For decades, the Iranian regime’s military doctrine relied on three pillars: sponsorship of proxy militias across the “Axis of Resistance,” development of nuclear weapons, and refinement of ballistic missiles. Israel’s response in the wake of the October 7, 2023, attacks disrupted this strategy.
As Tehran recalibrates its strategy, Iraq becomes more central to its strategic calculations. Just hours after former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, Sayed Hashim al-Haidari, secretary general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed Ahdollah Movement, told a Revolutionary Guard audience in Iran, “After Syria, the main war will be in Iraq.” A close ally to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Haidari advocates strengthening Revolutionary Guards-trained militias in Iraq, many of which claimed legitimacy as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces mobilized to combat the Islamic State in 2014. They then proceeded to infiltrate Iraqi institutions, weaken the national army, and intimidate opponents of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps objectives.
The Iraqi government recognizes that militias like the Badr Corps, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah that take direction from outside powers are a problem. Baghdad says they seek to both dismantle the groups and integrate them into the Iraqi military, but the Islamic Republic continues to emphasize the independence of Shi’ite militias.
The Iraqi government recognizes that militias like the Badr Corps, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah that take direction from outside powers are a problem.
Here, domestic Iraqi politics weakens Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s ability to act even if he were sincere. Sudani’s involvement in a wiretapping scandal against opponents and their families created demands for his resignation, even from within his ruling coalition. His survival likely is due to the Iranian regime’s calculation that a weak Sudani dependent upon Tehran for his political survival would be better than early elections. Realism also may color Khamenei’s decision to stick with Sudani: Iraqis say former pro-Iranian Prime Ministers Nouri al-Maliki and Adil Abdul-Mahdi are both in very poor health. So, too, allegedly is Badr Corps leader Hadi al-Ameri. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq head Qais al-Khazali remains a powerhouse, but the Iranians recognize that he and his brother are increasingly more interested in their Iraqi business empire than in doing the Iranian regime’s military bidding. Moqtada al-Sadr, meanwhile, has turned on Iran, even if more for tactical reasons than ideological ones.
In a January 8, 2025, meeting in Tehran, Khamenei urged Sudani to strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces as a crucial component of power in Iraq. To deter the Iraqi government from dismantling the groups, Iran’s regime might leverage its provision of electricity and gas supplies. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, Iran has decreased gas imports to Iraq, citing its own domestic gas shortfall. Should Sudani not do the Islamic Republic’s bidding, Tehran could further leverage electricity and gas to cause unrest.
Western powers should demand and help Iraq to enforce stricter checks on Iranian cargo and personnel to curb Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps efforts to arm Iraqi proxies.
While the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fights behind the scenes to consolidate control over Iraq, it has yet to give up on Syria. Replicating its success fighting the United States by proxy in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will seek to bog down the new Syrian government. Khamenei has already hinted at this, stating, “The zealous youth of Syria will rise up and, with perseverance and even by sacrificing lives, they will overcome this situation, just as the zealous youth of Iraq, after its occupation by America, with the help, organization, and leadership of our dear martyr [Qassem Soleimani], were able to drive the enemy out of their homes and streets.”
Khamenei could succeed if the United States and its regional allies disengage. To stop Tehran from destabilizing the new Syrian government and to continue to undermine the “Axis of Resistance,” the West should focus on reducing the Iranian regime’s grip on the Iraqi state.
Here, the devil is in the details: Western powers should demand and help Iraq to enforce stricter checks on Iranian cargo and personnel to curb Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpsefforts to arm Iraqi proxies or to use Iraq as a land bridge to Syria. Iraqis should take inspiration from Lebanon, where Lebanese security and customs recently stopped and searched Khamenei’s delegation for the first time.
Targeted airstrikes can also erode the capabilities and morale of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, while also assisting Iraqi efforts to disarm and demobilize the militias: In effect, such double-teaming would present a choice: Disarm or die by drone. Although past attempts have failed, the Iranian regime’s weakened state infuses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ proxies with new vulnerability.
To stand down now would be akin to containing 90 percent of a wildfire and then going home, allowing it to again grow and burn out of control.
