A Comprehensive Strategy for Democratic Transition in Iran

Iran’s status as the most destabilizing force in the Middle East presents a pressing need for change. Today, the Islamic Republic is a regional hegemon that uses proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to destabilize neighboring states and challenge US interests. The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led massacre and subsequent regional escalation serve as reminders of the Islamic Republic’s ambitions and its nuclear aspirations, making it the central challenge to US policy in the region.

For decades, US strategies toward Iran have failed to achieve their intended outcomes. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) emboldened Tehran by providing financial resources that it used to augment regional terrorism and its ballistic missile program. Conversely, the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign created economic hardships for the regime but failed to force substantive policy changes. These shortcomings highlight the need for a new, comprehensive approach to empower Iranians to challenge their regime and enable democratic transition in Iran.

The 2022 protests that erupted after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini underscored the Iranian regime’s fragility as they spread across the country and exposed deep-seated public dissatisfaction with the government’s corruption, mismanagement, and suppression of human rights. The difficulties the regime faced suppressing these protests exposed other vulnerabilities. Simultaneously, Iran’s ethnic minorities—including Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis – demonstrated organizational capacity and present opportunities to exert additional pressure on the regime.

The December 2024 fall of Assad’s regime in Syria has dramatically altered Iran’s regional position. While Tehran maintains proxy networks in Syria, the loss of its primary state ally and Russia’s diminished regional role create new strategic opportunities to constrain Iranian influence.

With the second Trump administration crafting its foreign policy strategy, decisiveness is imperative. Half-hearted measures will not suffice. As Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio pointed out, “Empowering the Iranian people is not just the right thing to do; it’s the most sustainable path to regional stability.”

The incoming US administration must seize this opportunity to exploit the regime’s weaknesses and to stymie its external aggression. The approach requires integrating economic pressure, support for internal opposition, dismantling Iran’s regional proxy network, finalizing Saudi-Israel relations, and implementing an aggressive information warfare campaign.

The Iranian regime’s vulnerability lies in its internal fissures. Public dissent has reached unprecedented levels due to economic collapse, widespread corruption, and unpopular foreign interventions. A strategy of regime change must capitalize on these weaknesses by fostering domestic opposition and amplifying social unrest. Establishing an Iran Democracy Fund will serve as a central mechanism for this effort.

The Iran Democracy Fund would channel resources to vetted grassroots organizations, amplifying the power of labor unions, women’s rights advocates, environmental activists, and students. Transparency will be critical, but so will results. Equally important is providing secure technologies like encrypted messaging platforms and satellite internet access, enabling activists to communicate and organize.

Case studies from the Cold War illustrate the transformative power of external support for dissidents. Programs including Radio Free Europe provided not just information but hope – a critical resource under oppressive regimes. A modern equivalent—using social media and Persian-language satellite television—can play a similar role in Iran, broadcasting credible content that challenges regime narratives and highlights democratic alternatives.

Radio Free Europe (RFE) provides a powerful historical precedent for how external media support can empower dissidents and undermine authoritarian regimes. Launched in 1949 during the Cold War, the CIA initially funded RFE with additional support from private donors. Its mission was to broadcast uncensored news and cultural content into the Eastern bloc, countering state propaganda and fostering pro-democratic sentiments.

RFE’s reach was substantial. At its peak, it broadcast in multiple languages to millions of listeners behind the Iron Curtain.

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Dissidents, including Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Lech Wałęsa, in Poland credited its broadcasts with inspiring resistance movements and offering hope. RFE also amplified the voices of exiled intellectuals, creating a bridge between dissident communities abroad and those living under Communist rule. By the 1980s, Soviet leaders acknowledged the network’s role in fomenting unrest, demonstrating its effectiveness as a soft-power tool.

A modern equivalent for Iran could harness advances in digital technology while maintaining RFE’s core principles of accuracy, credibility, and accessibility. Persian-language satellite television channels, complemented by social media platforms like Telegram and Instagram, could replicate RFE’s ability to penetrate an authoritarian information space. Investment in these platforms would give Iranian activists a vital resource for organizing, spreading counter-regime narratives, and fostering hope for change.

