Backgrounder: Abu Muhammad al-Julani

Ahmad Hussein Ash-Shara (aka: Abu Muhammad al-Julani) was born in Damascus in 1982 to a lower-middle-class Sunni Arab family: his father was a grocery owner. He helped his father with his work but also graduated from high school. As evidenced by the nickname he adopted when he began his jihadist activities in 2003, his identity was greatly influenced by the fact that his parents fled the Golan Heights in June 1967. In an interview he gave a few years ago to the American Public Broadcasting Network, he explained that his interest in Middle Eastern politics began when he was about 18 years old, following the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. In other words, he has a deep emotional connection to the Arabs of Palestine, who he says suffer from occupation and oppression, and to the Golan.

When the Americans began massing forces in Kuwait in early 2003 to invade Iraq, the 21-year-old joined hundreds of Islamist volunteers who were transported with the help of Bashar al-Assad’s regime to Baghdad to help Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime repel the Americans. With the American occupation, he joined Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi’s organization, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and fought in its ranks against the American army as a mid-level commander.

In 2005 he was imprisoned by the Americans for five years in the Bucca prisoner of war camp, near the Kuwaiti border. In the detention camp, which was in fact a training camp for terrorists, he met many with whom he later collaborated, and wrote a 50-page booklet in which he summarized his thoughts on how to topple the Damascus regime of Bashar al-Assad. His main conclusion was that war between the different communities should not be encouraged, since Syria is a huge ethnic mosaic.

In 2010 he was released and moved to the Al-Anbar province in western Iraq, part of which was controlled by ISIS members, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The aforementioned was impressed by his abilities and sent him as his representative to Syria. Baghdadi gave him $50,000 to fund his activities. He also asked for 100 fighters, but there was no enthusiasm on the part of the fighters to go to Syria, and he left with only six fighters. According to him, within a year there were already 5,000 jihadists under his command. It was Jabhat al-Nusra (“Front of Support”), which defined itself as part of al-Qaeda led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared that Jabhat al-Nusra was part of, and under the command of, ISIS. Al-Julani rejected it angrily, and in mid-2014 battles broke out between Al-Nusra and ISIS in eastern Syria (mainly in the Raqqa area). The conflict was personal, organizational, and a struggle over revenue, including oil, taxes, smuggling, and ransom for hostages. Ideologically, it was also the beginning of a rivalry between the Iraqi leadership of ISIS and the Syrian one of al-Nusra, with deep historical ties. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was inspired by the Abbasid dynasty that ruled a huge Islamic empire from Baghdad between the eighth and thirteenth centuries. On the other hand, at least a very important part of Jabhat al-Nusra was, and still is inspired by the Umayyad Empire, which ruled the Muslim world before the Abbasids and was defeated by the latter in the mid-eighth century.

For his activities in Iraq and Syria, Al-Julani was declared a terrorist by the United States and a reward was set on his head. Yet, nothing was done to eliminate him, suggesting that the Americans do not see him as a great threat. Perhaps this is because in 2016, apparently in view of the 2011 demise of Osama Bin Laden and the Western support for the war against ISIS in Mosul (Iraq), he announced the severing of all ties with al-Qaeda and the change of the organization’s name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (the Front of Syria Conquest). In other words, the organization confines itself to Syria (or the Levant) and has no interest in a global struggle against the Christians, Shiites, and all the other infidels. Later, Al-Julani further changed the name of the movement, and today it is called Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (the Organization for the Liberation of Syria (or the Levant). Al-Julani has also recently changed his style of dress, and instead of donning an Islamic attire, he wears smart military uniforms. The number of soldiers at his personal disposal is about 10,000, but there are other organizations currently operating under his command as part of what they call the “Salvation Government.” Unlike Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, they are careful not to declare a pan-Islamic “caliphate,” and emphasize that they are concerned only with “al-Sham”. In the areas they occupied, they are not trying to impose their Islam at this stage, and they are not exterminating populations that are “deviant” from the “correct Islam” such as Shiites, Druze, Alawites, and others, as did ISIS.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime is the most significant event in the Middle East since October 7, and perhaps since the establishment of Hezbollah in 1982. For Israel, the events in Syria constitute a 60 percent soft advantage and a 40 percent risk. Julani and his supporters have a hard reckoning with Hezbollah because during the Syrian civil war (about 2011-2018) they brutally massacred Sunni Syrian civilians.

It is reasonable to expect that they will not allow the transfer of new weapons to their slaughterers. With the Syrian land routes closed, Hezbollah will not be able to re-arm itself, and perhaps this is the end of Hezbollah as an armed organization, following which they will remain only as a political party. Lebanon already has an anti-Hezbollah majority in parliament, so now is the time to strike the iron while it is still hot: the West must press for presidential elections in Lebanon (there has been no president for two years). He will demand that Hezbollah give up all its heavy weapons in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006.

Hezbollah and Iran will object, but both are now in deep crisis. Therefore, with international pressure and the promise of aid to Lebanon’s crumbling economy, there is a good chance that this demand will be met. This is a truly historical opportunity.

Indeed, Iran is in the greatest distress since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Their vision of a “Shi’ite Crescent”, a territorial contiguity from Iran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon is broken. They have completely lost Syria and may lose Lebanon, and they may be left with only Yemen and Iraq. Furthermore, the last Israeli air raid left Iran with no effective air defenses and paralyzed its missile production. Its economy is in crisis too. Iran feels more vulnerable than ever since the 1988 end of its war with Iraq. Therefore, they will soon have to decide whether to rush to the nuclear bomb or to reach an understanding with the United States, which will lead to the lifting of the embargo and the resuscitation of its economy. At the moment, a political struggle is taking place inside Iran between two camps: the pragmatists, led by President Pezeshkian, who are interested in reaching understandings with the US, are facing the extremists (or “conservatives”) led by the Revolutionary Guards, part of the religious elite, and the largest party in parliament, the ultra-radical Paydari Party. In the middle is the arbiter, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

For Israel, there is a danger that there will be a radical jihadist regime on its Golan border. So far, Al-Julani is proving to be a pragmatist. He has seen what the West has done to ISIS and Al-Qaeda and is trying to convey to the West that he is not an international religious fanatic like bin Laden, and that it is about Syria. Yet, the nom de guerre that he took for himself, al-Julani, indicates that he thinks the Golan is Syrian land. Israel must also remember that in Syrian historical memory al-Sham, or Syria, or the Levant, includes the Land of Israel. The emotional connection to the Palestinian issue is also clear. Finally, he is and Islamist, and a Jewish state at the heart of the Islamic world must represent a problem for him.

In the face of all this, Israel and the West must take advantage of Julani’s pragmatism. Emirati and Saudi money is needed for Syria’s reconstruction. In addition, it is to be hoped that our military strength and that of the United States will remind Julani of what the West did to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Jerusalem Corps, and Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda. Al-Julani also needs to be reminded of what Israel did to Hassan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar. Between the Saudis as the good cop, and Israel as the bad one, it is hoped that al-Julani will behave.