For Islamic State observers, it was very predictable that this week’s editorial in the group’s al-Naba’ newsletter would be about the insurgent offensive in northwest Syria that has captured the cities of Aleppo and Hama. These insurgents, for the Islamic State, are ‘Sahwat’ (referring to the fact that they have fought against the Islamic State, just as the ‘Sahwat’ of Sunni Arabs fought against the group in Iraq during the years of the U.S. occupation), and therefore they are ‘apostates’ from Islam. The Islamic State in Syria primarily operates in the central and eastern regions of the country, fighting the Syrian government and its allies as well as the U.S.-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
To summarise the editorial’s main points:
. The conflict cannot be separated from timing and location. It is a proxy war between Turkey and Iran, with Turkey seeking to annex part of northern Syria as a buffer zone where it can deport refugees, and also seeking to exert pressure on Assad and his allies amid the failures in getting the normalisation process started between Syria and Turkey.
In short, this editorial helps to give a good idea of a very important distinction between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Islamic State.
The Syrian revolution is not one that seeks to implement the Shari‘a, but rather is simply striving to replace Assad with a civil democratic state, and thus it is a ‘Jahili’ revolution (i.e. reflecting the mindsets and attitudes of pre-Islamic ignorance). A particular target for criticism is the leading insurgent faction Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (whose origins ultimately lie in the Islamic State of Iraq), which is derided as the ‘commissions of apostasy’ and lambasted not only for conciliatory discourse towards non-Sunni sects in Syria but also its overtures to the international system, such as outreach messaging about potential partnership and directed to the Russian and Iraqi governments (the former deemed ‘Crusader’, the latter ‘Rafidite- a derogatory reference to the Shi‘a).
. The conflict reflects God’s law of ‘mutual repulsion’: i.e. setting off two groups against each other. So just as He set the Rafidites and Jews in opposition to each other (referring to Israel’s conflict with Iran and the ‘axis of resistance’), now He has set the nationalist insurgents against the ‘Nusayri’ (derogatory term for Alawite) government of Syria.
. Most importantly, it is to be realised that the Islamic State’s path, unlike that of the insurgent factions, is one that does not accord with the interests of any side or state, but rather strives to implement God’s commands and realise the interests of Muslims. Unlike the factions who accept the international system, the Islamic State rejects it, and this is what attracted and still does attract global hostility to it.
In short, this editorial helps to give a good idea of a very important distinction between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Islamic State (contrary to the pomposity of former British diplomat Craig Murray who lumps the two together as though they were one). Although Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is broadly influenced by Salafi Islam and invokes language of jihad to describe its insurgency, it has turned towards an approach that generally accepts the existing order of nation states. By contrast, the Islamic State’s approach is one of rejecting and ultimately dismantling all nation states to establish a caliphate that rules the entire world.
Below is the editorial with full translation.
Free Syria and Assad’s Syria
Suppose the Nusayri regime fell now. What is the system of rule that the factions will implement in ‘Free Syria’? If you say the Shari‘a, you don’t know the revolution! Or you don’t know the Shari‘a, and if you say ‘transitional council’ and ‘national constitution’, then with whom did the ‘revolutionaries’ have a problem? With the Assad family?!
In odious politics, one can’t understand events outside their temporal and locational context, and the recent escalation by the Sahwat can’t be understood in isolation from its temporal context following the ‘Lebanon agreement’, the generation of an international desire for Iran’s removal from the Syrian scene, and likewise the stumbling of the political dialogue between Assad and Ataturghan.[i] This prompted the latter to address Assad and his allies form behind the mask of the factions and their political statements, and via the mouths of their hired guns.
Indeed it is a Jahili revolution that strives to ‘implant the concept of the state’, and of course they mean by this the ‘civil state’ for which they waged war against the Islamic State.
Likewise, it is not possible to understand this escalation in isolation from its context of location, embodied in northern Syria, part of which Turkey wishes to annex as a buffer zone that protects its borders and enables it to send back refugees there.
It is well known that Turkey participates as a primary pawn in the ‘international coalition’ that is run by America, and for its part directs smaller pawns that compete with each other to gain the satisfaction of the international overseer or regional employer. Every pawn tries to present itself as a ‘liberating’ conqueror to the Syrians, and a ‘liberating’ politician to the supporters.
Indeed this is a proxy war between the ‘Turkish pawns’, some of which are mobilised by Turkey, and some of which it turns a blind eye to, and ‘Iran’s arms’, for the purpose of realising better gains at the ‘Astana’ or ‘Doha’ table or any table that draws the map of the ‘future Syria’.
The ‘future’ or ‘free Syria’ that the Sahwat strive for, has previously been clarified by the Islamic State’s leaders in their addresses many years ago, and today the Jahili signs appear clearly in the statements of the apostate commissions that have been dominated by the language of reassurance to the international system, and ‘co-existence’ with idolatrous and Batini[ii] ‘minorities’ like the Alawites, Ismailis and the Yezidis! Not to mention the Christians. In fact, the commissions of apostasy have gone further than that when they addressed Crusader Russia by describing it as a ‘potential partner in building a bright future for Free Syria!’ And they addressed the Rafidite Iraqi government with the language of ‘mutual understanding and brotherly cooperation!’
