The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syria’s interim government announced a major agreement on March 10, 2025, paving the way for integration of the Kurdish-led force into the Syrian Army.
Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazlum Abdi signed the agreement in Damascus. A U.S. helicopter reportedly shuttled Abdi from the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria to the Syrian capital.
This deal comes at a crucial moment for both sides. Al-Sharaa seeks greater domestic and international legitimacy. Abdi, meanwhile, wants to prevent any reason for the Turkey-backed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to assault the SDF-held regions of Syria; Turkey does not distinguish between the U.S.-allied SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Kurds now ask if this agreement benefits Syrian Kurds and fulfills their aspiration for political autonomy. The answer? It’s complicated.
[The agreement] states that the new Syria will guarantee the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process.
The document mentions guaranteeing Kurdish rights in Syria, a rare acknowledgement by the top leader of a country that historically has denied basic rights to the Kurdish people. It also states that the new Syria will guarantee the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process. These have been key demands of the Kurdish movement in Syria since the 1957 founding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria. In that sense, Abdi has achieved something for which Kurds have long strived.
However, the agreement makes no mention of decentralization, nor of the future form of Syria’s government. Decentralization has been a cornerstone of the political project championed by Kurds who have enjoyed autonomy within Syria for more than a decade. Their Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria bases itself on this principle, promoting federalism as a solution to the Syrian conflict. Even their political rivals in the Kurdish National Council embrace a political vision that aligns with this framework. Al-Sharaa’s government, however, opposes all decentralization. Such omission of any mention of decentralization appears to be a major SDF concession to the new de facto government in Damascus that will not sit well with Syrian Kurds.
The provision on integrating civilian and military institutions in northeast Syria into the state’s administration is vague. This has been a major point of contention between the two sides since their talks began shortly after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024. The SDF is willing to integrate into the Syrian command but wants to assure an intact force. Al-Sharaa’s defense ministry opposes this and demands SDF fighters join the military as individuals. Turkey also demands the disbandment of the SDF. The fact that the agreement does not specify the mechanism for the SDF’s integration into the Syrian military indicates that the issue is not resolved. Given its highly disciplined, U.S.-trained and -equipped force, it is unlikely that the SDF will relinquish its structural integrity—at least in the foreseeable future.
It is an open question who will rule Damascus nine months from now.
Syrian Kurds and the SDF find themselves in a precarious position. They understand Turkey seeks to eradicate any Kurdish governance or military units. Abdi likely hopes a deal with Damascus will ease Ankara’s concerns and buy the Syrian Kurds some time. They also recognize that President Donald Trump likely will withdraw U.S. forces. An SDF official told Sky News Arabia that U.S. officials helped mediate the SDF-Damascus meeting. If true, the Trump administration may have made the Syrian Kurds, in Godfather-fashion, “an offer they could not refuse.”
The agreement briefly mentions transferring border security in SDF-held areas to the central authorities. However, the U.S. should be especially concerned about any provisions related to the transfer of prisons holding Islamic State prisoners to central government control, given clear questions about its tolerance for Sunni extremism.
Critics of the deal cite the apparent unraveling of al-Sharaa’s control in recent days, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham loyalists and affiliated armed gangs carrying out massacres against civilian Alawites and Christians in Syria’s coastal provinces. This sectarian violence, however, may have led SDF leaders to believe a deal with Damascus could protect Kurdish lives in the future, especially should military dynamics deteriorate for Syrian Kurds against the backdrop of Turkish airstrikes and aggression. Nonetheless, the deal was celebrated by al-Sharaa’s supporters as a victory for the new rulers in Damascus, at a time when many in the international community blamed them for the violence in western Syria. In effect, the SDF—arguably the most pro-Western force in Syria—now risks being tainted by the human rights abuses of its new choice for a partner.
For now, the agreement between the SDF and Damascus remains nothing more than ink on paper. Implementation is set for the end of 2025, giving the Kurds more than nine months to assess and adjust. In a country like Syria, a lot could happen before then. Indeed, while a decade of Kurdish rule has brought maturity and consistency to local governance in northeastern Syria, it is an open question who will rule Damascus nine months from now. The deal is not ideal, but makes it more likely that the Kurds can survive to negotiate a new one.
