Just after midnight on March 2, 2026, an Iranian drone, perhaps launched from Lebanon, struck the British Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Akrotiri in Cyprus. The attack was unwarranted; the British have not used Akrotiri or Dhekelia, which together form the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, a British Overseas Territory that occupied 3 percent of Cypriot territory. The British reaction to the attack shows their continued presence on Cyprus is also unwarranted.
London granted Cyprus independence on August 16, 1960, but retained sovereign control over Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
The United Kingdom took possession of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire after the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War and the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Technically, British possession was a lease and the Ottoman Empire remained sovereign, as the Ottoman Porte needed British protection against Russian expansionism, although soon after World War I began, the United Kingdom formally annexed Cyprus. Following a brief insurgency by Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, a Greek Cypriot group, and then negotiations in London and Zurich involving the United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece, and both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, London granted Cyprus independence on August 16, 1960, but retained sovereign control over Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
Indeed, Article 1 of the Treaty between the United Kingdom and Cyprus recognizing Cypriot independence declared, “The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas… referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.” It was an insulting provision, but Cypriots decided that with independence at stake, the perfect could not be the enemy of the good.
At the time, the United Kingdom was still a world power, albeit one in significant decline. Most of the Gulf Arab states were still British protectorates, if not colonies, as was South Yemen. Akrotiri and Dhekelia were important logistical hubs for British interests throughout the Middle East.
On January 16, 1968, Sir Harold Wilson, Britain’s prime minister, announced to parliament, “Our security lies fundamentally in Europe and must be based on the North Atlantic Alliance.” So began the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from bases “East of Suez.” In the Middle East, this led to the transfer of British bases in the Persian Gulf to U.S. forces, as well as the independence of the Gulf Arab states.
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was fine with the British maintaining their foothold on Cyprus. Kissinger cared little for Cypriot sovereignty, as his support for Turkey during its 1974 land grab later showed. Kissinger logic, as always, was realpolitik. The Soviet Union was America’s chief competitor, and the United States needed to focus on the threat it posed. If the United Kingdom could help secure the Eastern Mediterranean from its Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus, so be it. After all, the Soviet Navy operated its Sevastopol-based 5th Operational Squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, posing a constant challenge, if not threat, to the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
As long as Britain was willing to use its Cypriot possessions to further European security, policymakers were willing to put the status of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the back burner. That changed with Brexit, when the United Kingdom formally separated itself from the European Union, of which both Greece and Cyprus are part.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s decision to renounce claims to the Chagos Islands, whatever his motivations, raised questions because of the parallels between the British Indian Ocean Territory and the Sovereign Base Areas.
That President Emmanuel Macron visited Cyprus to show support, but Starmer did not, just adds insult to injury.
With Starmer denying the United States the use of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and refusing, unlike France, even to send an aircraft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean or counter Turkey’s illegal F-16 deployment to occupied northern Cyprus, the question now becomes whether there is any strategic purpose for the United Kingdom to maintain its colonial presence on Cyprus. That President Emmanuel Macron visited Cyprus to show support, but Starmer did not, just adds insult to injury.
The United States Army maintains resorts around the world for servicemen’s rest and relaxation. Today, a British military in decline treats Akrotiri and Dhekelia, in effect, as its own Hale Koa Hotel.
That was never its purpose, nor should Cyprus stand for it. If the Cypriot government cannot say so out of diplomatic considerations, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio should do so bluntly: More than sixty-five years after Cypriot independence, it is time for British forces to leave. They are not wanted. They are not needed. Akrotiri and Dhekelia should be the sovereign territory of Cyprus only, just as every grain of sand should, from Cape Arnaoutis to Rizokarpaso. The bases need not disappear; the United States can lease some housing and pay rent for access, much like it has in places like Rota, Spain, or Souda Bay, Greece.
But there should no longer be any question: The United States should define the United Kingdom as an occupying power on Cyprus alongside Turkey.