Indeed it is a Jahili revolution that strives to ‘implant the concept of the state’, and of course they mean by this the ‘civil state’ for which they waged war against the Islamic State. Indeed it is a revolution and not jihad in God’s path: a revolution of liberation from a ‘repressive regime’ that monopolises authority, in order to bring about another ‘democratic’ regime that shares power. These are the concepts and ABCs of revolutions, and these are the nature of ‘Free Syria’ after ‘Assad’s Syria’! It is embodied in bringing down an ugly statue and building another on its ruins with a good face!
The Shari‘i interpretation of what is happening does not depart from the just cosmic law of mutual repulsion. For just as we saw mutual repulsion in the ‘Jewish-Rafidite’ conflict, here today we see the mutual repulsion in the ‘Nusayri-Nationalist’ conflict, and there is no doubt there is tremendous joy among the Muslim masses for being rid of the Nusayri regime’s grip, and this is natural and justified right now. But areas coming out of the Nusayris’ control and falling into the grip of secularist Turkey and its nationalist factions does not mean being freed from the cocoon of Jahiliya, but rather moving to another Jahili era.
They describe the Caliphate as a global, worldwide ‘conspiracy’ made by America, the Jews, Iran, Russia and all the intelligence agencies of the world!
In sum, the entire event has not departed from the framework of international desire and the international system with which the interests of the ‘jihadists and revolutionaries’ have only been intersecting! But when the Islamic State was on the marge years ago, contrary to the wishes of the international system, they rushed to form the greatest Jahili Crusader coalition in history to stop the raging march of the Caliphate that came contrary to their expectations and desires. Despite this, they describe the Caliphate as a global, worldwide ‘conspiracy’ made by America, the Jews, Iran, Russia and all the intelligence agencies of the world!
This is not the place for us to compare the project of the Islamic State with the projects of the nationalist, regionalist fronts and commissions. For what is between us and them is very different, but we issue the reminder that the armies of the Caliphate in the badiya areas[iii] and countryside areas have never stopped their fight against the Nusayri regime, and they have not restrained their horses.
If the movement of the Sahwat concords and intersects with the interests of the Jewish and American alliance, when the Islamic State went on the march, its march was and still is contrary and opposed to all the Jewish and American desires, such that when its march headed towards ‘Arbil’ and ‘Kobani’ (the Jews’ backyards), the Jahili alliance called upon each other in all their parties, shouting to each other: the Jews, the Jews, catch up with the Jews! And the aircraft of the earth began pouring their wrath to stop this roaring march, and the matter was repeated when the mujahidin marched towards the walls of Baghdad, and thus the Romans formed one army with the Russians, fighting and defending Baghdad in fear that it would become an abode for the Caliphate again. For the Islamic State’s march was contrary to all the international desires, and a separation from and not confluence with all international interests. Despite this, the Islamic State was accused of collaboration with all the lords of the earth (deceptive years…in which the traitor is trusted and the trusted one is deemed a traitor).
But let the Islamic State’s soldiers and supporters hear before its rivals and enemies. Indeed, by God, your state is not harmed by praise for it or blame for it, for they the same for it. It has never sort to realise its jihad in exchange for reward and thanks from anyone. If the annals of the world have done it wrong and repudiated it, the annals of the just King (exalted is He) do not do so, and tomorrow you will find it in a book that does not mislead and does not forget.
Nor does it lack testimony from anyone, and this testimony is the fields of epic battles that are still active, and its swords are still unsheathed. If these people fight today to consolidate and improve the agreements of the Tawaghit, the Dawla has not stopped its fight from the outset, and it has not pinned its decision to anyone. If they fight in response to the commands of their backers and the interests of the overseers, the Dawla fights in response to the commands of the Truth (exalted is He) and in realisation of the Muslims’ interests, and if they apply the covenants of the UN and its disbelieving wars in their war and peace time, the Dawla applies the commands of the Creator (exalted is He), and has never left the covenant or legacy of the prophets.
For our state was the opposite of what they like, enraging and infuriating them, and it still does so and will continue to do so, until God settles a matter that was implemented.
If these people fight in the shade of ‘Astana’[iv] and ‘Sochi’[v] and its borders, the Islamic State has only fought in the shade of the Shari‘a and its limits, and if they fight in accordance with international and regional interests, the Islamic State has only fought in opposition to them. For our state was the opposite of what they like, enraging and infuriating them, and it still does so and will continue to do so, until God settles a matter that was implemented.
And for a long time they have held it against the Islamic State that it did not has not made an enemy neutral, and if it could it would do so, but it is a war of separation in which they have struck it from one bow, because it has contravened all their projects and interests, and this was an admission without their realising it, that the Islamic State has never agreed with anyone’s desire and has not fought for anyone’s interest and has never been in anyone’s pocket.
And this is a whisper of faith, education and program: al-Sham will remain between tribulations and epic battles, and one cannot distinguish between these two contexts, and it is what makes it necessary for the Muslim to correct his creed in order for it to lead it, and necessary for him to strengthen his faith so that it can make him steadfast: ‘And God is predominant over His affair but most people don’t know.’
Notes
[i] Derogatory reference to Erdogan: a combination of both Ataturk and Erdogan.
[ii] Referring to belief in inner meaning of scriptures as opposed to external meaning.
[iii] Referring to desert and steppe areas in central Syria.
[iv] A framework for three-way meetings between Turkey, Russia and Iran on the conflict in Syria.
[v] Referring to a previous Turkish-Russian agreement on managing ‘de-escalation’ in the northwest of Syria.
Documents referenced in this article are available in the original Stubstack version (behind paywall).
