Regime change is coming to the Islamic Republic, though it has nothing to do with the outside world. Ali Khamenei, the regime’s 85-year-old supreme leader, has already started preparing Iranians for inevitable transition upon his death. The 2022-2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, meanwhile, demonstrated just how little legitimacy the regime maintains as it approaches a leadership change. The regime has responded with repression, but this will only hasten its collapse.
There is no shortage of Iranian opposition groups. Too often, however, they have been their own worst enemy as they amplify their differences and allow these to distract from both a unified goal of ending the Islamic Republic and their common belief that Iran should be at peace with itself and its neighbors.
When coalitions splinter, the international community concludes the opposition lacks staying power.
That dynamic must end. Fragmentation squanders resources, duplicates efforts, and confuses allies. When coalitions splinter, the international community concludes the opposition lacks staying power. This, in turn, demoralizes protesters inside Iran who need moral and material backing from those with freedoms abroad.
This does not mean the diaspora should ignore its differences. Monarchists and republicans have different visions of a post-Islamic Republic political order. Regional and ethnic groups suggest federalism.
Monarchists clash with republicans demanding an elected head of state. Federalists and minority activists prioritize local autonomy, which many Iranians conflate with separatism. Recent attempts at broad alliances, such as 2023’s Mahsa Charter initiative, collapsed under pressure from competing camps. Some participants faced online harassment for failing to pledge allegiance to the preferred leader. Others walked away in frustration when they sensed backroom maneuvering.
Democracy, however, thrives on debate and Iranian activists recognize the poles of this debate. Iranian political groups must debate now, or they will squander the opportunity when the Iranian regime teeters under the weight of its own incompetence, cruelty, and illegitimacy.
The key lies in shaping a transitional consensus around core principles: secular governance, religious freedom, respect for human rights, free elections, rule of law, and territorial sanctity.
Iranians should understand that some ethnic groups remain suspicious of centralized control given the history of persecution under both the monarchy and Islamic Republic. At the same time, regional leaders must acknowledge the suspicion that arises from past separatist movements, many sponsored by those like the British Empire and Soviet Union, who treated Iranian sovereignty with disdain. No Iranian is going to embrace a movement that calls for their country’s destruction but, simultaneously, decentralization is a valid topic to discuss as Iranians debate nuances such as the strength and reach of central rule versus what should be the power of provinces and localities.
There does not need to be consensus on specific policies, only on specific principles.
There does not need to be consensus on specific policies, only on specific principles. For too long and in different contexts, the State Department has counseled a “big tent” approach to bring opposition groups together in a unitary governing whole. This is misguided, though; nor would it even work in the United States, where forcing J.D. Vance and Kamala Harris to share an office would be a recipe for disaster. Instead, what makes the United States work is a common agreement about the political playing field and the core principles of American law. Iranian diaspora groups cannot bypass this step and hope to impose their own beliefs by force. The goal must be to agree to the framework of debate, to allow smooth transition to a constitutional convention and transitional elections upon the regime’s collapse.
Iran’s diaspora, therefore, should form a permanent liaison committee—call it a “unity council”—that balances ideological, regional, and generational viewpoints. This council needs seats for representatives from each province, secular republicans, and monarchists, many of whom seek a role for the son of the ousted shah as a unifying figure, though not necessarily as one who would wield power. The council can negotiate shared statements, conduct joint advocacy in Western legislatures, and organize synchronized worldwide rallies. Members must pledge to set aside their political differences when advocating for change outside Iran, while preparing for legitimate debates that will come as the regime collapses. They also may begin to draft proposed constitutions so that they can establish where consensus exists and what impasses they must debate following the Islamic Republic’s end. Having these drafts in hand will enable transitional authorities to begin their constitutional convention potentially within weeks of Khamenei’s death.
Iranians have pushed tyrants aside before. They can do it again. The Islamic Republic today counts on the fissiparousness of the opposition to undermine its own effectiveness, but personality cults and old grudges must not distract focus from the common goal.
