Europe’s Pragmatic Approach to Syria Rooted in Afghanistan Debacle

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Europe’s engagement with the new Syrian leadership has been notably swift, yet it still refuses to recognise the Taliban. On 19 December 2024, the European Council issued guidelines for recognising Syria’s transitional government, tying it to respect for ‘human rights, including women’s rights, non-sectarian governance, and the protection of members of religious and ethnic minorities.’ On 4 January 2025, the German and French foreign ministers visited Damascus, less than a month after Bashar Assad’s fall.

Europe’s differing approaches to Syria’s new governing authority and the Taliban clearly shows the complexity of modern diplomacy and the intricate geopolitical and ideological factors driving Europe’s Middle East foreign policy decisions.

Of course, Europe currently hosts millions of Syrian refugees, many of them having fled the violence and extremism that flourished during the civil war. With continuing pressures on European governments – ranging from housing to social integration – the prospect that these refugees might soon return to a stable Syria is an alluring incentive for Europe to positively engage with Damascus and support its transition.

But by proactively helping Syria (and doing its best to avoid the mistakes it made with Afghanistan), Europe would also be doing itself a huge favour, by alleviating social strains in hosting EU countries, taking away some of Russia’s influence in the region and contributing to long-term security in the Middle East.

The Taliban’s 2021 return to power in Afghanistan unfolded amid a chaotic US withdrawal, a debacle that fully exposed the West’s strategic missteps. Despite initially promising to be moderate, the Taliban quickly reversed course, severely restricting women’s rights and education. This solidified their pariah status in the West’s eyes.

In stark contrast, Syria’s interim government has meticulously cultivated an image of pragmatism and reform. By disavowing extremist ties, embracing inclusive rhetoric and committing to women’s education, they have sought to distance themselves from the failures and radicalism associated with Assad and from competing Islamist movements.

The recently installed regime consists of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), both backed by Turkey. HTS, a rebranded faction with roots in al-Qaeda and ISIS, has been framed as a pragmatic option due to the absence of ‘viable’ alternatives. However, extremist alliances rarely lead to democratic outcomes and the EU, the UK, the UN and other influential states still designate HTS a terrorist group.

The transitional leadership has demonstrated that it’s particularly PR-savvy, strategically positioning itself as a partner for stability. The de facto leader, Mohammad al-Shaara – better known as the jihadist Abu Mohammed al-Julani, who doesn’t have a US bounty on his head anymore – tidied up his physical appearance for the role, is quite photogenic and has made himself easily accessible to journalists. Unlike the Taliban’s austere and isolationist image, the Syrian authorities have embraced media accessibility and modern optics. Their polished appearance and promises of inclusivity offer a stark contrast to the Taliban. In a region where public perception often dictates policy decisions, this tactic has paid off handsomely.

The geopolitical landscape also goes a long way to explaining Europe’s differential treatment. Assad’s rule – a long-time Russian ally – became an extension of Moscow’s influence in the Middle East. With Assad gone, Europe has seen an opportunity to weaken Russia’s foothold there.

Similarly, Iran’s diminished influence in post-Assad Syria aligns with the European and American strategic goal of countering Tehran’s regional ambitions. By engaging with Syria’s new government, Europe is signalling a shift in how it’s fostering alliances to curb authoritarian and anti-Western forces.

The Kurds, as victims of the Assad regime’s policies of Arabisation and suppression, have demonstrated their true character. Since 2012, the Kurdish-led administration known as Rojava Kurdistan has established a model of pluralistic democracy, offering refuge to many ethnic and religious groups.

The Kurds’ contributions against terrorism, marked by over 12 000 fatalities and 15 000 injuries, have earned them recognition as a reliable Western ally. Yet the SNA has been actively fighting Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces – comprising the YPG and YPJ – since last December, with the aim to erode Kurdish control of over a third of Syria’s territory.

Despite this, European diplomats have emphasised their commitment to safeguarding their Kurdish partners’ autonomy, framing it as a bulwark against terrorism. And with their democratic credentials, the Kurds don’t require any assessment or testing, unlike the interim regime in Damascus. Europe’s experience with the southern Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is a great example of successful collaboration, showcasing the potential for productive partnerships with the Kurds.

Europe’s engagement is also being driven by pragmatic concerns over Islamism. Curbing the spread of radical Islamism is an increasingly urgent concern for both Europe and the broader region. A Syria that embraces moderate political reforms, inclusive governance and a clear commitment to combatting terrorism offers an opportunity not only to alleviate Europe’s refugee burden but also to reduce the risk of Islamist movements gaining further traction within Syria or spilling over into neighbouring countries – and then possibly Europe.

Syria’s interim authority emphasising religious and ethnic coexistence is also appealing for European policymakers. Of course, this isn’t the case with the Taliban’s Sunni-dominated government, its repression of Afghanistan’s women, their right to education and its mistreatment of minorities.

Syria’s new leadership, however, has positioned itself as a guardian of diversity, advocating for tolerance in a region often defined by sectarian strife. Yet there are still reports of minorities like Christians and Alawites being suppressed and their houses looted by HTS factions and the SNA.

Europe’s Syria stance reflects a calculated effort to balance moral imperatives with geopolitical realities. Unlike how it dealt with the Taliban, Europe is extending an olive branch to Damascus. This nuanced strategy underscores the interplay between values, geopolitics and the imperatives of realpolitik in shaping foreign policy.

European policymakers aim to guide Syria’s transitional government as they pursue recognition by promoting ‘a peaceful and urgent transition in the service of Syrians and for regional stability,’ as French foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot stated, while warning them that Europe ‘will not fund new Islamist structures,’ as declared by his German equivalent, Annalena Baerbock.

By extending cautious support to Damascus, Europe hopes, ‘without naivety’, to leverage the lessons learned and pre-empt the mistakes made in handling the Taliban’s return. We’ll no doubt discover over the coming months whether it’s truly ‘second time lucky’ for Europe.

Published originally under the title “Europe Is Taking a Pragmatic Approach to Syria. Its Origins Lie in Kabul.”