Between October 2023 and October 2024, the Islamic Republic executed more than 800 people. That most of these deaths occurred under a reformist president should not surprise anyone. Across the broad sweep of the Islamic Republic’s 45-year history, capital punishment spikes during periods of reformist rule.
If the proportionality between Iranian reformism and executions surprises, it likely rests in the false conventional wisdom about Iranian politics that predominates in Washington and European capitals. When Jake Sullivan, then a young aide to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, responded positively to an Omani offer to mediate with Iranian reformers 15 years ago, he was breaking new ground, although not in the way he believed. The Omanis long had sought to entice Americans into diplomacy with the Islamic Republic. Previous American officials rebuffed the Omani mediation overtures because they recognized the Iranians on the other end had no power over the regime’s security policy. What made Sullivan different from predecessors was his credulity toward Iranian officials.
Sullivan bought the narrative that a battle between Iranian regime hardliners and reformers could meaningfully change the parameters and policies of the Islamic Republic. Sullivan and his fellow travelers in the Obama administration, and later the Biden administration, believed that if they demonstrated generosity of spirit and showed Iranians that engagement brings enrichment, the balance of power might shift in favor of the reformists.
The policies to which Iranians most object are hardwired into the Islamic Republic.
At the root of this theory were two false assumptions. The first was that the difference between Iranian reformers and hardliners was one of policy rather than tactics. For the past two years, I have attended roundtables with the Iranian president at the United Nations. Hardline President Ebrahim Raisi and his reformist successor Masoud Pezeshkian hit the same points in their discussions; their difference was one of style rather than substance, with Pezeshkian more cleverly packaging his remarks for a Western audience. Likewise, during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement protests, not a single Iranian reformist resigned for a simple reason: They wholly support Iran’s theocratic regime. Essentially, Sullivan fell for a game of good cop, bad cop.
Sullivan’s second false belief was that the Iranian electorate matters. In reality, polls suggest the hardline-reformist dichotomy reflects only about a quarter of the population; the other 75 percent reject the Islamic Republic. The Iranian people live under the regime’s repression; they are not as naïve as many Americans about the enemy they face because they encounter its petty humiliations every day. The Iranian electorate cannot meaningfully change policy because the policies to which Iranians most object are hardwired into the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps exists to prevent meaningful debate or protest.
When Mohammad Khatami won the 1997 election, there was elation in the West, especially after his call for a “Dialogue of Civilizations.” As his top aides later admitted, he was never sincere. Iranian reformists often treat diplomacy as an asymmetric warfare strategy to tie their opponents’ hands while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seeks to advance Iran’s own military capabilities. Lest the Iranian people believe the fiction, the regime ramps up the death penalty alongside reformist rhetoric. This is why the death penalty doubled under Khatami. If Khatami’s supporters wanted to absolve their leader of responsibility, they would need to acknowledge his powerlessness over the regime. Executions also skyrocketed to record levels under Hasan Rouhani, labeled a moderate by many in the West.
The Biden team may want to encourage the Islamic Republic’s reformers, not aware that the Revolutionary Guards exists to prevent muddle-through reform from succeeding. Actions have consequences, however. By coddling reformers, President Joe Biden and aides like Sullivan not only may give space for Iran to achieve nuclear breakout, but also may be condemning even greater numbers of Iranians to the gallows.
Certainly, the Iranian regime itself bears ultimate responsibility for its actions, but Biden’s and Sullivan’s inability to understand Iran or recognize the patterns of precedent leads to their moral culpability.
