In a dramatic turn of events, insurgent factions principally led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham have managed to seize Aleppo. This offensive not only represents the first major military action in Syria in nearly five years, but also juxtaposes sharply with the previous round in which the Syrian army took four years to capture Syria’s second most important city. Idlib province in its entirety also has fallen to the insurgency, reverting the situation to where it was in 2015 when the Syrian government earlier lost the province to the insurgency.
What explains these dramatic losses, and what is likely to transpire?
While conspiracy theorists suggest a link between the insurgent offensive and the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, the most important reason for the collapse of the Syrian government forces is more likely a failure of anticipation and preparation.
In 2020, Russia and Turkey negotiated a ceasefire that effectively froze front lines and produced an expectation that major battles were over as both sides seemingly accepted the status quo to be preferable to active conflict. The Syrian government thought this status quo would persist for the foreseeable future with the hope that Turkey eventually would agree to withdraw its troops from the Northwest. While the status quo required manning front lines, there was little evidence that government forces had prepared for a major insurgent attack by building fortifications along or mining the lines of contact.
Assad’s allies seem prepared to stand by him and assist him.
Conversely, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani made frequent speeches in Idlib and its environs about the necessity to continue the military struggle and capture territory. Observers might have dismissed these statements as rhetoric but, just like Hamas on October 7, 2023, al-Jawlani was willing to try something big to shake up the status quo.
Beyond the specific failure to anticipate and prepare, the front-line collapse likely reflects more systematic problems within the Syrian Army’s ranks. Although the government’s retaking territory in prior years should have widened its recruiting pool, the sharp deterioration in the value of the Syrian pound made military service harsher and continued to incentivize desertion, evasion, and corruption. In addition, the inclusion of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah in command roles and the development of the Russia-backed 25th Division undermined a unified chain of command.
These issues do not mean that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall is imminent. Here, there is an analogy to the panic that surrounded the Islamic State’s rise in Iraq, but fear that the group could capture Baghdad following the fall of Mosul proved unfounded.
Ultimately, the government’s survival depends on whether its two main allies—Russia and Iran—will stand by it. Contrary to rumours of an imminent coup, Assad’s allies seem prepared to stand by him and assist him, as Russian airstrikes on insurgent positions in Aleppo show. However, absent a decisive counter-offensive, it will be difficult to dislodge the insurgents from the city. Aleppo’s fall is a major strategic loss for the Syrian government, as well as its allies in Iran and Hezbollah, but celebrations that Assad’s demise is imminent may be premature.