Ethnic minority regions also present specific opportunities for destabilizing the regime. In the Kurdish northwest, longstanding smuggling networks offer conduits for material support and information flows. Training programs conducted in neighboring countries’ regions, such as Iraqi Kurdistan, can enhance the organizational capabilities of Kurdish groups and equip them with the tools needed for sustained resistance. Similar opportunities exist in the southeastern Baluchi regions, where traditional tribal structures and cross-border connections provide natural frameworks for challenging the regime. In Khuzestan, home to Iran’s Arab minority and key oil infrastructure, civil resistance efforts can disrupt critical economic operations while gathering intelligence on regime activities. However, support for these communities must tread carefully. While their grievances are legitimate, the focus must remain on a unified, democratic Iran—not fragmented separatism that could weaken the broader movement by allowing the regime to cast itself as the defender of Iranian nationalism.

Technology plays a critical role in empowering opposition groups. To ensure effective use, the United States must provide secure communication tools such as encrypted messaging platforms, satellite internet access, virtual private networks, and comprehensive training. These tools will enable activists to coordinate protests, disseminate information, and evade regime surveillance. Simultaneously, professional development programs should focus on building sustainable leadership within opposition movements. Training in organizational management, civil resistance tactics, strategic communications, and coalition-building will prepare these groups to play a central role in a post-regime transition.

With a youthful, educated population eager to connect with the global digital economy, there are natural avenues through which influence can flow into the country. Iranian tech entrepreneurs need access to international mentorship programs, technical resources, and networking. These linkages will also play an essential role in turning Iran’s young, technology-literate generation into a potent force for pro-democracy change as it builds its capabilities to evade and circumvent regime control systems.

Economic pressure must not only exceed the scope of previous sanctions campaigns, it must also evolve to outpace Iran’s evasion tactics. The Treasury Department should establish a specialized task force to dismantle the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) financial empire, which spans construction, telecommunications, energy, and shipping. These operations often rely on front companies and shell corporations to evade sanctions. The US can deprive the IRGC of revenue streams by targeting these entities.

The shipping sector requires particular attention, as the IRGC uses a fleet of vessels operating under flags of convenience to transport oil, weapons, and other goods. Interdiction in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean must be relentless. Targeting IRGC-linked vessels, supported by diplomatic pressure on complicit port operators and flag states, could sever critical smuggling routes. Similarly, IRGC-linked engineering firms, which secure lucrative infrastructure contracts across the region, must be denied access to materials and financing.

The energy sector remains a cornerstone of the Iranian economy and a vital source of funding for the regime. The US should expand its monitoring of oil and petrochemical transactions, working with financial institutions to block suspicious payments. Enhanced scrutiny of trade finance mechanisms, such as letters of credit and pre-export financing, will further disrupt Iran’s ability to sell its resources.

Additionally, targeting the personal financial networks of regime leaders, including their assets in foreign jurisdictions, will create direct pressure on decision-makers and expose their corruption. IRGC officials and clerics have fortunes held in the names of family members or subordinates. Such assets are spread around different countries, including Turkish and Malaysian properties, Gulf State investments, and accounts in Asian financial centers. This direct pressure on decision-makers while exposing the corruption of the regime elite is uniquely effective in targeting these personal holdings.

Iran’s use of cryptocurrency to evade sanctions presents an evolving challenge. The US should collaborate with blockchain analysis firms to monitor these transactions and develop regulatory frameworks to counter this threat. Financial institutions must adopt stricter due diligence practices to sever Iran’s access to international banking networks, particularly in crucial trading hubs such as the UAE, Turkey, and Malaysia.

Iran’s proxy network is its greatest strength and Achilles’ heel. Groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen enable Tehran to project power far beyond its borders. However, these proxies also drain resources and expose vulnerabilities.

