. Some 80,000 Israeli residents have been displaced after hundreds of homes there were destroyed by Hezbollah missiles since October 7. The movement’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, although beset by the challenges of domestic governance in Lebanon’s failing economy, must justify Hezbollah’s existence by maintaining “resistance” to “the Zionist enemy” in Israel’s north.
While Hezbollah shares the same rejectionism as Hamas and the PA towards Israel, its “strategic goal” differs. With its arsenal of thousands of precision missiles, it serves as a “strategic deterrent on behalf of Iran” by providing a “second strike capability.” Thus, should Israel contemplate attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, the real possibility that Hezbollah would inflict major damage on Israel’s cities could give the Jewish state pause. However, if Hezbollah were to unleash its missiles, Israel would exact a price Nasrallah is hesitant to pay, namely suffering a fate similar to Hamas’s. At present, the U.S. and European powers are pressuring Hezbollah to move 10 km north so that Israeli assets are out of range of Hezbollah’s anti-tank fire.
While Israeli leaders appreciate the Biden administration’s military support fights in Gaza, in the long-term Israel plans to increase its capabilities so that it becomes “an equal partner” to the U.S. rather than a “supplicant or dependent.” While past Israeli leaders have managed threats since its establishment, solving them has remained elusive. October 7 and its aftermath finds Israel’s leaders “under scrutiny” to secure its future with policies that are “not just a matter of strategic necessity, but of moral imperative to protect Israeli lives.” The “seven-front war” that began in Gaza, spread to the West Bank, and continues in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen “finally ends in Iran.” Each front demands a strategy of “total victory.”
