Iraq’s Presidency Should Belong to a Kurd but Not to a Kurdish Political Party

If the Kurds Want Respect on the World Stage, They Should Nominate Someone Respectable; They Once Were Iraq’s Engine for Democracy

An Iraqi polling station with ballot box election concept. Iraq is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025.

An Iraqi polling station with ballot box election concept. Iraq is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025.

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Saddam Hussein, the late president of Iraq, was a Sunni Arab supremacist. He accused Shi’i Iraqis falsely of harboring loyalty to Iran and stripped thousands of Iraqis’ citizenship. He gerrymandered districts, changed curricula, and used chemical weapons against the Kurds, although he also cynically reached out to and cooperated with politicians like Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani in order to divide and conquer.

Following Saddam’s fall, Iraq’s Shi’ite Arab majority and Kurdish minority demanded proportional power in the post-Saddam order. In practice, they entered into an informal confessional system not unlike Lebanon’s, albeit one of consensus rather than law. Since Iraq held its first free elections in 2005, Kurds have always claimed the presidency, Sunni Arabs the speakership of the parliament, and Shi’i Arabs the premiership. This worked for Iraq’s various groups because Kurds sought prestige on the world stage, Sunnis wanted the greater power that came with control of the legislature, and the Shi’i believed their majority status made the most powerful political office their due.

Iraqi elections are important because they largely determine which group or coalitions of groups will take the premiership.

Each sectarian and ethnic group, then, competes for the office. Iraqi elections are important because they largely determine which group or coalitions of groups will take the premiership. Sunni rivalries and ambitions revolve around the speakership. One of the reasons why Al Anbar is now among Iraq’s most developed and affluent governorates is the investment that former Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi channeled into his home province. The intra-Kurdish jockeying for the presidency was more cynical. Results released always awarded Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party more Kurdish votes than the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led first by party chief Jalal Talabani and, after his death, by former aide Barham Salih, or Talabani’s brother-in-law Latif Rashid. Barzani preferred to dominate Kurdistan and so signed off on their rival’s supremacy in Baghdad.

As elections loom, that intra-Kurdish understanding is fracturing. Masoud and his son and heir-apparent Masrour Barzani no longer see Kurdish leadership in Erbil and Baghdad as an either-or prospect. With the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in disarray and Jalal Talabani’s sons, Bafel and Qubad, seemingly intent to drive it into the ground, the Barzanis believe they can have it all.

Current president Latif Rashid has distinguished himself with his lethargy. He lives high on the public dime but contributes little, if anything, to Iraqi politics or unity, especially when compared to Jalal Talabani and Barham Salih, both of whom used their office to bring parties together, represent Iraq on the world stage, and mediate to prevent conflict. Latif’s presidency, instead, only highlights Kurdish nepotism and the political dysfunction that promotes a low-energy, inept, and disinterested former official to be the face of the Iraqi nation.

In a country filled with corrupt political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party is perhaps the most corrupt.

Certainly, undermining Barham Salih to punish his prestige, only to replace him with Latif, should disqualify the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from its assumed monopoly over the presidency pick. So, too, does the party’s hemorrhaging popularity on its home turf. The problem is that the Kurdistan Democratic Party offers nothing better. Masoud Barzani long has sought to put his consiglieri, Fuad Hussein, in the top post. Iraqis would resent this for two reasons. First, in a country filled with corrupt political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party is perhaps the most corrupt. It also rejects Iraqi unity. In 2017, to shield himself and other top Barzanis from lawsuits and arbitration judgments over unfulfilled contracts, the Barzanis sponsored a referendum for independence; their logic was they would have sovereign immunity if they became sovereign. This is why the Barzanis thumbed their noses at a U.S. offer to delay the referendum for two years to better prepare. Ultimately, it was a disaster for the Kurds, as the Kurdistan Democratic Party lost control over most of the territory it disputed with Baghdad. Both Fuad personally and the Kurdistan Democratic Party as a whole supported that disaster.

In recent months, Fuad has, according to State Department sources, used his position as Iraq’s foreign minister to arrange meetings on behalf of Masrour Barzani that ran counter to Iraq’s sovereignty and diplomatic positions. To have the Kurdistan Democratic Party represent Iraq is akin to having Basque or Catalan separatists lead Spain.

Perhaps the answer for Kurds is to claim the position but reject party control. Rather than treat Iraq’s presidency as a perk for party service, Kurds might demand a choice—someone whose service set them apart.

Rather than treat Iraq’s presidency as a perk for party service, Kurds might demand a choice—someone whose service set them apart.

Three well-known judges could fit the bill. Naz Nuri was an extraordinary judge who resigned several years ago in disgust over corruption and injustice; she since has become a well-known painter. Or, Rizgar Mohammed Amin, a Kurdish judge who presided over Saddam’s trial for his atrocities against the Shi’a at Dujail. He was bold and the only judge who initially released his name. Judge Sheikh Latif, a former Gorran member of parliament, also has widespread respect.

Another possible candidate would be Jalal Sam Agha, widely respected for his integrity and commitment to democracy. Both sides of the Kurdish political divide respect him as a technocrat and good bureaucrat.

Politicians may complain that Iraq’s presidency is a political position and so it should remain the domain of politicians. Judges can weigh evidence and negotiate just as well. As important, though, is the image presidents convey. Jalal Talabani was gregarious. Barham Salih was detail-oriented and energetic. Latif Rashid is lethargic, and Fuad Hussein venal. Masoud Barzani’s uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, a former foreign minister, also would send the wrong signals given his impeachment for corruption, his reputation for playing dirty, and a career based on nepotism.

If the Kurds want respect on the world stage, they should nominate someone respectable. Perhaps both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan might find some advantage in the choice, so long as it denies the position to the other. Kurds deserve and Iraqis would celebrate Naz, Rizgar, Sheikh Latif, or another Jalal. The Kurds were once Iraq’s engine for democracy. The parties ruined that, but they still could be Iraq’s engine for reform.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Turkey. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.
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