Iran’s proxies represent both a threat to US allies and a vulnerability for Tehran. Hezbollah’s prior dominance undermined Lebanese sovereignty and fueled regional instability. The US should suspend aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces until it disarms Hezbollah. Supporting Israeli operations to neutralize Hezbollah aligns with US interests and weakens Iran’s influence.

In Iraq, Tehran has established a “deep state” through pro-Iran Shia militias and allied political figures. Countering this influence requires strengthening nationalist elements within Iraq’s political system and security forces. The United States should maintain a military presence in both Baghdad-controlled Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government while investing in infrastructure and development projects that provide alternatives to Iranian economic penetration. Security force professionalization programs emphasizing national loyalty over sectarian allegiance will further reduce Iranian influence.

In Syria, the collapse of Assad’s regime has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape. While Iran lost its primary state ally, Tehran maintains militia networks that now operate with greater autonomy. These forces seek to preserve Iranian interests amid the power vacuum, particularly around Damascus and in areas near Lebanon’s border. The United States must adapt its approach given Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) control of Damascus and Turkey’s expanded proxy presence. American forces should establish defensive positions east of the Euphrates, while coordinating with Kurdish allies to prevent both Iranian resupply efforts and Turkish expansion. Special operations teams must enhance training for Kurdish units while gathering intelligence on Iranian militia movements through the region.

Maritime operations require enhanced naval presence across multiple theaters. The Strait of Hormuz demands particular attention, with continuous deployment of naval assets to ensure freedom of navigation and deter Iranian provocations. These operations must be closely coordinated with regional partners, particularly the Saudi and Emirati navies, in order to establish comprehensive maritime domain awareness.

Interdiction of weapons shipments requires sophisticated intelligence collection and rapid response capabilities. This effort must focus on known trafficking routes while maintaining flexibility to respond to emerging patterns.

Protection of commercial shipping demands an approach combining military presence, intelligence collection, and industry cooperation. The administration should establish a dedicated maritime security coordination center, bringing together military assets, commercial shipping operators, and regional partners. This center would coordinate escort operations, share threat intelligence, and establish standard operating procedures for vessels transiting high-risk areas.

Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel presents a pivotal opportunity to alter the strategic landscape in the Middle East and strengthen US efforts to diminish Iranian power. Normalization might allow military, economic, and intelligence cooperation in practice, creating a regional front against Tehran and its destabilizing actions.

Maritime security is an area of potential cooperation. Iranian smuggling, including the delivery of weapons to militia proxies, continues through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, critical chokepoints for all traffic. This has become even more crucial following Assad’s fall, as Iran seeks alternative supply routes to maintain its influence in Syria. With its naval forces, Saudi Arabia can operate in these regions and offer logistical support and operational resources, while Israel can use its intelligence capabilities to locate and monitor IRGC-affiliated vessels. Combined with the US Navy, these regional actors could develop a cohesive maritime security architecture that would dramatically enhance interdiction capabilities and disrupt Iranian supply chains.

Air defense is another critical feature of regional cooperation. Iran has been expanding its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones, which are a severe danger to US partners in the area. With Assad’s fall creating new uncertainties about weapons proliferation in Syria, integrated air defense becomes even more crucial. THAAD – and other US systems – could be integrated with systems like the Israeli Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow III to create a standard, multi-layered air defense. The ability of the Saudis to field Israeli systems in Saudi Arabia is part of a contiguous swath of protective cover over the Gulf region. Aside from cementing operational ties, this partnership would also bolster the collective security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other American allies.

Sharing intelligence to dismantle Iran’s proxy networks is also critically important. Iran uses clandestine means to supply money and arms — over land and sea routes — for its regional proxies, especially Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq. Saudi-Israeli intelligence-gathering allows the dissemination of information well in advance of these operations so that this potential intelligence is utilized to disperse Iranian forces working with militias in Yemen, Iraq, or Syria. A regional intelligence coordination center — staffed by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other like-minded states — could track and eliminate Iranian proxies.

