Too often, human rights activists, diplomats, and journalists misunderstand the idea of proportionality as it pertains to the laws of land warfare and the Geneva Conventions. These and other relevant international law sources neither state nor imply that a party must respond to an attack with force proportional to that used against them; rather, force used must be proportional to the objective.
For example, if sniper fire coming from a house pins down a military unit, that unit could legally call for artillery fire to destroy the house and neutralize that threat. Artillery and sniper rifles may not represent equivalent firepower, but the amount of force would be proportional to the legitimate military objective of preventing the deaths of the troops. There is not a carte blanche, however; it would not be proportional to call in an air strike to wipe out an entire city block to kill one sniper in a single house.
The mistaken notion that a party responding to an attack may only respond in a way that would cause the same amount of damage is widespread. Fareed Zakaria, for example, wrote in the Washington Post, “It is now almost three months since Benjamin Netanyahu’s government launched its ground invasion of Gaza, and it is time to ask some hard questions: Has it been proportional to the damage that Hamas inflicted on Israel?”
The proper measure for Israel’s response requires Jerusalem look at what is the legitimate military objective of the war in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, or perhaps even Iran. In Gaza, for example, Israel’s stated goal is the destruction of Hamas’s military capability and the end to its control of Gaza. That allows much greater use of force than the violence Hamas perpetrated on October 7, 2023. Diplomats may not like Israel’s goal and may themselves favor a ceasefire that would allow Hamas to reconstitute its arms and governance, but that does not affect the legality of Israel’s goal and methods. Israeli strategists rightly consider decades of deadly Hamas attacks and the likelihood they would continue. The Israel Defense Forces, therefore, have every right to take the war to Gaza until Hamas surrenders or is destroyed.
Like Zakaria, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch for almost three decades until stepping down in 2022, stumbled over proportionality. Roth argued that Israel violated proportionality while rescuing three hostages held by Hamas because, in his opinion, too many Hamas fighters and civilians died. He is wrong, however, because had Israel used less suppressive fire, Israel’s likelihood of rescuing the hostages and protecting the rescuers would decrease. (Roth also plays fast and loose with whom he defines as a civilian.)
President Joe Biden also erred in his reference to proportionality. After Iran launched more than 100 ballistic missiles at Israel, he opined, “Israel has a right to respond. It should be a proportional response,” and warned Jerusalem not to target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The decision about how Israel responds, though, revolves around whether Israel is prepared to tolerate a cycle of repeated missile attacks by Iran, or if they want to end altogether the multi-front war Iran imposes upon Israel. Jerusalem also might consider that the Islamic Republic may now rush its efforts to build an operational nuclear device, a goal that it must preempt.
Israel, therefore, has a menu of legitimate options, ranging from limited strikes to an effort to destroy Iran’s nuclear program entirely and/or eliminate the regime’s leaders. To be legal, Israel’s efforts would need to be proportional to those objectives, not some arbitrary or political notion limited to emulating the attacks on Israel, the standard now bantered about by pundits or politicians.
