For more than two decades, the United States sought to encourage the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga—the local militia—to unify into a regional body rather than operate as party militias answering to either the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Unity made sense: It placed the system above the individual and reduced the risk of internecine struggle; after all, the Kurdish parties had fought each other in the 1990s and had almost come to blows many times since.
The [U.S.] State and Defense departments appear ready to bless dividing the peshmerga into separate Erbil and Sulaymani divisions.
On February 12, 2025, Sheikh Jaafar, vice president of the Kurdistan Region, acknowledged the failure of peshmerga reform over the past decade. After years of pressuring the Kurds to unify, now it appears Washington has given up. The State and Defense departments appear ready to bless dividing the peshmerga into separate Erbil and Sulaymani divisions. On paper, they are just two units; in reality, geographic division perpetuates family rule as the Barzanis’ KDP dominates Erbil and the Talabanis’ PUK dominates Sulaymani. Both parties understand that without control of the peshmerga and security apparatus, they will neither continue their monopoly over power and resources nor even win elections. Until now, the KDP 80th and PUK 70th peshmerga divisions were illegal under Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish law. The new proposal to bring these units “under the Ministry’s command” simply normalizes partisan militias.
Herein lies the problem with compartmentalizing Iraqi policy. While those working on Kurdish issues may find such sleight of hand an elegant solution to a longstanding problem, the precedent that the State Department and Pentagon now set undermines demands that Baghdad disband Shiite militias. President Donald Trump has demanded Baghdad disband pro-Iranian militias, especially the Popular Mobilization Forces, which operate outside state authority and threaten Iraq’s sovereignty.
Just because the peshmerga are not Iran-funded militias does not make them good militias. The Kurds deserve democracy, and democratization is an illusion if two political parties sustain their control over militias, police, and security apparatus. By legitimizing KDP- and PUK-controlled militias, it signals to leaders of Popular Mobilization Forces that they can both filibuster U.S. efforts and cite U.S. policy precedents against Washington.
Trump has nominated Joel Rayburn to be Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. If Rayburn allows this peshmerga “reform” plan to proceed, it will become nearly impossible to better govern in Iraqi Kurdistan or unravel Iran’s militia strategy in Iraq. Instead, Rayburn should use U.S. leverage to force real reform.
Condition U.S. military and financial aid on structural reform—not just on paper, but in command structure.
U.S. funding is no entitlement. He should demand cessation of funding for the 80th and 70th divisions until the Ministry of Peshmerga integrates them into a unified, nonpartisan peshmerga force that serves Kurdistan rather than its ruling parties and families. He should condition U.S. military and financial aid on structural reform—not just on paper, but in command structure, training, and deployment. He should demand no security forces or peshmerga members to be members of the KDP and PUK, nor should the peshmerga and security forces have special voting days in which their patrons can supervise their balloting.
What has worked in Beirut with the Lebanese Armed Forces versus Hezbollah and what Washington now demands for Baghdad regarding disbandment and integration of Popular Mobilization Forces should extend to Erbil. Such a policy not only would strengthen the U.S. position in Baghdad and Erbil and among the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish populations but also would receive plaudits among many in the peshmerga and new generation of Iraqi army recruits who seek professionalization above politics.
