The rapid advance of Turkey-backed Syrian groups, along with militants from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a former Al Qaeda affiliate, into Aleppo and northwestern Syria have reignited a previously frozen conflict.
The rebel advance toward Aleppo was part of a larger offensive launched on November 27, 2024. The rebels took most of Aleppo within two days as forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad offered only minimal resistance. Assad has controlled Aleppo since 2016 when regime forces, backed by Hezbollah, expelled the rebels. The fall of Aleppo again to Syrian rebels and their jihadist allies will have major repercussions for Syria and its 13-year conflict. As the country’s now second largest city and its economic capital, Aleppo’s capture marks a significant shift to the civil war.
The collapse of the Syrian regime in Aleppo underscores how recent shifting dynamics elsewhere in the Middle East influence the situation in northern Syria. The Israel-Hezbollah conflict has preoccupied Iran for 14 months, and Hezbollah’s redeployment to Lebanon from Syria has left a void upon which Syrian rebels sought to capitalize.
Without a strong presence by Iran and its allied militias, Syrian forces in Aleppo were left to fend for themselves. After years of a frozen conflict, the Syrian military failed to recalibrate and operate independently.
While Turkey has expressed its concern about resulting instability, Ankara sanctioned the operation.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its Turkish supporters correctly calculated that with Iran distracted and Hezbollah with its back to the ropes, momentum had shifted to the rebels’ favor. What transpired was not a surprise attack, however, but rather an offensive in the making for months. During a meeting with commanders in May 2023, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani alluded to an eventual battle to capture Aleppo.
But al-Jawlani could not carry out this campaign alone. He required military and political support from Turkey-backed groups with whom he has maintained a volatile relationship. Militarily, their support was essential. Politically, their support was crucial to secure Turkey’s approval. While Turkey has expressed its concern about resulting instability, Ankara sanctioned the operation. Turkey-backed Syrian proxies would not have participated in such a significant offensive without Ankara’s direct authorization.
For Turkey, this move is less about supporting its Syrian proxies and more about demonstrating the extent of its influence in Syria. For months, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has expressed a desire to meet with Assad as a step toward normalizing relations with Damascus. However, Assad has consistently demanded a full Turkish military withdrawal from Syria as a precondition for talks. With Aleppo under the control of its allies, Turkey gains leverage over Assad—although the prospect of reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus seems elusive.
While Kurdish forces remain in [Aleppo] for now, it is likely that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Turkey-backed rebels will attempt to drive them out.
The capture of Aleppo also provides Turkey with an opportunity to weaken its Kurdish adversaries in Syria. This is particularly significant given that the People’s Protection Units (YPG) have controlled at least two predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo since 2012, as well as several towns north of the city. While Kurdish forces remain in these areas for now, it is likely that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Turkey-backed rebels will attempt to drive them out. Controlling a strategic territory in northwestern Syria, including Aleppo, will strengthen the position of Turkey’s Syrian proxies to launch further attacks on other Kurdish-held towns such as Kobani and Manbij. This threatens the semiautonomous region established by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in the wake of the Syrian civil war.
Predictions are difficult in a volatile situation, but one thing is certain: The Syrian conflict has entered a new phase. Even if the capture of Aleppo does not result in a regime collapse, it will still undermine Assad’s hold over other areas under his control. Retaking Aleppo would be impossible for Assad without Russian air support and ground assistance from Iran-backed militias. If these two elements are not present or are too degraded, Islamist rebels are likely to enjoy an extended period of dominance in northwestern Syria.
