The Kurds stand at a crossroads.
General Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, has affirmed support for “the unity and integrity of Syrian territory” and rejected “division projects that threaten the country’s unity.” While he emphasized the importance of stability and dialogue, Mazloum did not specify conditions for this support. The Kurds have been here before. Just as they seek to negotiate their rights within a hostile Syria, so, too, did they once seek to negotiate their rights within an equally hostile Iraq.
In Syria, the Kurds control one-third of the country’s territory while facing persistent incursions by Turkey and its proxies.
After U.S.-led forces ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani sought autonomy within a federal state to formalize the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government that they had formed in the aftermath of the 1991 Kurdish uprising. Yet, the Iraqi government did not honor Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, which mandated a resolution for territories disputed by the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi central government before December 31, 2007. After the Kurds held an independence referendum in September 2017, the Iraqi government retook much of the disputed territories, including areas that Baghdad had committed to resolving through implementing Article 140.
Kurds should not make the same mistake twice. Negotiations are one thing; enforcement is another. The saga of Article 140 demonstrates the danger of relying on promises of future resolution, even if they are inscribed in law.
Since 2018, Turkey has occupied, ethnically cleansed, and Turkified portions of Kurdish regions in Syria. This should not be the baseline for future negotiations; rather, the return of the Kurds to their homes must be a pre-condition to negotiations for establishing a new Syria.
For states like Syria to demand protection of territorial integrity, it should be required that they safeguard the rights of all national and ethnic groups within their borders. A new Syrian constitution, the drafting of which could take up to three years, must recognize Kurdish grievances, uphold the Kurds’ right to self-determination, and incorporate provisions for their independence should a future Syrian government again violate Kurdish rights or seek forcible Arabization.
In Syria, the Kurds control one-third of the country’s territory while facing persistent incursions by Turkey and its proxies. They should negotiate from a position of strength, even as Turkey demands their disarmament and opposes any form of Kurdish administration. Meanwhile, the new Turkish-backed leadership in Damascus remains weak and lacks a unified military. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in contrast, are disciplined.
The Kurds’ historical suffering should galvanize resolve to secure a political framework.
The Kurds’ control over oil-rich regions in Syria is a bargaining chip. Here, too, Kurds should consider their experience in Iraq. The Kurds there suffer recurring budget cuts and delays in public sector salary payments, largely due to continuing disputes with Baghdad over ownership and control of regional oil resources. Drawing from this lesson, Kurdish negotiators in Syria must therefore prioritize enforceable agreements that safeguard their economic interests.
After the fall of the Assad regime in early December 2024, the United States, Israel and European Union have backed the Kurds in Syria. However, this support is not guaranteed. The return of President Donald Trump to the White House may alter the trajectory of U.S. involvement. Kurdish leaders must prepare for such contingencies.
The Kurds have paid a steep price for their current autonomy over their homeland. Whether in Iraq, achieved through the U.S.-led intervention against Saddam Hussein, or in Syria, forged amid civil war, Kurds have made huge sacrifices. Over 12,000 Kurdish fighters have died and 15,000 have been injured in Syria alone.
Both the price and the stakes are too high for compromise without accountability. The Kurds’ historical suffering should galvanize resolve to secure a political framework. Kurdish leaders have an opportunity to carve out a future that ensures the establishment of a second recognized Kurdish entity. They should not squander this moment by accepting insincere promises like many of their Kurdish compatriots did in Iraq.
