Had the United Nations and the broader international community been serious about peace and security in the Middle East, the threat posed by Hezbollah should have long-since passed.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps formed Hezbollah in 1982 as a proxy to fight Israel. At the time, the Iran-Iraq War consumed the Islamic Republic; revolutionary authorities could not afford to send too many of its own elite forces abroad, but could train Lebanese Shi’ites to do their dirty work.
Hezbollah consolidated control in an intra-Shi’ite struggle, and grew to create a state within a state, slowly eroding Lebanon’s historic Christian identity and the ability of the Lebanese parliament to elect Maronite presidents not beholden to the group.
Core to Hezbollah’s strength is its military might. While the 1989 Taif Accords called for militia disarmament, Hezbollah ignored the demand arguing that the necessity to resist Israel took precedence but, after Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah still refused to disarm. It likewise ignored UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in September 2004 demanding the disbandment of militias in Lebanon.
Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, authorizing an enhanced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to monitor and ensure that Hezbollah deployed no arms between the Litani River and Israeli border; the 2008 Doha Agreement reinforced the disarmament call.
UNIFIL failed in its task. Today, Hezbollah has a more robust arsenal in both quality and quantity than it had prior to the 2006 war. Hezbollah terrorists freely and provocatively roamed openly along the Israeli border. Hezbollah Deputy Leader Naim Qassem, meanwhile, declared the party’s Islamic obligation is to fight Israel, regardless of Lebanese law or the effect on the state.
Almost three months into the Hamas War, many analysts consider an Israeli-Hezbollah War next, indeed already accelerating. The terrorist group has launched hundreds of attacks on Israel, damaging dozens of homes in the northern Galilee. Having long ignored Hezbollah infractions of Resolution 1701, Israel now responds militarily. Both the United States and France, meanwhile, deliberate to no effect thus far toward implementing 1701 against the backdrop of Hezbollah intransigence.
Washington’s decisions will be a critical factor as the situation unfolds. Its arms shipments to Israel demonstrate support. While the Biden administration may still hope for a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran, the Pentagon remembers that Hezbollah terrorists killed 241 Marines in a 1983 truck bombing of their barracks in Beirut.
It is unlikely Hezbollah will comply and withdraw to the Litani in what will appear to be a capitulation to Jerusalem, Washington, and the United Nations. The appearance of Israeli isolation will only harden Hezbollah’s rigidity. Israel’s air superiority and precision weaponry might deter Hezbollah from escalating border attacks into a full-scale war but as with Hamas, the chance for miscalculation is high.
Diplomats may want to revive 1701 and pass another resolution promising to police Lebanon’s southern border, but Israel will likely not tolerate the triumph of wishful thinking over action. The question for policymakers now is, with both the United Nations and UNIFIL discredited, what mechanism might disarm Hezbollah and spare Lebanon a war the country itself might not survive. Ironically, a Hezbollah defeat could be a liberating moment for Lebanon.
