Since the fall of the Assad regime, there has been much debate surrounding the persona and career of Syria’s new president Ahmad al-Sharaa (better known previously by the name of Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani). Of course, some basic facts are known, such as the fact that he went to Iraq after 2003 to participate in jihad there and was then dispatched by then Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to Syria in order to establish Jabhat al-Nusra, which rejected a formal merger with Baghdadi’s group in 2013 and declared allegiance to al-Qaeda, only to fully break ties with al-Qaeda by January 2017 in the formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which led the final offensive that brought down the regime. But other issues are more murky: what exactly was he doing in Iraq during his time there? What exactly was his relationship with Baghdadi such that the latter entrusted him with forming Jabhat al-Nusra?
Recently, an Islamic State supporter online published a purported message written by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani to both al-Baghdadi and then al-Qaeda leader Aymenn al-Zawahiri in 2013. Unfortunately, the surviving message is not complete (a page is missing; if anyone finds the missing page let me know). The message’s contents do not give a good reason to doubt its authenticity. As it happens, the message was written just a short time before Islamic State of Iraq’s al-Furqan Media released a message by Baghdadi announcing the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013. While Jowlani seemed to express surprise in his audio message rejecting a merger, the reality is that tensions had been simmering between him and the Islamic State of Iraq for some time, and the formal announcement of ISIS was likely an attempt to force Jowlani to finally respond publicly: either he would accept subservience to Baghdadi or make clear his real agenda.
Adnani’s testimony focuses on his experiences with Jowlani both in prison and inside Syria [al-Sham]. While Adnani is best known for being the official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq and its successor organisations, he in fact had many responsibilities beyond just being a spokesman, as this message and other lines of testimony make clear. Among the most important insights from this testimony:
- It seems Jowlani himself did little of great import inside Iraq before being captured by the Americans and detained. Per Adnani, Jowlani’s operational role was in a unit responsible for planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- While in prison, Adnani had some observations on Jowlani’s creed and methodology, particular about takfir (declaring others to be disbelievers) regarding supporters and members of existing governments.
- Jowlani himself came to be in a part of Camp Bucca known for housing senior members of al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was apparently his path to acquiring credentials to be vouched for by others.
- Most importantly, how Jowlani acquired the necessary tazkiya (vouching) to be entrusted by Baghdadi to form Jabhat al-Nusra was partly a matter of luck. Towards the end of his imprisonment he happened to get to know someone who became a member of the Islamic State’s senior consultation council [Shura Council] and the group’s ‘governor’ of Ninawa province in northern Iraq (where Mosul is located). This person took a liking to Jowlani and was a strong advocate for him to be sent to al-Sham. Baghdadi, who wanted to establish a wing of the group inside Syria anyway, agreed to the suggestion on condition of testing Jowlani by making him Islamic State of Iraq official responsible for Mosul city. However, he only occupied this position for two months- a period Baghdadi deemed sufficient as a test. He thus sent Jowlani to Syria to establish Jabhat al-Nusra.
- Baghdadi outlined a plan for Jowlani in Syria and gave him half of his group’s budget every month. He initially thought well of Jowlani.
- Jowlani himself insisted that Adnani should be sent to al-Sham, and Baghdadi agreed to this and gave Adnani various assignments. In turn, Adnani expressed initially his desire and willingness to obey, and was at first made responsible for Jabhat al-Nusra’s northern sector.
- However, Adnani himself felt some things were off, as though Jowlani did not like affiliation with Islamic State and was unwilling to implement many of Baghdadi’s orders. Eventually, Jowlani had Adnani demoted to managing a guesthouse to receive new foreign fighters [muhajirin] and then removed entirely from responsibilities.
- Subsequently however, Baghdadi summoned Jowlani and made him appoint Adnani as his deputy. However, Jowlani gave little real power to Adnani and essentially foiled his plans.
- Adnani accuses Jowlani of ‘betrayal’ and urges Zawahiri to have him removed from his position. It is notable in fact that Zawahiri is described as Adnani’s ‘amir’ in this message, suggesting that outwardly, Islamic State of Iraq at the time was professing nominal subservience to Zawahiri.
Below is the testimony translated by me in full.
Praise be to God to whom nothing is concealed on heaven or earth. Exalted is He who knows the difference between the sower of corruption and the reformer, and prayers and peace be upon His Messenger: whoever is guided by his guidance is successful. As for what follows:
Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (may God protect him) has asked me to write my testimony regarding the brother Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani and touch on it with regards to what went on between me and him, so I say, and God is the One whose help is to be sought:
What I know about him: his name is Ahmad al-Sharaa. He was born in the Peninsula (Saudi Arabia), and his family is from the Golan. He got up to university level, and registered in the media college and did not engage in regular attendance. Then he abandoned his studies and I met him for the first time in American custody at Camp Bucca.
