There Should Be No Negotiations or Deal With Iran Absent Khamenei’s Signature

If He Is Sincere About a Nuclear Agreement, Iran’s Supreme Leader Will Agree and Ink the Text

Ahnaf Kalam

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei poses in front of warheads.

Original artwork. Photo: Midjourney

On April 7, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that direct negotiations with Iran will begin within a week. The president has set a two-month deadline for diplomacy, though it is unclear whether the deadline refers to the period Iran has to start talks or to reach an agreement. Regardless, if talks proceed, the U.S. administration should demand any agreement be signed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The Islamic Republic’s structure does not parallel the U.S. system, or any other government. The Islamic Republic’s permanent state sets the policy. Elected parliamentarians, executives, and administrators are glorified bureaucrats who implement the commands of policymakers like Khamenei whom the public does not elect.

Among the 10 to 20 percent of Iranians who support the regime, only Khamenei’s words carry legitimacy.

Among the 10 to 20 percent of Iranians who support the regime, only Khamenei’s words carry legitimacy. The foot soldiers in the security services, including those who work within the nuclear program, have no qualms about ignoring an agreement signed by President Masoud Pezeshkian or Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, as long as they believe that they are acting according to the supreme leader’s wishes. This leaves room open for cheating. The lower echelons of the regime could be told to continue the work toward a weapon, despite an agreement with the United States, because the Iranian president or foreign minister negotiated the deal that is against Khamenei’s will.

A good nuclear agreement with Iran would require strong verification mechanisms, which the previous agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), lacked. Khamenei’s signature would be one such mechanism—though not the only one. The rank and file within the regime would find it difficult to violate an agreement inked by the old man himself, as opposed to a reformist president they despise for being soft on upholding the revolution’s ideals, be it sticking it to “the great Satan” or refusing to beat up enough girls for not wearing the hijab.

Such a suggestion also will be a litmus test for the Islamic Republic’s seriousness. It is plausible, if not likely, that Khamenei is stalling. In this scenario, Iran’s on-again, off-again willingness to make a deal delays a military strike against its nuclear facilities while it sprints toward a nuclear weapon to acquire near-total deterrence.

The evidence for this scenario is that Khamenei has not publicly given the green light for negotiations. Rather, he remarked that “diplomacy with America has no effect in fixing the country’s problems” and “is not smart, wise, or honorable.” By doing so, he keeps face before his supporters, as he uses his diplomats as a tool to buy time. As in the past, he squares the circle by blaming everything on traitorous reformists who dutifully embrace their good-cop role.

Further, demanding Khamenei’s signature as a necessity before starting negotiations would require the supreme leader to legitimize negotiations, something that comes at a hefty price before his hardline supporters. If he is sincere about a nuclear agreement, he will prove so by paying the price twice: once by agreeing to the demand and a second time by inking the final text.

Refusing to spend political capital will be evidence of his dishonesty.

Refusing to spend political capital will be evidence of his dishonesty. It would mean that Khamenei is unwilling to give legitimacy to the agreement, something necessary for meaningful implementation.

Detractors will charge that such a demand would run Iran off the negotiating table. But with B-2 bombers in Diego Garcia like the sword of Damocles and no Hezbollah to use as a deterrent, the strategic considerations have narrowed his options to two opposite choices: either acquiring nuclear deterrence immediately or relieving pressure by giving up the nuclear program. Whatever his decision, it is silly to suggest that a single demand will force Khamenei to change the future of his regime 180 degrees.

Harold Macmillan (and not Winston Churchill) once said, “Jaw jaw is better than war war.” Khamenei might have a different formulation: “Jaw jaw while you prepare for war war.” To prove his goodwill, he should pay a price on top. Meanwhile, American diplomats will be better served if they ignore second-hand assurances behind the scenes from Iran’s glorified bureaucrats who carry no authority.

Shay Khatiri is vice president of development and a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.
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