The Assad family, father and son, dominated Syria for more than a half century. The last 13 years in Syria were chaotic, but diplomats from both the moderate Arab camp and Europe believed that since Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian army had won the civil war after recapturing much of northwestern Syria in 2016, that rapprochement was just a matter of time. Beginning in 2023, the Arab League resumed its invitations to Bashar after more than a decade. Arab diplomats told me that Brett McGurk, President Joe Biden’s chief National Security Council aide for the Middle East, had quietly met with Assad intermediaries in Muscat, Oman to discuss rapprochement with Washington.
Arab diplomats told me that Brett McGurk, President Joe Biden’s chief National Security Council aide for the Middle East, had quietly met with Assad intermediaries in Muscat, Oman to discuss rapprochement with Washington.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s rapid-fire, weeklong march through Syria showed how naïve such outreach was. Assad projected an image of strength but internally, his regime was riven with rot. While analysts did not predict Assad’s downfall, in hindsight, reasons for his rapid collapse are apparent. Assad used conscription to staff his army. Men between 18-42 had to serve at least 18 months in the army. It was a tolerable evil when army salaries sufficed to feed their families but with the Syrian pound losing 99.7 percent of its value since the war’s outbreak, time away from family was untenable. Syrian troops either went absent without leave or stole and sold whatever they could get their hands on to subsidize their absence. Even with violence declining and the conflict frozen, few saw any reason to put their lives on the line for a family who lived siphoned away Syrian wealth and resources and lived as billionaires while their own people barely subsisted.
Syria is not Azerbaijan. For one, Azerbaijan has faced no civil war, though it did lose far more conscripts in President Ilham Aliyev’s anti-Armenian jihad in Nagorno-Karabakh than Aliyev or Azerbaijan’s tightly controlled media are willing to acknowledge. But, like Assad, Aliyev comes from a family whose corruption and nepotism chafe even the elite, let alone ordinary people. While the Aliyevs horde luxury vehicles, watches, jewelry, and cash much as the Assads did, ordinary Azerbaijanis like their Syrian counterparts live in poverty. Perhaps Syrians had an excuse: the command economy prevented much foreign direct investment and, aside from some small oil fields in the east, Syria had few natural resources. Agriculture thrived and kept many Syrians afloat, but did not provide enough to become wealthy.
On paper, Azerbaijanis should enjoy among the highest living standards on earth. Azerbaijani oil brings in billions of dollars annually, while the population hovers around ten million. In the first 11 months of 2022, for example, Azerbaijan earned $33.6 billion in oil revenue. While dividing that among the population would only earn each citizen a few thousand dollars, had Azerbaijan invested its funds in a sovereign wealth fund like Abu Dhabi, Qatar, or Norway have, then they could expand that multifold through shrewd investments. Instead, the Aliyevs pocketed and squirreled away their cash, and so many Azerbaijanis live without even adequate fuel or electricity. The corruption is so severe that, despite Azerbaijan’s resources, per capita income is actually higher in both Georgia and resource-poor, landlocked, and blockaded Armenia.
An accident of history allowed Bashar to succeed his father; for decades, the heir-designee was Basil who died prematurely when he sped his car into a barrier on a foggy morning in January 1994. Aliyev will face similar difficulty with his next generation; his son is rumored to be autistic and substance abuse and addiction have tarred his daughters. The reason for his increasingly autocratic control and smothering of additional freedoms is that Ilham himself realizes how tenuous his family’s power would be if the terror with which he rules ever abated.
Today’s beacon of stability can easily become the subject of tomorrow’s eulogy. It may not be likely, but it is more possible than Aliyev will admit.
There are important differences: Assad belonged to a minority sect; Aliyev does not. Syria is largely Sunni; Azerbaijan is overwhelmingly Shi’ite and historically more secular in outlook. Turkey supported Assad’s opposition but it props up Aliyev.
Still, Aliyev should not sit pretty. Few predicted the Syrian uprising until it occurred. Other former Soviet states — Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, for example — suffered sudden uprisings that shook their leadership to the core. Assad’s Kremlin support ultimately meant little with Russian President Vladimir Putin so distracted in Ukraine. Does Aliyev truly believe Russia would come to his aid when it did not Assad’s?
The most important factor is the loyalty of his people; Aliyev kids himself if he believes Washington think tanks whispering sweet nothings in exchange for access or other reward substitute for respect.
Every democrat awakes knowing when his rule might end; every dictator awakes knowing today could be his last. Aliyev promotes a façade of strength and unity; he should be wary, however, as the reverberations of the Assad example could impact Azerbaijan far more than other countries. Today’s beacon of stability can easily become the subject of tomorrow’s eulogy. It may not be likely, but it is more possible than Aliyev will admit.
Published originally under the title “Could Aliyev Collapse Like Assad Did?”