Before prison: he entered Iraq and gave allegiance to the al-Qaeda organisation in 2005. He worked as a soldier in the IEDs unit and the Americans took him prisoner a few months after he entered Iraq. This was his first jihadist experience.
In prison: we were brought together in one camp for specific circumstances. There were only a few observations about him by the brothers regarding his methodology (issues relating to takfir of the supporters of the Tawaghit, members of parliament etc.). I took him to our camp and we remained together in the same camp for around three months. During this time, I only saw good manners from him. He read and studied a lot, and was very quiet, and he had a good relation with the brothers in the camp. No problem arose regarding him, and he did not speak about the disagreements he had. I would sometimes present him to lead prayers inside the camp and would observe his delight and desire to do so.
Among the people, it was known that no one was accepted in the camp except those who were senior and close to al-Qaeda. Thus, many of the youth refused to live there despite their desire to study and train, lest the apostates outside the camp should get word about this, thus impacting their security and perhaps rendering them at risk of being killed. It was also known that the members of the camp would not be released: it was called the camp of the Zarqawists, and this was the first path of tazkiya for this brother.
After prison: in the last period of his time in prison, he had come to know one of the senior brothers, who took a liking to him. This man is now in the Shura Council of the Dawla [Islamic State]. Shaykh Abu Bakr had made him the general official for the general committee for follow up and coordination in the Dawla, and he is now basically Shaykh Abu Bakr’s deputy. Fatih [Jowlani] got out and found that this brother was wali [provincial governor] of Ninawa at the time, and thus he got close to him. Shaykh Abu Bakr was looking for a muhajir from al-Sham to entrust with work in Syria. Fatih was insisting on working there, and so the committee official asked him to write a report about al-Sham to refer to Shaykh Abu Bakr. Fatih did this.
The report was sent to the shaykh and he liked it, and so the brothers nominated him to go to al-Sham. Among those who gave him tazkiya was the committee official, who in fact insisted to the shaykh to send him to al-Sham and entrust him with work there. The shaykh agreed particularly because the cadres were few in number, and he asked the wali of Ninawa to make him supervisor of the Mosul city sector in order to test him. So he [Jowlani] remained for around two months and the brother’s insistence on sending him continued, so the shaykh decided to send him, but some of the brothers objected to this, among them three people in the Shura Council, because they knew about his positions in prison. The committee’s official replied however that Fatih had gone back on those issues. The shaykh asked me about him, and I did not mention to him anything that could be raised against him, because I myself did not witness a bad position on his part. Rather I told the shaykh: I only saw good from him.
The shaykh thought well of him and treated him well:
Shaykh Abu Bakr (may God protect him) outlined for him the policy for operation in al-Sham, and made him comply with it, and put in place for him a comprehensive plan and gave him instructions, guidelines and directives. We all did this, such that I even named for him some sensitive areas in al-Sham he should focus on in operation, and I named some sensitive military targets for him. The shaykh said goodbye to him, praised him, encouraged him, prayed for him and gave him all the competencies in al-Sham to implement the policy he outlined for him.
The shaykh split the Dawla’s treasury in half with him every month, and promised to offer him all the support for al-Sham, and in fact the shaykh fulfilled all that, for until now he [Jowlani] still receives half of the Dawla’s treasury each month, despite the many bounties of donations and war spoils that are showered upon al-Sham, and despite the lack of resources and expansion of operations in Iraq. Until a few days ago, the shaykh continued to defend and praise him, and not allow anyone to speak a bad word against him. I do not know that the shaykh refused one request of his until he came himself to al-Sham.
Fatih’s expertise and his jihadist history:
I have mentioned that the field of Iraq was his first experience, and he remained there for some months and was then taken prisoner, and then he got out and received responsibility for al-Sham. According to my knowledge and what I have heard about him: he waged one battle, and did not fire one shot at the enemy, and did not participate in any operation or expedition, and did not previously enter any military camp, and did not undertake any military cause. I never saw him train in prison or after it, and I never saw him do or undertake any physical training, despite the fact he is healthy and does not suffer from any illness. He is not good at holding or carrying weapons, and often I saw weapons fall from him while he walked, rose and sat. But he is good at riding horses.
My relation with him in al-Sham:
Since the first moment it was decided to send him, Fatih would insist to Shaykh Abu Bakr that I should be sent with him to al-Sham. He continued insisting on this in every letter more or less, and I had strong desire to operate in al-Sham. When the shaykh decided to send me, he entrusted me with a number of missions, the most prominent being: establishing training camps and forming a special forces division.
