The ceasefire that both the Biden administration and incoming Trump administration pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept is an extraordinarily bad deal. It rewards terror and continues a dynamic by which Israel releases convicted terrorists, only to see them murder on an even greater scale later. The deal almost certainly will fall apart as Hamas leaders realize that if they release all hostages, they lose their leverage.
The victory that Israel handed Hamas will not only be limited to Gaza, however. Hamas and its backers chose October 7, 2023, to shred the then-existing ceasefire and attack Israel for three reasons: It was the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War; it coincided with the Jewish holiday Sukkot; and it was Hamas’s opening move in a struggle for broader Palestinian leadership.
The latter reason is too often ignored. Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is 89 years old and in the twentieth year of his four-year presidential term. Unlike his predecessor Yasser Arafat, the chain-smoking Abbas has not appointed a successor. Transition is coming, and all Palestinian factions seek to position themselves for the post-Abbas era. Even prior to October 7, 2023, Hamas sought to infiltrate and establish cells in Nablus, Jenin, and other West Bank towns.
Transition is coming, and all Palestinian factions seek to position themselves for the post-[Mahmoud] Abbas era.
By throwing a lifeline to Hamas and allowing it to claim victory, Netanyahu is essentially promoting Hamas in the leadership struggle to succeed Abbas. On January 15, 2025, Hamas released a statement on its Telegram channel (translated by MEMRI), declaring, “The fruit of the legendary steadfastness of our great Palestinian people and our valiant resistance in the Gaza Strip, for more than 15 months.” Palestinians will read between the lines: Hamas provided resistance and victory; the Palestinian Authority achieved nothing.
Israel may believe it can play whack-a-mole to keep Hamas out of the West Bank, but Jerusalem overestimates its own abilities. Hamas laid a multibillion-dollar terror infrastructure despite Israel believing it had hermetically sealed Gaza. Penetrating the West Bank from Jordan will be easier given the porous nature of the region and its mountainous terrain. Jordanian officials may offer intelligence and support officially, but they make the same devil’s bargain that Egypt made: turning a blind eye to weapons smuggling in exchange for Hamas declining to target them. That Jordan will not be resolute is already clear: Against the backdrop of Israel’s war against Hamas, Jordan’s Queen Rania lobbied for Hamas in private meetings on Capitol Hill, shocking the senators with whom she met. It was spinelessness at its most malign.
Palestinian public opinion matters. If Hamas has a critical mass of supporters, it will be able to penetrate. After Abbas passes, Palestinian governance will face a vacuum that the forces of altruism will not fill.
In a December 2001 interview, Usama Bin Laden explained the strategy behind his terror: “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse.” By throwing Hamas a lifeline and validating its rhetoric that terrorism worked to achieve its goals, both Joe Biden and Donald Trump’s Qatar-promoting Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff have allowed Hamas to show itself as the strong horse at the worst possible moment, likely handing the West Bank to the terrorist group on a silver platter after Abbas’s demise.
