On December 8, 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and took over Syria. Its chief, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has declared his goal to be the restoration of Syrian unity. In practice, this signals his intent to end the de facto autonomy that Syrian Kurds have enjoyed since Syria’s civil war began.
While the Turks have targeted Kurdish towns and civilian infrastructure with increasing bombardment, both the United States and Israel have sought to delay any Turkish invasion. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recognizes that Washington and Jerusalem remain the biggest wild cards and potential obstacles in his desire to eradicate the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The Turkish intelligence agency ... undertakes psychological operations aimed at influencing U.S. and Israeli policy regarding their support for Kurdish groups in Syria.
Accordingly, the Turkish intelligence agency (MIT) now undertakes psychological operations aimed at influencing U.S. and Israeli policy regarding their support for Kurdish groups in Syria. Hence, on January 12, 2025, Yeni Şafak, a newspaperaligned with Erdoğan, published a report claiming falsely that Iran would supply the SDF with 1,500 Iranian drones. The Jerusalem Post subsequently repeated this disinformation. On the same day, Clash Report, a news outlet that propagates fake content to align with Turkish government interests, disseminated the narrative, referencing the Jerusalem Post’s coverage to add credibility.
On its face, the Yeni Şafak story did not make sense. Secretly moving Meraj and Shahed-136 kamikaze drones is difficult: They are large, and require launchers and a runway. The logistical challenge of transferring these drones from Iran to Syria would be huge. The Jerusalem Post caught on and revised its coverage to include its original source. The Turks and their supporters did not care; even American think-tankers cited the planted Jerusalem Post to fulfill, knowingly or not, a Turkish propaganda aim.
Turkey has attempted to undermine the SDF’s military capabilities by falsely attributing their use of advanced drone technology to Iranian support.
In addition to psychological warfare through media manipulation, Turkey has attempted to undermine the SDF’s military capabilities by falsely attributing their use of advanced drone technology to Iranian support. Both Turkey-backed groups and the SDF use First-Person View (FPV) drones. The SDF has employed a Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) to shoot down Bayraktar TB2 drones that Turkey uses in Syria. Subsequent Turkish claims that these drones and tools are Iranian ignore that Turkey uses the same technology. In effect, Turkey increasingly makes baseless claims to manipulate media narratives.
In response to the false claims of Iranian drone support, Farhad Shami, the director of the SDF’s media center, issued a statement refuting the allegations and stating that the SDF produces its own FPV drones, a claim corroborated by images and videos showing the drones being manufactured.
Nor are the Syrian Kurds the first victim of a deliberately false narrative. In 2023, as Azerbaijani forces occupied a portion of Armenia proper, Turkey and Azerbaijan placed a false report in the Israeli and Saudi-funded press that Armenia was using Iranian drones against Azerbaijani positions. Again, American think-tankers amplified the story. By the time it emerged that Armenia did not have such Iranian drones, the damage was done.
Credibility matters, and increasingly, Turkey-based reports have none. To repeat uncritically Turkish claims or give them credence plays into a calculated Turkish effort to tar the reputation of the Syrian Kurds or depict them as Iranian clients. By critically assessing and withholding unverified reports, the media can neutralize a coordinated and sophisticated Turkish propaganda campaign.
