Historically, Iran’s relationship with Israel has been complex and multifaceted. Before the 1979 Revolution, Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi maintained relatively positive diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. The two countries cooperated on various initiatives, including intelligence sharing and arms deals, positioning themselves as pragmatic partners in the volatile Middle East. Pahlavi emphasized the Persian and Jewish relationship, based on the historical narrative that Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian Empire, is remembered for liberating the Jews from captivity in 539 BCE after conquering Babylon. He allowed them to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple, earning him a revered place in Jewish history as a compassionate and just ruler.
But while Shah Pahlavi’s elites had a positive relationship with Israel, a more pessimistic view toward Israel was prevalent on the social level. Clergies, Islamists, and leftists collectively depicted Israel as an evil country aiming to destroy the Islamic holy land. Leftist Marxists saw Israel as a continuation of imperialism in the Middle East, seeking to colonize the region.
After the 1979 revolution, the new Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, severed all ties with Israel and labeled it an illegitimate and “cancerous state.” The revolution brought with it a political ideology deeply rooted in anti-Zionism, making the elimination of Israel a core pillar of Iran’s regional policy. Most Iranian people supported this policy at that time. With the new regime, Iran emerged as a strong supporter of the Palestinian liberation movement, initially aligning with Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and later extending its support to groups like Hamas, which was formed in 1987. The IRGC Liberation Movement Office, the predecessor of the IRGC Quds Force, backed various anti-imperialist movements, with a particular focus on those aimed at opposing Israel.
This support marked a significant ideological commitment. Iran saw itself as the vanguard of an Islamic revolution that transcended borders, aligning with Islamist groups it believed could help extend its influence and counterbalance the presence of Western powers and Israel in the region. In 1982, Iran’s strategy expanded with support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, consisting of Shia Lebanese factions. Backed by military, financial, and logistical support from Tehran, Hezbollah grew into a formidable force aimed at opposing Israel and advocating for the liberation of Jerusalem, or Quds.
The Islamic Republic also started a massive campaign based on anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. Dehumanizing Israel and its citizens, Iran promoted anti-Zionist propaganda to oppose the state of Israel and its policies. The Islamic Republic has frequently labeled Zionism an imperialist and colonialist movement that oppresses Palestinians. This has been reflected in various media, from political speeches to cultural productions like films, posters, and public murals. One of the most notable examples is Iran’s annual “Quds Day,” a state-sponsored event where protests are held, calling for the liberation of Jerusalem from Israeli control and denouncing Zionism. Iran’s state media often refers to Israel as the “Zionist regime,” de-legitimizing its existence and portraying it as an illegitimate occupier. Additionally, Iranian leaders have frequently questioned the Holocaust, framing it as a tool used by Zionists to justify Israel’s existence. While the United States is depicted as the “Great Satan,” Israel’s existence was never accepted and, it is argued, should be destroyed.
Over the years, the Islamic Republic has poured significant resources into Islamist groups with the aim of exporting the revolution and destroying Israel while simultaneously isolating itself from the global economy due to the consequences of its foreign policy. International sanctions, particularly after Iran’s nuclear ambitions became evident, exacerbated the economic isolation. Iran’s involvement in Syria’s civil war, Iraq, and Yemen through other proxy forces further strained its economy and resources. Simultaneously, the regime became more repressive and less inclusive. Political repression intensified, and many Iranians who didn’t subscribe to Ayatollah Khamenei’s ideology were marginalized.
But many Iranians, who suffered from political repression, social and cultural limitations, and economic hardships, began to resent these policies, which seemed more focused on regional power projection than domestic well-being. As economic and political conditions worsened, more Iranians began questioning the regime’s priorities. Instead of focusing on development within Iran, the government was perceived as sacrificing the country’s prosperity for ideological goals abroad and prioritizing non-Iranian causes over its citizens. This dissatisfaction was especially pronounced during the 2009 Green Movement, a series of protests that emerged following a disputed presidential election. The movement initially called for political reform, but quickly became a broader critique of the regime’s foreign policy. Protesters chanted slogans such as “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I Give My Life to Iran,” reflecting a growing sentiment that Iran should prioritize its citizens over foreign entanglements. Other slogans were repeatedly chanted, such as “Forget Palestine, think about us!” This called on the regime to stop supporting external groups in the Middle East and instead focus on the needs of the Iranian people.
