Will the Congress and Executive Branch Ever Again Have a Common Israel Policy?

The Biden-Era Divide Between the Legislative and Executive Branches over Israel Juxtaposes Sharply with His Predecessors

The U.S. Capitol building.

The U.S. Capitol building.

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In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, more than a dozen Democrats signed onto bills like House Resolution 786 that voiced more concern over ensuring deliveries of humanitarian aid into the Hamas-run Gaza Strip than support for U.S. efforts to win the release of hostages, including American citizens. While that effort’s sponsor, Rep. Cori Bush (D-Mo.), was long antagonistic toward Israel and Jews, outside the United States, that nuance was lost in the Gaza Strip. Hamas instead concluded the U.S. Congress was on its side and used Bush’s bill to transmit to suffering Palestinians that Hamas’s terror strategy was working.

Radicals like Bush once may have been the exception and, while they may not be the rule, they are nonetheless increasingly mainstream. In 2015, 58 Democrats boycotted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress. Just nine years later, half of congressional Democrats skipped Netanyahu’s address. As the clock wound down on President Joe Biden’s term, those criticizing Israel openly were not only fringe figures. Prominent Senate Democrats like Chris Van Hollen of Maryland pressured Biden to hold the Israeli government accountable for the war against Hamas.

Netanyahu is not the only foreign ally to receive a cold welcome in Washington, D.C. Members of “The Squad” protested Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Congress in 2023, citing his alleged “extensive record of human right abuses.” Some Republicans likewise protested Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit in December 2022, but only five skipped his speech entirely. The congressional letters and posturing highlight growing ambivalence toward Israel within Congress.

Congressional letters and posturing highlight growing ambivalence toward Israel within Congress.

Under Biden, such inconsistency extended to the executive branch as Biden sought to combine his support for Israel with a political need. While Biden repeatedly affirmed his support for Israel in its fight against Iran and its proxies, he also repeated the Obama precedent of using his lame-duck period to punish Israel for sleights real or imagined. He slowed down weapons deliveries to Israel that enabled Hamas’s rebound and pressured Israel to accept a ceasefire with a U.S.-designated terror group. Lisa Carty, the U.S ambassador to the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the wife of Director of Central Intelligence Bill Burns, reaffirmed support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as a “critical entity,” despite evidence showing that 10 percent of UNRWA employees have ties to designated terror groups. Sometimes there was a bait and switch. While the Biden team sought to win support from Israel’s supporters by pausing funds to UNRWA, it then announced a United States Agency for International Development transfer of $230 million in aid to Gaza, despite evidence Hamas embezzles aid.

The Biden-era divide between the legislative and executive branches over Israel juxtaposes sharply with his predecessors. During the Clinton years, Democrats and Republicans in Congress worked together to bring accountability to Israel’s enemies and terror sponsors. In 1993, during the Oslo Accords peace process, the House and Senate passed the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993 to urge the Arab League to ends its boycott of Israel and made Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) compliance with the act a requirement to receive foreign aid. In January 1995, President Bill Clinton enacted Executive Order 12947 to sanction any foreign individuals who had participated in acts of violence and impeded the Middle East peace process. Subsequently, in June 1995 and with bipartisan support, Congress introduced H.R. 1930 with the intent to hold the PLO accountable for violating agreements and to prevent U.S assistance until the president ensured the PLO did not misuse the funds.

During the George W. Bush years, the president and Congress were unified in their support of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. President Bush sent a letter to Sharon in April 2004 to reaffirm his commitment to protecting the Jewish state and condemning all acts of terrorism against Israelis. Shortly after, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 460, in which it declared support for Israel’s right to defend itself from foreign enemies and called for Israelis and Palestinians to join forces to dismantle terrorism.

[With] Democrats openly questioning whether the abandonment of moderation hurts them at the ballot box, Congress may pivot back toward greater partnership with Israel and moderate Arab states.

While President Barack Obama began his administration blaming Israeli settlements for hampering meaningful peace talks, Congress remained largely supportive of Israel. Toward the end of Obama’s first term, it passed the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012, which reaffirmed an “unshakeable” commitment to Israel and declared it U.S. policy to veto any one-sided, anti-Israel United Nations resolutions. That remained true until, in the twilight of his administration, Obama ordered the United States to abstain to allow the U.N. Security Council to pass a lopsided resolution to outlaw Israeli presence even in portions of the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem, to which Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had previously agreed. Not since the Suez Crisis during the Eisenhower era did executive branch and congressional policy toward Israel diverge.

Prior to beginning his second term, President Donald Trump also pressured Israel to conclude a ceasefire with Hamas but he since has approved delivery of weaponry the Biden administration withheld. Secretary of State Marco Rubio paused aid to ensure that no aid went to groups that did not respect U.S. interests. Trump’s suggestion to force the migration of Gaza’s population to Egypt and Jordan suggests his motivation was not simply to call for a ceasefire to win short-term quiet regardless of longer-term cost.

With many representatives from the progressive fringe losing election and Democrats openly questioning whether the abandonment of moderation hurts them at the ballot box, Congress may pivot back toward greater partnership with Israel and moderate Arab states. That pivot is tenuous, though. The question for Trump’s second term remains whether the White House and Congress can preserve consensus between the legislative and executive branches on Israel and restore bipartisanship to America’s Israel policy.

Should they not, then Cori Bush’s tactics might win even absent Cori Bush. Not only isolated congressional statements but also presidents like Obama and Biden acting out of personal pique can lead Arab, Iranian, and Turkish rejectionists to believe they can outlast U.S. administrations, rather than abandon terror and accept the compromises needed for peace and security.

Maria Muñoz is a junior fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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