Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israeli forces have moved to prevent Turkish-backed Sunni Islamists from threatening Israel. While Israeli airstrikes sought to prevent Assad-era weapons caches from falling into both Iranian and Sunni Islamist hands, Jerusalem also sought to convey its strikes should end a message to Turkey that “We will not allow you to establish a presence in Syria.”
After Assad’s fall, and with Turkey backing radical Islamist groups if not Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria, Israeli strategists increasingly see the Kurds and Druze as natural allies in Syria.
Israel’s military actions have indirectly aided the Kurds.
Because of their proximity to Israeli-controlled areas, the Druze benefit from Israeli protection, potentially shielding them from atrocities Syria’s new rulers perpetrate against the Alawis and other minorities. Israel, however, has not afforded the Kurds the same security guarantees; Israel is not situated adjacent to any Kurdish-controlled part of Syria, making relationships with the Kurds more complex. The lack of a geographic connection has led Israel to favor a more indirect approach toward the Kurds. Since Assad’s ouster, Turkey and its proxy Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have intensified attacks on areas under the Kurdish government, including the Tishrin Dam and the areas around Kobani. Turkish drone strikes and air raids continue to target Kurdish civilians, journalists, and Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) bases.
Despite these challenges, Israel’s military actions have indirectly aided the Kurds. By dismantling Syria’s weapons stockpiles, including chemical weapons, Israel has prevented these arms from falling into the hands of groups that could use them against the Kurds. While the SDF, under the command of General Mazloum Abdi, remains a disciplined and capable force, prolonged hostilities with HTS and the consolidation of power in Damascus could put Kurdish territories at risk. The recent massacre of Alawis serves as a warning of what the de facto rulers in Damascus might consider. While some covert intelligence sharing may exist, formalizing such structures would benefit Israel due to the Kurds’ effective intelligence-gathering network, which has insight into both jihadist movements and Iran’s influence in Syria.
While the Israel Defense Forces have conducted deterrence operations against Turkey and its proxies that indirectly benefit the Kurds, many Kurds await a more explicit show of support from Israel in international forums.
Alas, Israel’s diplomatic support still lags. While Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has engaged in rhetorical outreach toward the Kurds since his November 2024 appointment, it is unclear whether Israel’s foreign ministry will move from virtue signaling to substance. They should.
With both of their existence threatened by Turkey, neither Israel nor the Kurds should be afraid to embrace open cooperation.
Israeli diplomats in Washington and intelligence officers are in close contact with the new Donald Trump administration and could reinforce the importance of Kurdish autonomy in Syria despite Trump’s willingness to trade it for ephemeral Turkish assistance. Israeli forces also should begin direct and open support for the Kurds. With both of their existence threatened by Turkey, neither Israel nor the Kurds should be afraid to embrace open cooperation.
As Abdi has stated, the Kurds welcome assistance from any actor willing to help them protect their people from Turkey’s aggression and its allied forces. The political crisis in Turkey could open possibilities for Israel in its outreach to the Kurds. The question is whether Israel will take a more direct role, and how far it will go in support of Kurdish autonomy or even independence. The worst outcome, however, would be keeping the status quo, where Israeli talk does not match its commitment. This encourages aggressors like Turkey to determine that Israel is a paper tiger, and it may accelerate direct Turkish or indirect HTS aggression.