The rise of discontent toward political Islam and Islamist groups in Iran has paralleled an increase in secularization, marked by a decline in religiosity, a growing desire for the separation of mosque and state, and the privatization of religion. Many Iranians have gradually developed resentment toward political Islam and Islamist groups seeking to implement Islamic Sharia law and to govern based on an Islamic constitution.
This shift reflects the growing disillusionment with the Islamic Republic and its ideological commitments, including confronting Israel. A growing number of Iranians have gradually shifted from merely criticizing the regime’s support for certain groups to actively expressing support for Israel. For many, Israel is seen less as an enemy and more as a prosperous, modern state that has achieved remarkable technological, scientific, and agricultural advancements despite being surrounded by hostile neighbors. Israel’s high-tech sector, innovations in water management, and resilience in the face of existential threats have become a source of admiration among many Iranians.
The divide between the Iranian government’s anti-Israel rhetoric and the sentiments of its people has widened. For many Iranians who have lost trust in the Islamic Republic and its rulers, anything coming from the regime’s propaganda apparatus is met with skepticism, including their portrayal of Israel. For some Iranians, Israel represents a potential strategic ally in the broader struggle against Islamism and pan-Arabism.
The Iranian regime paints American and Israeli flags on the street to encourage people to walk on them, symbolically humiliating these countries. However, many Iranians often refuse to walk on these flags as an act of defiance against the regime’s propaganda, showing disagreement with this forced demonstration. Some Iranian athletes, such as judoka Saeid Mollaei have competed with Israeli opponents despite harsh punishment by the regime.
Following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, while some groups expressed support for Hamas, many Iranians rejected the regime’s propaganda and blamed Hamas for the war. Additionally, many members of the Iranian diaspora openly voiced support for Israel. In various demonstrations, the Iranian diaspora stood in solidarity with Israel, distinguishing themselves from other groups. One sign read, “I am Persian, not a Muslim.” Even inside the country and under a repressive regime, much of the population viewed the actions of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime as responsible for provoking the conflict. This is in direct contradiction with the position of the Islamic regime and its leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who publicly praised the events of October 7 as a legitimate act of resistance. This resentment towards Islamism and support for Israel reflects the broader disillusionment of Iranians who see these groups, not Israel, as perpetuating instability and obstructing their country’s development.
From the other direction, political leaders in Israel, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have expressed admiration for Iran’s ancient civilization and its people while making a clear distinction between the Iranian regime and the Iranian population. Israel has intensified its messaging to the Iranian public, expressing solidarity with the Iranian people’s struggles against their regime’s authoritarianism. Israel has also shown support for the Iranian Crown Prince, Reza Pahlavi, as a symbolic figure of opposition to the Islamic Republic. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made public addresses directly targeting the Iranian people, attempting to distinguish between the oppressive Iranian regime and the people it governs. He has emphasized that Israel does not see ordinary Iranians as enemies and that the Islamic Republic’s policies are a burden on its citizens. These messages have resonated with many Iranians, particularly the younger generation, who are more connected to the outside world through social media and are more aware of Israel’s accomplishments.
In April 2024, Iran launched an attack on Israel using over 300 missiles and drones. While some Iranians expressed deep fear of war, a common response observed both online and in street graffiti was the hope that Israel could somehow help overthrow the Iranian regime. And after the intensification of the conflict, in which Iran attacked Israel with more than 200 ballistic missiles on October 2, Israel has promised to retaliate and attack the Islamic Republic’s assets, including military and nuclear facilities. The Israeli threats and possibility of war, although making ordinary people anxious, have led some to express their support for Israel by calling for action against Ayatollah Khamenei and his office.
In conclusion: While the Islamic Republic continues to call for the destruction of Israel, there is a growing segment of the Iranian population seeking normalcy, economic progress, and peaceful relations with Israel. As Iranians continue to resist the Islamic Republic’s authoritarian policies, their affinity for Israel may continue to grow, offering a glimmer of hope for a future where the two nations can coexist peacefully.
