What can the 19th century teach American strategists confronting 21st-century threats?
In recent weeks, both Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Rep. Tim Burchett (R-Tenn.) proposed using Letters of Marque & Reprisal to empower private American entities to disrupt cartel operations without direct U.S. military engagement. While such application is compelling, the same strategy could apply even more effectively to counter the Houthi threat in the Red Sea. Despite U.S. military strikes and international pressure, the Houthis continue to threaten global shipping, Israel, and regional stability.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to issue Letters of Marque & Reprisal to allow private individuals or entities to engage in sanctioned military action. Historically, privateers used them to disrupt enemy shipping and exert pressure through asymmetric naval warfare. While obsolete in the conventional sense, a modernized model could apply to the Houthis.
These security personnel could act as a bulwark against boarding attempts and a defense against other possible close-in engagements.
By issuing Letters of Marque, Congress can deploy private maritime security forces aboard commercial and allied vessels to provide a layered defense against Houthi attacks. These security personnel could act as a bulwark against boarding attempts and a defense against other possible close-in engagements. They also would enhance counter-drone operations to degrade the impact of the Houthis’ use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
These forces would not operate as standard private security contractors limited to defensive roles at sea. Traditional private security contractors provide armed security for vessels, protecting against piracy or asymmetric threats under strict rules of engagement that emphasize self-defense. Under Letters of Marque, these private actors could interdict Houthi threats, conduct offensive maritime operations, and seize enemy vessels without micromanagement.
A further distinction comes from historical precedents, where privateers under Letters of Marque seized enemy assets as prizes and claimed financial rewards from the government or through the resale of captured property. If applied today, this system could include a bounty structure where the U.S. government pays per successful interdiction, destruction of Houthi drones, or capture of hostile vessels. Private forces also could auction or repurpose captured Houthi property, such as armed skiffs, drones, weapons, or fuel shipments, under U.S. oversight. Additionally, maritime industry stakeholders—such as global shipping corporations and insurance companies—could fund private operators to neutralize threats proactively.
This commercial structure would incentivize these forces to engage the Houthis aggressively across the full spectrum of their capabilities, transforming them into a modern, state-sanctioned asymmetric warfare tool, rather than simple security contractors.
From a U.S capacity perspective, the additional manpower expands maritime security coverage without overextending U.S. Navy and Special Operations Forces assets. Employing the private sector can speed up deployments and give U.S. policymakers operational flexibility. Such an unconventional approach aligns with the administration’s drive to streamline government while maximizing operational outcomes. By leveraging private sector expertise, Washington can expand maritime security at low cost, freeing up U.S. assets to focus on high-value missions. It enhances the return on investment without increasing the level of risk.
Washington must establish clear operational guidelines, legal oversight, and stringent vetting procedures for any private entity operating under these letters.
From a Joint Operations perspective, Letters of Marque could help the Pentagon employ a task-organized force structure to align specific capabilities with mission objectives. This framework should follow the Deep, Close, Rear paradigm. The Close fight in the Red Sea benefits from private maritime forces reinforcing ship security, ensuring that commercial and allied vessels remain operational. The Rear fight focuses on providing security for U.S. and allied supply lines and infrastructure, enabling the sustainment of their warfighting capabilities. The Deep fight is where U.S. strategic instruments of power target Houthi supply lines, and Iranian financial, materiel, and information support for the Houthis.
Certainly, the issuance of Letters of Marque is not a magic bullet. There are risks. Enabling private security forces in a combat environment raises concerns about accountability, adherence to international law, and escalation. To mitigate these risks, Washington must establish clear operational guidelines, legal oversight, and stringent vetting procedures for any private entity operating under these letters. Private security forces must operate under strict rules of engagement that align with U.S. strategic objectives and international norms. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), allied naval forces, and regional partners must coordinate closely to prevent miscalculations or unintended consequences. If properly managed, these measures will allow for a scalable and effective maritime security strategy without undermining U.S. credibility or escalating the conflict unnecessarily.
