The only acceptable nuclear deal with Iran requires complete dismantlement of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure—not just a temporary freeze. Any agreement that falls short would repeat catastrophic historical mistakes and embolden a regime ideologically committed to regional hegemony and existential threats against Israel and America’s other allies.
Iran must destroy, rather than freeze, its nuclear program, while committing to shut down its proxy terror network and limit its ballistic missile procurement.
Iran now possesses enough highly-enriched uranium to produce multiple nuclear weapons within weeks, with advanced missiles capable of delivering them. The regime continues funding proxy armies across the region while evading international sanctions. A truly effective deal must address this entire threat matrix, not just isolate the nuclear issue.
The regime’s fundamental nature precludes limited diplomatic solutions that permit Iran to retain enrichment capabilities.
Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities significantly, possessing dozens more nuclear sites, advanced centrifuges, and approximately 606 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent—close to the 91 percent threshold for nuclear weapons. Allowing Iran to retain any enrichment capability would prove deeply inadequate for preventing nuclear weapons development.
The regime’s ideological opposition to the West and Israel makes it impossible for the Islamic Republic to accept permanent restrictions on its nuclear ambitions. To the mullahs, the Islamic Republic represents not just a government but also a mission. Abandoning their anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-liberal stance would not constitute merely a political shift; it would effectively commit ideological suicide.
This ideological character serves as the primary barrier to meaningful agreements. The regime’s fundamental nature precludes limited diplomatic solutions that permit Iran to retain enrichment capabilities.
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes multiple facilities, several built underground to resist military strikes. As of 2025, these facilities have expanded significantly, with advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels.
Natanz, Iran’s primary uranium enrichment site, operates approximately 16,900 centrifuges, including advanced IR-6 models that enrich uranium much more efficiently than earlier designs. A new deep underground complex under construction would prove extremely difficult to target militarily.
Fordow, buried up to 80 meters deep inside a mountain near Qom, currently enriches uranium to 60 percent purity—a short technical step from weapons-grade. In 2023, uranium enriched to 83.7 percent (near weapons-grade) was discovered at this site.
Isfahan contains facilities for uranium conversion, fuel fabrication, and uranium metal production—the latter having direct weapons relevance. Other facilities include the Arak heavy water reactor, potentially enabling a plutonium path to weapons, and Parchin military complex, where nuclear weapons-related research reportedly continues.
After withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran quickly resumed and expanded enrichment activities within months.
The difference between freezing versus dismantling these facilities proves profound. Freezing leaves all equipment intact, preserves technical knowledge, and allows rapid reconstitution of capabilities when restrictions expire. After withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran quickly resumed and expanded enrichment activities within months.
Dismantlement requires physical removal and destruction of centrifuges and related equipment, forcing a much longer rebuilding period, measured in years rather than months. It creates more easily verifiable conditions through the physical absence of equipment.
According to February 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency assessments, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon in about one week using existing 60 percent highly enriched uranium, and nine nuclear weapons within two months using all enrichment resources.
The 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea provides crucial lessons about what not to do with Iran. This bilateral agreement required North Korea to freeze its 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon, halt construction of two larger reactors, and cease reprocessing activities.
In exchange, the United States would provide two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually.
The agreement collapsed for predictable reasons. First, verification was deferred: Key inspections of undeclared sites were postponed until after the United States made significant concessions. Second, parallel development continued: While freezing its plutonium program, North Korea pursued a covert uranium enrichment program, creating an alternative pathway to nuclear weapons. Third, sequential implementation created imbalance: The agreement’s structure meant North Korea received benefits before fulfilling its most important obligations. Fourth, ambiguity was exploited: North Korea maintained strategic ambiguity about its past production of plutonium, making it impossible for inspectors to establish a complete baseline inventory. Fifth, political interference undermined verification: North Korea cited sovereignty concerns to limit inspectors’ access, effectively making verification a bargaining chip rather than a requirement.
By 2003, the agreement had collapsed, with North Korea withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. Within three years of the agreement’s failure, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.
Iran possesses the region’s largest and most diverse missile arsenal with approximately 3,000 missiles across multiple range categories.
Iran possesses the region’s largest and most diverse missile arsenal with approximately 3,000 missiles across multiple range categories. Recent developments include hypersonic missile development: The Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 missiles reportedly travel at Mach 13-15 with maneuvering reentry vehicles to evade missile defenses. Precision guidance has improved from several hundred meters to 30-60 meters for advanced systems. Iran has increased deployment of mobile launchers and development of underground “missile cities” to enhance survivability.