The shaykh sent Fatih a letter informing him he agreed to my coming and the shaykh told me: you must have competencies so you can accomplish your assignment. He was hesitant regarding granting me competencies, and his view was that he should make me a deputy. In those moments, Fatih’s letter came, showing his joy at the decision for me to go, and saying that he needed an official for the northern region (Idlib, Aleppo, Homs and Hama), and that my transfer was the right decision, he would put me in charge of the northern region. I told the shaykh: “This is a position that has sufficient competencies for me if God wills.” And so the shaykh sent me for that purpose and instructed me to hear and obey Fatih.
When I first arrived:
Fatih welcomed me and showed his joy and I treated him in the way I treated my amirs, such that I kissed his hand when I first arrived, since he had become my amir. He gave me an overview of the details regarding the field and I gave him an overview of the assignments the shaykh had entrusted me with. He said: “Don’t do anything without my knowledge.” And so I literally told him: “God willing, I will be a soldier who hears and obeys.”
The beginning:
As soon as I arrived, I noticed some things, and so I asked the Fatih in our first meeting: “Do you want to separate from the Dawla?” In other words: “Do you want to be a Jabha [Jabhat al-Dawla] and a Dawla, or a Dawla?” He said: No. And he swore to me regarding that and affirmed that his loyalty was to the Dawla and Shaykh Abu Bakr. Among the things I observed:
He had not sent a letter to the shaykh for three months so he could review his activities, even though he could have sent a letter covering a period of 20 days at most and three days at minimum, and he was making all effort to get in direct contact with Khorasan without referral to the Dawla. He was not implementing the shaykh’s orders and requests except in what accorded with his convictions, and he was giving flimsy excuses. When he would talk at length, he would mention Jabha [Jabhat al-Nusra] and Dawla as though they are two groups, and he would show displeasure on his face when speaking about the Jabha’s affiliation with the Dawla.
Bad relations:
I reached Aleppo and so he had me meet with three people, who were the official for Aleppo, the official for Hama and the official for Homs. He told them: “This is your official.” I met with them and gave them some directives. I requested things from them and took leave from them. On the next day, he also had me meet with the official for Idlib, and told him also: “This is your official.” So I went there and stayed five days and changed a lot there and gave many instructions. Then I went to Aleppo and Fatih met with me. He surprised me in that he had removed me from responsibility for the north and entrusted me with receiving a guest house on the borders in order to receive the muhajirin and organise their affairs. I said to him: “Why have you removed me?” He said: “The muhajirin in the guesthouse are numerous (around 30 in number), and need someone to organise their affairs and show concern for them, and the northern region is a big responsibility with many things to keep one occupied, and you won’t be able to keep track of the muhajirin.”
I told him: “This isn’t the real reason, so what’s the real reason?” He said: “There is no other reason.” I replied: “So you are relieving me of the assignments the shaykh entrusted me with, because I need competencies to implement them.” He said: “Supervise the guest house and start establishing a camp, and I will ask the walis to assist you.” I said: “With these competencies I will fail, therefore I will entirely refrain from work and we will write to the shaykh.” We had a discussion for more than an hour about this matter, and in the end I said to him out of hearing and obeying: “I will go to follow up on the muhajirin’s affairs and build a camp.”
Then I went to continue the work night and day for a period of a little more than a month, and then I was surprised by Fatih who had two men with him. He said they were from the Shura Council, and he told me: “The Shura Council has met and decided you should refrain from work and return to Iraq, because you have visions that differ from ours and contravene the group, and you will cause fitna for us.” I said to him: “But I am placing my desires in accordance with what the group wants, so what are these violations or crimes I have done.” He said: “There is no point in our speaking about them, and the brothers have decided you should stop working.” I told him: “Is this justice? You are directing accusations at me and putting me on trial for them, and I don’t know what these accusations are.” He said: “There is no benefit in your knowing about them, and if you go to Shaykh Abu Bakr, he will tell you about them.” I told him: “Have you ordered or prohibited me from doing anything and I have not complied?” He said: “There is no benefit in arguing. It is better for you to depart right away.”
I told him: “In terms of refraining from work, I can only hear and obey you. As for my leaving al-Sham, it is not for you to decide, and I will not depart except by order of the one who sent me.” He said: “Then you can sit in your house and not meet with the group until the shaykh’s order comes regarding you.” He also told me: “Do not tell anyone about what has occurred between us, or that you are stopping work.” I did as he said and did not intervene in anything, and I did not meet anyone from the group except by chance, apart from someone who accompanied me from Iraq and remained with me in my house for the entire time I refrained from work. He [Jowlani] has not told me of the accusations against me and what I had done wrong until now, and no official accusation has been directed at me except from him. As for the talk, there was a lot of it, such that one of the muhajirin met me, was dazzled and embraced me warmly while his eyes shed tears. I said to him: “What’s up with you?” He said: “How are you here?” I told him: “Where should I be, and why are you surprised?” He replied: “It has been said about you that you are an agent of the Americans!”
