Could Donald Trump Give Pakistan’s ISI Head the Qasem Soleimani Treatment?

In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020, two cars sped along an isolated stretch of the 12.5 kilometer road that leads from Baghdad International Airport, past a U.S. and Iraqi military base, and into Baghdad’s green zone, the highly secure areas where many government officials work or reside. U.S. forces had tracked its occupant, Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, since he arrived on a charter flight from Damascus. The U.S. government believes that the Qods Force, the external and special operations wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to have been directly responsible for the deaths of several hundred Americans.

President Donald Trump gave the order, and an MQ-9 Reaper fired several missiles, engulfing the cars in flame; all that was left of Soleimani was his severed hand with his tell-tale ring.

Soleimani’s assassination’s shocked both the Islamic Republic and even many in Trump’s inner-circle. Few thought Trump, for all his bluster, would give such an audacious order.

After all, when the Islamic Republic downed an American RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone that cost almost $200 million flying in international airspace, Trump declined to respond. Criticism of both his Democratic and Republican predecessors for engaging militarily far from American shores was also a staple of Trump’s record.

Trump was unapologetic about the assassination. “Last night, at my direction, the United States military successfully executed a flawless precision strike that killed the number-one terrorist anywhere in the world, Qasem Soleimani,” the president said, adding, “Under my leadership, America’s policy is unambiguous: To terrorists who harm or intend to harm any American, we will find you; we will eliminate you. We will always protect our diplomats, service members, all Americans, and our allies.”

That Soleimani was an Iranian government official did not concern Trump, nor did the possibility that Iran would retaliate. Ultimately, despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s threats, Iran did not do much. There was some drone attacks on Iraqi bases in which the United States co-located forces, but these caused only minor injuries and property damage. The lessons Trump learned are that he could get away with shredding diplomatic convention and self-imposed restraints, impose a price for killing Americans, and be applauded by even his more isolationist base.

As Trump initiates his second term, the closing incident of his first administration should worry senior Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officials up to and including Lieutenant-General Asim Malik as well as his immediate predecessors.

After all, the ISI has with duplicity and direction killed nearly as many Americans as has the Qods Force. Pakistan, like Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, nurture proxies on the assumption the international community will reward the sleight of hand with impunity. With its support for groups ranging from Kashmir and Khalistani terrorists to Taliban groups and the Islamic State-Khorasan, the ISI deserves designation as a terror group while its institutionalization within and dominance over the Pakistani government should lead to U.S. designation of Pakistan as a terror sponsor.

Pakistani terrorists have repeatedly targeted Americans. The 2008 Mumbai attacks killed not only Indians but also Americans among other nationalities, including a 13-year-old girl. The September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, 2008 Mumbai attacks, and then October 7, 2023 attacks all became possible only because states like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran calculated they could avoid accountability by outsourcing policy to terror groups. The Mumbai attackers are not just directed by hatred of India; like their Al Qaeda and Hamas brethren, antisemitism ran deep, as they scoured Mumbai for Jewish targets. The ISI actively protects terrorists. While the ISI’s protection of Al Qaeda founder Usama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is the premier example, it is not the only one.

The ISI also protects Sajid Mir, a terrorist responsible for the Mumbai attacks, who is on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Most Wanted list. While Pakistan said it had arrested Mir to get off the Financial Action Task Force gray list, the Counter-Terrorism Department of the Punjab Police did not announce his conviction, nor did it allow the media to cover his alleged trial. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s claims that Mir is in prison appear to have the same credibility as Pakistan’s earlier denials that Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden was in Pakistan. Either way, the ISI refuses to allow the United States, which maintains a $5 million bounty for his arrest, to access Mir, likely fearing he would tell American officials the truth about his sponsors.

The United States tried diplomacy with Tehran for decades to compel the Islamic Republic to cease its terror sponsorship before Trump ordered Soleimani’s assassination. Successive administrations have done the same with Islamabad, only to have Pakistani authorities lie repeatedly. There is not a single U.S. director of Central Intelligence who believes his Pakistan counterpart in the ISI to be either truthful or uninvolved in the deliberate murder of Americans.

Could Trump order such a hit? It seems farfetched, but so too analysts and diplomats have described many of Trump’s positions which are now reality. Frustration has grown so great under President George W. Bush that his deputy secretary of State, Richard Armitage, reportedly threatened that the United States could bomb Pakistan “into the stone age.” Armitage’s subsequent denial was pro forma to help both sides save face.

Pakistan, of course, is also a nuclear power, but that did not stop Barack Obama from launching a direct attack on Bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound. When push comes to shove, the United States does not respect Pakistani sovereignty because Islamabad deserves no such respect.

Any attack on the ISI chief would likely coincide with outreach to Pakistan’s civilian leadership—whose private reaction might be relief—as well as a broader U.S. effort to make sure Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles remain under lockdown.

A hit on the ISI chief would also require intelligence penetration, but this is not a high hurdle. After Soleimani was killed, Iranian-backed interests in Iraq detained nearly half of Baghdad International Airport’s workers. They never caught the culprits; frankly, Iraq is so penetrated, they likely would not even have enough prison space. Pakistan is not much different.

Would a drone strike on ISI Chief Asim Malik be likely? No. Frankly, the CIA and Pentagon would strongly urge against hitting any sitting official. But, a former ISI director-general like Ahmad Shuja Pasha is another thing. After all, he oversaw the agency during the Mumbai attacks and whose relationship with Washington was deservedly poor.

Pakistan would react with outrage, but every demarche and statement would only focus more attention on its record of terror support.

Still, with Trump again in the White House, it is time Pakistanis asked both whether the assassination of Soleimani was the exception or the rule and if they believe Trump will be as weak as Biden when it came to the willingness to avoid holding those who killed Americans responsible for their actions.