Those seeking justice for terrorist atrocities celebrate the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, though the operational, political, and strategic consequences of his elimination are not yet clear. His death could end the ongoing Gaza conflict, serve as a deterrent against future Hamas activity, or even be a turning point for the broader Middle East. Yet, regardless of how events unfold, Western policymakers should consider how terror leaders rise. Leaders like Sinwar do not emerge in isolation; rather, they reflect, either directly or indirectly, the will of their people.
There is an instinctive response among policymakers to exonerate populations and argue they have no responsibility for dictators acting in their names. It is unfair to hold either Palestinians responsible for Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, for example, or the Iranians writ large for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. While separating innocent civilians from the actions of terrorists and autocrats may seem empathetic, such exculpation misunderstands links in societal, political, and military structures. As Prussian general and strategist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized, the trinity of leader, army, and people forms the foundation of society. Strategists must assess each of these elements to develop measures that address the collective will driving a conflict.
Collective mindset and tolerance of the group’s governance speak volumes about the alignment between the population and its leaders.
Palestinians voted Hamas into power in 2006 elections. While observers can note election flaws, the fact remains that the Palestinian people participated and allowed any irregularities to stand. Moreover, the Palestinian people long have supported hostilities against Israel. Palestinian school curricula promote the idea of a world without Israel, illustrating a worldview that aligns with Hamas’s objectives. Collective mindset and tolerance of the group’s governance speak volumes about the alignment between the population and its leaders.
Even if a majority of Palestinians opposed Hamas, they have allowed the organization to govern for years. While overthrowing an armed group is challenging, Hamas could not rule easily if Gaza’s population united in resistance.
This concept of collective responsibility has far-reaching implications for policymakers seeking strategies to bring stability to the region. Accepting that the people’s will supports their leaders and the causes they champion is essential to formulating an effective approach. This means understanding that it is first necessary to persuade or compel the Palestinian people to reject the legitimacy of figures like Sinwar. Similarly, it is essential to demand the Iranian population even more openly reject theocratic rulers.
By accepting links between dictatorial leaders and popular will, it is possible to target the core issue: Populations sustain oppressive and militant regimes. Such recognition then opens an array of other tools from the full spectrum of national power. Whether through influence campaigns, strategic messaging from key Western leaders, economic sanctions, or a combination of incentives and penalties, it will be possible to deploy a variety of tactics. It is essential to target each campaign to the specific population, but the goal should remain consistent: weakening the people’s will to support their leadership.
Real transformation occurs only when the people decide they have had enough.
Breaking this will is the key to achieving lasting change. While external forces can eliminate individual leaders, real transformation occurs only when the people decide they have had enough. The Palestinians must reach the point where they reject the violence and destruction Hamas has brought upon them. Likewise, the Iranian people must find the courage to reject the oppressive rule of their theocracy. This may mean a drive to absolute Israeli victory followed by unconditional Hamas surrender in Gaza or favoring “Maximum Pressure” over more targeted sanctions in Iran.
Lebanon offers another example. Following the Israeli attacks to remove Hezbollah’s leadership, the Lebanese have an opportunity to rid their country of the terrorist group. They should take such action. The West can provide public and material support to local political parties and militias and galvanize the broader population in the cause. If Lebanese do not act against Hezbollah, they should not feel themselves immune from the consequences of Hezbollah provocations.
Leadership structures endure because the people allow them to endure. Sometimes, external forces must push the people toward the difficult choice of replacing their leaders. The West should not, however, fall into the trap of exculpating people who have yet to deserve any such exoneration. Frankly, the West’s enemies count on false assumptions diluting effective strategies and allowing terrorist groups and terror-sponsoring regimes literally to get away with murder.
