In recent years, Morocco has been at the center of discussions surrounding the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel. The historic shift in Morocco’s stance toward Israel came in December 2020 when the country officially normalized diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, under the auspices of the Abraham Accords. While the normalization agreement has garnered broad support from political elites, business communities, and key allies like the United States, one of the most vocal opponents has been the Islamist movement in Morocco. But are all Islamists truly against normalization with Israel, or is there more nuance to their stance?
In 2020, Morocco became the fourth Arab country to normalize relations with Israel, following the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan. The normalization deal was a significant diplomatic shift, marking a departure from decades of hostility that had characterized Arab-Israeli relations, especially since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The agreement with Morocco included diplomatic recognition, the establishment of direct flights, economic cooperation, and the opening of embassies.
Morocco’s main Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), and various radical Islamist groups have consistently opposed any form of cooperation with Israel.
For Morocco, the deal was seen as a pragmatic move, with numerous potential benefits in terms of trade, investment, and technology. One of the key elements of the agreement was the U.S. recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, a disputed territory claimed by both Morocco and the independence-seeking Polisario Front. This recognition provided a major diplomatic victory for Morocco, adding a layer of complexity to the normalization deal.
The Islamist opposition to normalization in Morocco is primarily rooted in the ideological framework that views Israel as an occupying force in Palestinian territories. Morocco’s main Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), and various radical Islamist groups have consistently opposed any form of cooperation with Israel, citing the historical and ongoing plight of the Palestinian people.
Islamist movements, especially those aligned with the Palestinian cause, view Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories as an affront to Arab identity and Islamic values. For groups like the PJD, this opposition is not merely about politics but also about upholding religious and cultural solidarity with Palestinians. The PJD has long championed the idea that Arab countries should stand united in resisting normalization with Israel until a fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is achieved.
Many Moroccan Islamists see normalization as a betrayal of Palestinian aspirations. They argue that establishing ties with Israel would embolden the Israeli government to continue its policies of settlement expansion in the West Bank and its military actions in Gaza. As a result, they have often staged protests and voiced strong criticisms of Morocco’s new position.
However, the Islamist stance on normalization in Morocco is not as monolithic as it may appear at first glance. There are multiple factions within the Islamist political landscape, and not all of them view relations with Israel in the same light. Some factions within the PJD have softened their opposition to normalization, recognizing the strategic benefits of the deal for Morocco’s political and economic interests.
For example, in the wake of the normalization agreement, some members of the PJD have been more open to the idea of diplomatic engagement with Israel, albeit in a cautious manner. While they still express sympathy for the Palestinian cause, they have suggested that Morocco’s diplomatic interests should also be taken into account, particularly in relation to the broader geopolitical context and the evolving dynamics of the Middle East.
The king, who has historically been a strong advocate for Morocco’s relationship with Israel, played a significant role in pushing forward the normalization deal.
Furthermore, there are more moderate and pragmatic Islamist factions within Morocco that are willing to accept the normalization of relations with Israel, provided that certain conditions are met, such as ensuring continued support for the Palestinian cause and advocating for a two-state solution. These factions see the normalization as an opportunity to engage with Israel on economic and security matters while maintaining a commitment to the broader Arab consensus on Palestine.
The Justice and Development Party (PJD), which held the position of prime minister in Morocco for nearly a decade (2011-2021), has been one of the key players in shaping Morocco’s foreign policy. While the PJD initially opposed the idea of normalization, its position was somewhat constrained by the broader political environment in Morocco, particularly the role of King Mohammed VI. The king, who has historically been a strong advocate for Morocco’s relationship with Israel, played a significant role in pushing forward the normalization deal.
The PJD’s leaders were caught in a delicate balancing act. On one hand, they were pressured by their Islamist base to maintain a strong stance against normalization. On the other hand, they also faced political realities that required them to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape, where relations with Israel were becoming increasingly important for securing economic and diplomatic advantages. Ultimately, while the PJD opposed the deal in principle, it did not lead to a breakdown in Morocco’s political cohesion. The party’s leadership chose to focus on domestic concerns, rather than pushing for a radical change in foreign policy.
Public opinion in Morocco is not uniform on the issue of normalization with Israel, but it is important to note that the Islamist opposition to the deal does not necessarily reflect the majority view among the Moroccan populace. According to various polls and surveys, many Moroccans are indifferent to the normalization agreement, seeing it as part of a broader geopolitical shift rather than as a betrayal of Palestinian rights. Others, particularly younger generations, may view the issue more pragmatically, focusing on the potential economic benefits of improved relations with Israel.
The evolving geopolitical realities, combined with Morocco’s national interests and the changing regional dynamics, have led to a nuanced debate within the Islamist camp.
That said, Islamist groups in Morocco continue to leverage the Palestinian cause to mobilize public sentiment. The Islamist base remains deeply invested in the idea of Palestinian liberation, and they use this as a rallying point in their opposition to normalization. For many, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still seen as a matter of Arab dignity and solidarity, and they view any form of cooperation with Israel as undermining this cause.
While Islamist movements in Morocco, particularly the PJD, have been vocal in their opposition to normalization with Israel, the reality is more complex. The Islamist position is not entirely unified, and there are signs of a more pragmatic shift among some factions. The evolving geopolitical realities, combined with Morocco’s national interests and the changing regional dynamics, have led to a nuanced debate within the Islamist camp.
For many Islamists in Morocco, the question of normalization with Israel remains tied to broader issues of Palestinian rights and Arab solidarity. However, as political, economic, and security considerations increasingly take precedence, some factions within the Islamist movement are beginning to reevaluate their positions. Ultimately, while opposition to normalization remains strong among many Islamists, it is clear that Morocco’s relationship with Israel will continue to be shaped by a variety of factors—domestic political calculations, regional dynamics, and the ongoing struggle for Palestinian rights.
