The proponents of a nuclear agreement in Iran say a deal is necessary because Iran already possesses necessary scientific knowledge which a military strike cannot undo. For example, the Arms Control Association’s Kelsey Davenport, opined
The National Iranian–American Council (NIAC), which often appears to act as the Islamic Republic’s unofficial lobby in the United States, also takes this position: “While some of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli or U.S. military strikes, Iran’s nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed away,” it asserts.
The Wall Street Journal’s Laurence Norman also repeated this logic: “That knowledge can’t be reversed,” he wrote, while suggesting an effective deal would require a wholesale dismantling of Iranian facilities.
Such assumptions may not be valid, though; often, they do not affirm the policy prescriptions that follow. There are no magic formulas. Just because Policy A has flaws does not mean its alternatives are better. If Iran already has knowledge and duplicative and diverse facilities, does this mean only a diplomatic resolution can prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? From a military perspective, if the United States, Israel, or other potential combatants are aware of secret sites, they can strike them. If they are unaware, Iran would likely not expose them in diplomatic negotiations or include them in an agreement.
In essence, striking Iran’s dual-use nuclear facilities would force Khamenei to rip off the Band-Aid and accept the pain rather than draw out talks over months or years.
The technical point about Iran’s existing nuclear capabilities also sidesteps the advantage of a military strike: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s decades-long support for Iran’s nuclearization ties his own legitimacy to the program. This makes it extremely difficult to reverse course absent delivering a death blow to his own regime. This in turn suggests Iranian negotiators are trying to entrap the West in a process but have no intention of reaching an effective deal. A military strike could shake up this dynamic: A limited strike might damage Khamenei politically and force him to compromise lest he suffer even greater humiliation. In essence, striking Iran’s dual-use nuclear facilities would force Khamenei to rip off the Band-Aid and accept the pain rather than draw out talks over months or years.
Most importantly, Iran’s nuclear knowledge can be reversed. Consider how much the assassination of chief scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh set back the Iranian program. What this suggests is that a military attack must be coupled with a campaign to remove Iran’s nuclear scientists, either by encouraging defection or, alternatively, by assassination. Iran’s scientists need to face a choice: defect or die.
Many within the arms control lobby favor a diplomatic resolution to preserve the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But preserving the NPT requires assuring regional partners like Saudi Arabia and even Egypt that Iran will not go nuclear, which Riyadh and Cairo will not believe so long as Iran is allowed to enrich uranium and keep its facilities. Instead, they will likely jumpstart their own nuclear programs. Simply put, the arms control community’s commitment to diplomacy over military action undermines its own mission and will make the effective death of NPT probable.
