Syria’s former dictator Bashar al-Assad fled the country on December 8, leaving behind numerous unresolved issues for the new Islamist-led regime to address. Chief among them is the Kurdish question.
Since the founding of the modern state in Syria in 1920, no government has treated the country’s Kurds as equals. Except for a brief period of political and cultural freedoms under the French mandate, Syrian governments have treated Kurds—who now make up about 15 percent of Syria’s 24 million population—as second-class citizens. In 1962, one year before the consolidation of Baath rule, and continuing afterward, Arab nationalist leaders stripped Syrian citizenship from a significant percentage of Kurds.
The Assad dynasty not only failed to address past injustices against the Kurds but exacerbated them through demographic engineering and repression of the Kurdish political movement.
Kurds were able to achieve a level of de facto autonomy only after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war, largely due to extensive U.S. military support in the fight against the Islamic State terror group since 2014.
With Assad out of the picture, Kurds face a new reality—one marked by significant Turkish involvement in Syria’s affairs.
While it may seem that Kurds, with U.S. backing, have built strong institutions on the ground, Turkey’s multiple invasions in recent years reveal how precarious the situation remains for Syrian Kurds.
Syrian Kurds have largely embraced secularism, rejecting political Islam.
The current outcome of the Syrian conflict has positioned Turkey as the biggest winner, and it appears determined to leverage this status to dismantle the Kurdish autonomous experiment in Syria. The Kurdish forces in Syria, linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, have never posed a direct threat to Turkish national security. Rather, it is their political project that threatens the Islamist agenda of the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey.
Since the founding of the first Kurdish political party in 1957, Syrian Kurds have largely embraced secularism, rejecting political Islam. Although most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, no Islamist-leaning party has emerged within the Kurdish political landscape, despite persistent efforts by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and attempts by the Assad regime to foster such movements.
With the jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) now wielding political power in Syria, there likely will be efforts by HTS to infiltrate Kurdish society. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, now rebranded as Ahmed al-Sharaa, recently made positive remarks about Kurds. But he is a shrewd Islamist with a proven ability to appease effectively. While he may avoid direct confrontation with Kurdish forces, particularly with American troops still present in northeast Syria, he likely will take every possible step to bring the Kurdish region under his control.
It remains unclear whether al-Jawlani will fully comply with Turkey’s directives regarding the Kurdish dossier. However, Ankara has numerous tools at its disposal, which it has utilized to erode Kurdish influence in various parts of northern Syria. Most recently, Islamist factions within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army group have expelled Kurdish forces from several strategic towns in Aleppo province and are now making serious threats to seize the Kurdish city of Kobani, long regarded a symbol of resistance to Islamic State militants.
Syrian Kurdish groups could strengthen their position by forming a unified front in negotiations with Damascus.
The Kurdish-led autonomous administration, which governs northeast Syria, has made overtures to the new rulers in Damascus in the hope of reaching an understanding regarding the Kurdish region. For example, shortly after Assad’s fall, the Kurdish administration opted to raise the new Syrian flag, signaling their acceptance of the new reality. Since December 8, Kurdish leaders have issued statements expressing willingness and readiness to engage in dialogue about the future of the Kurdish region.
It may sound like a cliché—given the complex history of fragmentation in Kurdish politics—but Syrian Kurdish groups could strengthen their position by forming a unified front in negotiations with Damascus. In 2020, the United States sponsored direct talks between the major Kurdish political factions in northeast Syria. Although those efforts did not yield meaningful outcomes, renewing such initiatives is worthwhile, especially with U.S. support as Washington still holds leverage in the region.
Despite the rapidly evolving events in Syria, one thing remains clear: Kurds will not accept a return to the pre-2011 period when the Syrian regime denied them basic rights. After more than a decade of de facto autonomy, Syrian Kurds are determined to fight tooth and nail to protect their gains and secure their recognition in the future constitution of Syria.
