With Trump Returning, Saudi Arabia Should Stop Appeasing the Houthis

The Kingdom Does Not like the Houthis, but Long Ago Stopped Seeking to Win the War Against Them

Iran-backed Houthi rebels have attacked cargo ships in the Red Sea region, leading to rising tensions with the West.

Iran-backed Houthi rebels have attacked cargo ships in the Red Sea region, leading to rising tensions with the West.

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It has been more than a decade since Iranian-backed Houthis seized the Yemeni capital Sana’a. Initially, Saudi Arabia sought to counter the Houthi onslaught. Many progressives reflexively took the Houthi side. Ideology motivated some. Too many in the West find the Houthi narrative of resistance compelling, even if false. Navel-gazing within American political discourse played a role. Because then-President Donald Trump embraced Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), Trump’s domestic critics sought to demonize Saudi Arabia and exculpate the Houthis. Many human rights advocates suffered MBS-derangement syndrome, irrationally focusing on his alleged responsibility for the death of Saudi Muslim Brotherhood activist Jamal Khashoggi. While Bin Salman may have been responsible, to exculpate the Houthis for their massive violation of human rights because of anger at one man demonstrated the subjectivity and politicization of the human rights community.

Whether out of ignorance or dishonesty, political partisans and diplomats exclusively blamed Saudi action for humanitarian tragedy. They cited United Nations reports citing Saudi airstrikes for causing starvation, for example, but ignored UN reports that acknowledged Houthi militiamen blockading food delivery to cities like Taiz due to its loyalty to the internationally recognized government. Perhaps the greatest example of cherry picking to favor the Houthis was Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s decision to lift terror designation on the Houthis less than three weeks into his tenure.

Between 2015 and 2022, the Houthis launched almost 1,000 rockets and missiles and more than 350 drones into Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia was angry. The Biden administration essentially victim blamed. Between 2015 and 2022, the Houthis launched almost 1,000 rockets and missiles and more than 350 drones into Saudi Arabia, seldom differentiating between military and civilian targets. With the United States doing little to protect Saudi Arabia, the White House drawing moral equivalency between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and many in Congress siding with the Houthis and threatening sanctions against Riyadh, the Saudis recognized they could not trust Washington to have their back.

Today, there is a dissonance between public perception of Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Yemen and reality. The Kingdom does not like the Houthis, but long ago stopped seeking to win the war against them. Instead, the Saudis seek quiet, even at the expense of their Yemeni allies in the internationally recognized government. In short, Riyadh cuts deals and may even appease the Houthis to keep quiet on its southern border and stop Iranian-provided Houthi drones and missiles from striking further north. In effect, the strategy the Saudi military takes to the Houthis is similar to the way Israel dealt with Hamas prior to October 7, 2023. Just as Israel tolerated Hamas embezzlement of UN and other international assistance, Riyadh turns a blind eye today to Houthi non-compliance with the Stockholm Agreement that is meant to prevent the embezzlement of and profiteering from humanitarian assistance shipped through Hodeidah.

The Biden administration virtue signaled by sending some U.S. ships into the Red Sea for limited time. If President-elect Trump wants to defeat the Houthis and protect international freedom of navigation, it is essential to show the Saudis that the United States has the Kingdom’s back, that the Biden (and Obama) years were anomalies, not the new norm. This means giving full support to Saudi offense as well as reinforcing its defense. If the United States can brag about downing Iranian drones and missiles heading to Israel, it should do the same with Houthi rockets fired into Saudi Arabia. Just as the new Trump administration will surely hold the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to account for its complicity with Hamas, the United States also must compel real enforcement of the Stockholm Agreement to ensure no Houthis work in the Hodeidah port nor receive salaries from port revenues.

Riyadh’s soft approach to the Houthi threat may frustrate Yemenis who do not wish to remain under the yoke of Iran and its local proxy, but it is not alone to blame. Trump should not only demand that Saudi Arabia stop appeasing the Houthis but show Saudi Arabia that defeating the Houthis is both possible and a U.S. strategic goal.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Turkey. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.
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