Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has cast himself as a humble servant of the Syrian people, someone who rejects power and prestige. His actions, however, tell a different story. While he stated that he would be more comfortable if Syrians did not ask him to run for president, such sentiment did not stop him from declaring himself interim president.
Each step he has taken points to a leader invested in consolidating control and advancing his authority. Through the provisions he orchestrated in the interim constitution, al-Sharaa now holds several powerful positions: president, head of government, commander in chief of armed forces, and head of the newly established national security council. He is set to serve in these roles throughout the five-year transitional period—a timeline he determined.
Al-Sharaa has surrounded himself with not only loyal HTS acolytes but also close family members he appointed to senior positions at both national and provincial levels.
In a display of nepotism, al-Sharaa has surrounded himself with not only loyal HTS acolytes but also close family members he appointed to senior positions at both national and provincial levels. On April 5, for example, al-Sharaa appointed his eldest brother, Maher—born in 1973—as general secretary of Syria’s presidency, a powerful post at the heart of the new regime. The move marked another step toward consolidating familial control, following Maher’s tenure as minister of health in the caretaker government established eight days after Assad’s fall.
Having lived and studied in Russia, Maher is a key intermediary between Damascus and Moscow. His influence is bolstered by his Russian wife, whose family maintains close connections with the Russian government. Maher had been involved in his brother’s political enterprise well before the fall of the Assad regime. From 2022 to 2023, he oversaw the health sector in HTS-controlled areas in northwest Syria, signaling his early role in governance under the group’s rule.
Another of al-Sharaa’s siblings, Hazem, emerged on the political scene following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s takeover of Damascus. Born in 1975, he studied law and worked in Damascus before leaving Syria in 2012. After spending several years in the Persian Gulf, he settled in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, where he joined al-Hayat, a company specializing in soft and mineral drinks, eventually rising to the position of general manager.
While the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham government has not formally announced an appointment for Hazem, his public presence has become increasingly visible in recent months. During al-Sharaa’s first foreign visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Hazem was part of the delegation. A widely-circulated photo showing Hazem shaking hands Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made headlines across Syrian media.
Reports suggest that Hazem will sit on the country’s investment board, with the hope of leveraging his extensive regional network to attract investment in Syria. This move underscores al-Sharaa’s intent to place family at the nexus of power and wealth. There are also reports of al-Sharaa appointing other family members, including relatives of his wife, to key positions in Damascus and other provinces that are under his control.
Al-Sharaa’s nepotism carries a distinct post-conflict character and reflects his ongoing efforts to legitimize and consolidate his rule.
Nepotism was an entrenched feature of Syria’s governance for decades under the Assad dynasty. It is hardly an unfamiliar phenomenon in much of the region. However, al-Sharaa’s nepotism carries a distinct post-conflict character and reflects his ongoing efforts to legitimize and consolidate his rule. By placing family members in important government positions, al-Sharaa rewards loyalty and constructs a political ecosystem that ensures control and minimizes dissent.
In a fragile political landscape marked by competing interests among Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham allies, al-Sharaa carefully navigates internal fault lines, striving to maintain cohesion while projecting the image of a decisive leader. His performance of control, however, largely masks underlying tensions within his Islamist movement. As his own distrust grows about the loyalty of some of those in his political movement, al-Sharaa increasingly appears to place his trust—and his vision for stability and long-term rule—in the hands of his family.