And God is my witness that I did not tell anyone about what went on between me and him. I did not even tell Shaykh Baghdadi orally, but rather wrote about some matters to him by letter. I did not tell anyone except one person, ten days before writing these lines. This is so despite the fact he [Jowlani] does not leave one person from the first and second order ranks of the leadership without slandering my reputation among them until this day.
The new page:
Shaykh Abu Bakr sent for him and so he came to him in Iraq, after he intended not to go but was advised by the one accompanying him and some of his retinue that he should go. He came back and surprised me at my house, and apologised to me and said: “We have made a mistake against you, and the shaykh has appointed you my deputy in al-Sham.” I replied: “How is that so? First, I do not have competency to be a deputy, and second, I no longer command respect among the group, and my standing has gone, especially among those who have control over the sectors of work.” He told me: “I swear I see no one better than you to be a deputy. As for the brothers’ respect for you, I will tell them to open a new page with you, as though you have just now come from Iraq.”
I rejected this and said: “I will not work, and I will write to the shaykh to judge me situation.” He said: “It is wrong for us to remain like children, writing to the shaykh every day. Work is in need of follow-up, and we fear the Ummah will be harmed by us.”
The important point is that the result was that we agreed that what had taken place between us was a page that had been torn out, and that it would not be opened again, and that this would also be the brothers’ opinion, and thus we took leave of each other on this basis. We did not speak about what had happened, and he did not tell me of what previous crime or violation I had been accused of, and we agreed that hearts had been purified and there was thus no us in speaking about what had previously happened, whatever it was.
And I bear witness to God that I was honest with them and trusted them, and I returned to work with all trustworthiness, and I did not deal with him [Jowlani] except as the soldier deals with his amir until moment, despite all the past that he claimed was bygones, and despite all the new things I will mention.
The new page:
They did not cease to attack, backbite and scandal-monger about me, and he [Jowlani] didn’t give me any competencies, and the position of deputy remained merely a name. They worked to foil any work I would undertake. In addition to the position of deputy, he entrusted me with the position of general security official, and asked me to establish this department because it had not been activated until now. He also entrusted me with establishing a special camp to prepare cadres, and they worked to foil all these assignments, and they are still working on doing so
He tells his followers: “Adnani is not competent to be a deputy, but he was imposed on us and so we must bear it.” I present a project or suggestion or idea, and he expresses his complete agreement and praise and asks me to implement it and carry it out and publicise it. Then he goes to those close to him and he and his followers mock the project or suggestion and laugh and make fun of the matter. Then they work to foil it and this is still my status with them until this moment.
Jabhat al-Nusra and the field of al-Sham:
Had al-Qaeda sent a woman and given her the name of al-Qaeda and the cadres of the Dawla and its wealth and support, those who have congregated around Jabhat al-Nusra today would have congregated around it. And had the name of al-Qaeda and the Dawla been removed from the Jabha and Fatih, only those whom God willed would have congregated around him.
In the Jabha, there are cadres and competencies such that had they been put in their proper place, the Jabha would have become powerful. In it are crude resources that give many good tidings, but these cadres are wasted because the one who directs them is preoccupied with other matters.
Fatih’s betrayal of Shaykh Abu Bakr and the Islamic State:
[page missing]
[in?] Iraq is a traitor to its amirs in Afghanistan, and I swear to God that he [Jowlani] is working on accumulating personal glory at the expense of the blood of the muhajirin and ansar. I advise for this man to be removed and appropriately reprimanded, and then to be returned to the status of a soldier. Were the matter in my hand, I would order for him to be brought to one of the camps so he could physically train and learn how to use weapons, and then he could be in his appropriate place and gradually ascend in the group as he should have done.
Note:
Some may ask: How can all this be in this man when he is put in such a position and place? I say: He had some defects in his manhaj [ideological program] and he announced his renunciation of them before he received responsibility for al-Sham, and so we thought well of him. I say that he did not previously have all these malaises I have mentioned, for they were not apparent to any of us and we judged the man on his outward appearance. If it is said: Why then did he remain this long after these malaises became apparent? We say: It was so until the shaykh could confirm this for himself, and thus the shaykh gave him opportunities and advised him, but his advice was of no use to him, for he [Jowlani] has been blinded by the wealth he has, while media attention and the praise he gets there have stolen his heart, and the status the shaykh gave him has made him lose his sense.
This is my testimony regarding Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Fatih Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani] and I am ready to stand before God and be asked about it on the Day of Judgement. And God is witness to what I have borne witness to, and there is no power or force except in God.
Written by the poor servant Abu Muhammad al-Adnani.
On 19 Jumada al-Awla 1434 AH [c. 31 March 2013 CE], in order to excuse himself, first to God Almighty, then the Ummah, then to his amirs Shaykh Dr. Aymenn al-Zawahiri and then to Shaykh Dr. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (may God protect them).