A Saudi-Israel economic partnership would further strengthen endeavors to corner Iran. Together, they could interdict Tehran’s dark money flows, enforce sanctions relief, keep tabs on shipping lanes, monitor sanctions evasion, and diminish Iran’s capacity to support its proxies and nuclear ambitions.

An effective information campaign will target Iranian audiences across multiple platforms, emphasizing regime failures and opposition successes. Persian-language media initiatives should produce content that challenges regime narratives while promoting democratic values. Persian-language media must move beyond traditional news broadcasts. Cultural programming—dramas exposing corruption, documentaries on democratic movements, and satire—can engage younger audiences and challenge the regime’s legitimacy. Social media campaigns must leverage influential Iranian voices to build credibility and engage younger demographics, while mobile messaging platforms distribute real-time updates on protests and regime activities.

Documentation of human rights abuses will reinforce the regime’s illegitimacy on the international stage. A dedicated human rights documentation center should collect, verify, and publicize evidence of regime violations, focusing on both historical atrocities and ongoing abuses.

Economic mismanagement represents a compelling message theme that resonates across Iranian society. The administration should establish dedicated analytical capabilities to track and publicize the regime’s financial failures, connecting high-level policy decisions to impacts on ordinary citizens. This should include regular reports on inflation rates, unemployment levels, and the deterioration of public services.

The costs of maintaining proxy forces provide another crucial messaging theme. The administration should develop tracking mechanisms to document the regime’s expenditures on foreign interventions, presenting this information in formats accessible to average Iranians. This effort should highlight examples of regime spending on foreign militia groups while domestic needs go unmet.

Nuclear program expenses represent a sensitive topic that requires careful messaging. The administration should develop detailed analyses demonstrating the massive costs of nuclear development while highlighting how these resources could be better spent on domestic needs. This messaging should emphasize the program’s role in perpetuating Iran’s international isolation while questioning its actual benefits to national security.

Assad’s fall in Syria provides valuable lessons for Iranian transition planning. The swift collapse of a longstanding authoritarian regime, the emergence of new power centers, and the challenge of securing military assets all offer insights for preparing contingencies in Iran. The United States must anticipate similar dynamics while preparing for multiple transition scenarios in Tehran.

In the event of a managed transition, military elements willing to facilitate change must be identified and incentivized with guarantees of institutional survival. Technocratic continuity in essential government functions will ensure stability during the transition period, while rapid international recognition of a new government will provide legitimacy.

A sudden collapse of the regime would demand swift action. Securing nuclear facilities, preventing weapons proliferation, and stabilizing public order would become priorities—yet these efforts could face significant logistical and diplomatic challenges. Interim governance structures must be established quickly to prevent power vacuums, while international partners provide technical and humanitarian assistance.

A hybrid scenario, where parts of the regime remain in power while others collapse, will require engagement to manage parallel transitions. Constitutional reform, security sector transformation, and economic restructuring will be critical to rebuilding Iran as a stable, democratic state.

No strategy is without risks. Sanctions come with risks. They could worsen suffering, alienate ordinary Iranians and fuel anti-US sentiment. Policymakers must balance these trade-offs with visible support for humanitarian aid to mitigate backlash. Similarly, support for opposition groups may provoke accusations of foreign interference, compromising their legitimacy.

Moreover, regional dynamics present additional hurdles. Saudi-Israeli normalization, while promising, requires navigation to ensure cooperation without alienating other Gulf partners. Efforts to dismantle Iran’s proxies must avoid entangling the US in prolonged conflicts that divert resources from broader strategic goals.

The United States stands at a crossroads in its approach to Iran. As historian Niall Ferguson observed, “Empires often fall not from external conquest, but from internal decay.” The Islamic Republic is rotting from within. Washington can accelerate that process with clarity, conviction, and care. The US can weaken the Iranian regime and pave the way for a democratic transition. Eliminating Iran as a destabilizing force will transform the Middle East, securing long-term stability and advancing US strategic goals.