There is no doubt that waste, fraud, and abuse permeate the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Some of this, including USAID’s disbursement of more than $100 million to terrorists, raises issues of criminal negligence, if not deliberate terror finance on the part of some staff members who evaded oversight after concerns first emerged.
Former USAID Administrator Samantha Power began her career writing about the unwillingness of U.S. officials to tackle genocide. During the Obama administration, she provided moral cover for a White House refusing to address it. She has now capped her career by funding those terrorist charities most dedicated to perpetrating genocide.
While many countries, non-governmental organizations, and activists castigate the foreign aid cutoff, they exaggerate the contributions of USAID.
While many countries, non-governmental organizations, and activists castigate the foreign aid cutoff, they exaggerate the contributions of USAID. First, while true that U.S. foreign aid amounts to less than 1 percent of gross domestic product, this figure ignores that Americans do not rely on their government to substitute for their own generosity; Americans give more to charities than do Europeans, Russians, or Chinese. Second, the failure of USAID to brand often reduces its impact. Third, moral hazard can be high. Substituting assistance for foreign government responsibility also undermines democracy.
At best, the United States gets some credit. There is a joke in sub-Saharan Africa about three businessmen discussing international assistance. “The Chinese built our stadium, so whenever I go to a football match, I think about China,” one man says. “The Japanese built our airport, so whenever I fly on business, I thank Japan,” another said. The third chimed in, “The Americans funded our sewer system, and so whenever I take a … I think about the United States.”
Too often, however, the tendency of USAID to supplement or even substitute for incompetent or malign government elsewhere can undermine security and stability. Why should the Palestinian Authority or Félix Tshisekedi’s regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo adhere to their commitment to cease terror when they know that international donors will simply rebuild everything or shield them from the consequences of their choices?
As Daniel Pipes and I wrote here recently, foreign assistance is a relatively recent phenomenon. While it can serve a real purpose—for example, providing emergency aid following a natural disaster—too often it achieves little, at least relative to the money invested. The American University of Cairo, for example, receives millions of U.S. dollars but has become a hotbed of anti-Americanism. Its president, Ahmad Dallal, formerly dean of Georgetown University Qatar, once spoke in support of both Hamas and Hezbollah.
The question, however, is not whether foreign assistance is always good or always bad, but rather, what works? It is easy to talk about “soft power,” but this is often wishful thinking. Even if there is some benefit, it is doubtful the cost equals the benefit. Dumping billions of dollars absent metrics to prove their worth is a poor use of limited resources.
The next question is whether there are exceptions that prove the rule. Is it possible for USAID to give grants where benefits to peace, security, and U.S. national interest are clear and quantifiable?
Abaarso was Somaliland’s first Western-style school. It chose applicants upon aptitude and merit, rather than political or clan connections.
Here, Somaliland’s Abaarso Network may be a marquee example. Founded in 2009 by former hedge fund manager Jonathan Starr with his own seed money, Abaarso was Somaliland’s first Western-style school. It chose applicants upon aptitude and merit, rather than political or clan connections. Shepherds, orphans, and those from more elite families mixed and matriculated. The school allowed Somalis in addition to citizens of Somaliland to apply. The education in English and emphasis on critical thinking was a game-changer. Today, it is the only U.S.-accredited high school in either Somaliland or Somalia. What began as a single coeducational school for grades 7-12 has expanded into a number of K-12 schools.
Within a few years, universities such as Yale, Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology were competing over Abaarso grade-school graduates, the first students from Somaliland in more than 30 years to matriculate at U.S. universities. More than 300 alumni have earned over $50 million in private scholarships.
Many Abaarso students have worked in the United States. One is the chief engineer of an Indiana steel plant; another is a consultant for Bain & Company. Several others are doctors. What makes Abaarso and its network special, however, is that it did not become an exit ramp from Somaliland, but rather, a revolving door. Many graduates returned after their stint at U.S. universities to catalyze Somaliland’s development. Its graduates have returned as teachers and university professors. Some have opened their own school or replicated the Abaarso model.
The project now enables Somalilanders to remain in Somaliland for advanced education. In 2017, the Abaarso network opened Barwaaqo University as the country’s first all-women university. In a country where female unemployment hovers around 95 percent, Barwaaqo graduates enjoy greater than 85 percent employment.
What works in Somaliland does not need to stay in Somaliland. As Zimbabwe recovers from decades of Robert Mugabe’s ruinous dictatorship, it has turned to Abaarso alumni to replicate Somaliland’s success in Zimbabwe.
While a humanitarian good news story, what makes Abaarso an example of clear USAID benefit?
First, while Abaarso took seed money from USAID, it never became dependent. It was a perfect example of teaching a man to fish, rather than giving a man fish. USAID helped fund Abaarso’s expansion, but it did not provide regular budgetary support. Abaarso’s leadership recruited and raised funds locally and from the Somaliland diaspora in the United States, as well as from private foundations. Seed money works; welfare does not.
Tax revenue from Abaarso graduates in the United States more than offsets any USAID grants into Abaarso.
More broadly, Somaliland’s pro-Western orientation and internal security reflect Abaarso’s success. As Abaarso graduates change a generational mindset, not only do the conspiracy theories that surrounded the project in its early years fall by the wayside, but its graduates are able to lift entire extended families out of poverty and enable them to invest in local businesses. Today, Somalia remains a failed state beset by corruption; Somaliland has become an economic engine with the beginnings of a 21st century economy. While Somalia embraces dictatorships like Turkey and China and rationalizes terror, Somaliland is unapologetically pro-Western and pro-American. The kicker is that tax revenue from Abaarso graduates in the United States more than offsets any USAID grants into Abaarso. Put another way, on the USAID balance sheet, Abaarso runs in the black, not red.
The national security successes are profound. Whereas terrorists strike across Somalia and Ethiopia, the last major terror attack in Somaliland was in 2008. Somaliland secures its territory and denies Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Al Shabaab pirates, and Yemeni weapons smugglers safe haven. Every dollar USAID spent in Somaliland obviated the need for security assistance, let alone intervention.
The DOGE cuts to USAID cost Abaarso the ability to expand its physical plant to more than double its women’s university capacity from 140 to 300, though the State Department still could reverse it given Abaarso’s clear record of delivery on investment.
Decades of poor management and oversight led USAID not only to hemorrhage money, but also to undercut U.S. security. As DOGE chief Elon Musk and Secretary of State Marco Rubio reformulate U.S. foreign assistance, it is essential to study and replicate the rare successes. If they define U.S. interests as peace, deradicalization, and development in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East or stabilizing post-conflict societies like South Yemen or Syrian Kurdistan more generally, they will find no better model than the little school that could in Somaliland.