These missiles were explicitly designed to deliver nuclear warheads. Evidence from the “Amad Plan”—Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program revealed by Israel’s 2018 seizure of the nuclear archive—shows Iran specifically designed a nuclear warhead to fit within the payload chamber of the Shahab-3 missile.
Iran’s proxy network extends its influence and potential nuclear threats throughout the region. Despite setbacks to Hezbollah and Hamas in recent conflicts, Iran maintains significant proxy influence. The Houthis in Yemen conduct attacks on shipping in the Red Sea using Iranian-supplied missiles and drones. Iraqi militias operate with approximately 100,000 to 150,000 fighters across multiple groups, receiving regular transfers of missiles, rockets, and drone technology. Iran’s cyber operations have enhanced significantly, ranking among top second-level cyber powers globally.
Any deal focused solely on nuclear capabilities would leave these other threats intact, allowing Iran to continue regional destabilization while building delivery systems for future nuclear weapons.
The current sanctions architecture consists of multiple overlapping authorities. Mahsa Act Sanctions target human rights abusers and those supporting terrorism, including Iran’s supreme leader and president. IRGC Sanctions designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, with extensive sanctions on affiliated entities. Ballistic Missile Suppliers Sanctions from April 2025 target six individuals and twelve entities involved in Iran’s domestic carbon fiber production for ballistic missiles. Financial isolation keeps Iranian banks disconnected from the SWIFT financial messaging system, and Iran was re-placed on the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. Energy sector sanctions target Iran’s “shadow fleet” of tankers and impose secondary sanctions on countries purchasing Iranian oil.
The economic impact of sanctions proves severe: Inflation remains above 30 percent, the Iranian currency has depreciated dramatically, and approximately one-third of Iranians have been pushed into poverty.
However, Iran has developed strategies to mitigate sanctions, including “ghost fleets” of tankers, alternative payment channels with Russia and China, and barter trade arrangements. These evasion tactics highlight the need for continued, comprehensive sanctions enforcement.
Iran has developed strategies to mitigate sanctions, including “ghost fleets” of tankers, alternative payment channels with Russia and China, and barter trade arrangements.
An acceptable nuclear deal with Iran must not repeat the mistakes of previous agreements. An acceptable deal must include complete dismantlement of nuclear infrastructure: All centrifuges, enrichment facilities, and related equipment must be physically removed and destroyed, not merely deactivated or mothballed. Front-loaded verification must precede sanctions relief, unlike the North Korea agreement, establishing a complete baseline of nuclear materials and activities. The verification regime must include prompt access to any site of concern, including military facilities, with minimal delay and no right of refusal. The agreement must address all aspects of Iran’s threat, including ballistic missiles, proxy support, and regional destabilization activities. Sanctions relief should automatically “snap back” upon verification of non-compliance, without requiring additional political decisions. Restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program should not expire until the IAEA has verified that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. The agreement should include measures to monitor key nuclear scientists and prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons-related knowledge.
Iran proves unlikely to accept these stringent requirements for several reasons. The regime’s ideological commitment to anti-Western and anti-Israel ideology makes abandoning nuclear ambitions tantamount to “ideological suicide.” Iran has invested billions in developing indigenous nuclear capabilities and will resist complete dismantlement. Iran views its nuclear program as critical leverage against perceived Western threats. Iran has consistently advanced its nuclear capabilities during negotiations and resisted full transparency. Hardliners would perceive complete dismantlement as surrender to Western pressure.
This reality creates a stark choice: accept a deeply flawed agreement that merely delays Iran’s nuclear ambitions, or maintain maximum pressure while preparing other options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
The only acceptable nuclear deal with Iran requires complete dismantlement of nuclear infrastructure, comprehensive addressing of missile and proxy activities, robust verification mechanisms, and maintenance of sanctions until full compliance across all areas. While Iran proves unlikely to accept such terms, the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear-armed Iranian regime make compromise on these requirements unacceptable.
The failure of the 1994 North Korea Framework Agreement demonstrates that partial measures, deferred verification, and sequential implementation lead to nuclear proliferation rather than preventing it. Maximum pressure through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and credible military options remains the most effective approach to confronting the Iranian nuclear threat until the regime demonstrates genuine willingness to abandon its nuclear ambitions and destabilizing regional activities.
