When Hamas launched its war on Israel in October, 2023, it did so on the basis of a clear analysis of Israeli society, according to which it hoped to achieve its objectives.
Given the nature and extent of the massacre of 7 October 2023, it was surely clear to the Palestinian Islamist movement that Israel’s response would be to seek to destroy the ruling regime that Hamas had established in Gaza since 2007. Hamas’s leaders hoped to avoid this outcome, however, by the taking of Israeli hostages. This would be followed by a bargaining process in which Hamas would exchange the lives of the hostages for its continued rule in Gaza.
Hamas and its allies were convinced throughout that Israel would eventually choose its hostages over victory. Their conviction appears to have proven accurate.
The ceasefire deal currently being implemented by the government of Israel and the once and future rulers of Gaza suggests that Hamas may well have achieved its goal.
Israel from the first defined its aim in the war as two-fold: the defeat of Hamas and the return of the hostages. But it has been obvious throughout that these goals were contradictory, unless Israel were to define the ‘rescue’ part of its intention as consisting only of attempts at rescue by force.
Once a process of negotiating for the hostages began, it was inherent that efforts to destroy Hamas would need to be curtailed. This is because of the simple fact that it is impossible to negotiate with any person or group of people and at the same time seek to kill them. It was always obvious that at a certain point a choice would need to be made. Hamas and its allies were convinced throughout that Israel would eventually choose its hostages over victory. Their conviction appears to have proven accurate.
Hamas now stands to rebuild its rule over Gaza, and to reconstitute its hold on the Strip (assuming, of course, that the ceasefire agreement continues after the first phase, which may yet not be the case).
The choice facing Israel was stark. Its decision is clear. The remaining important question is why. Why has the Jewish state opted once again to agree to a massively lopsided exchange of captives, which will involve the release of hundreds of individuals convicted of murdering Israelis, often in the most savage and brutal of ways? 1,904 Palestinians are to be released in the first phase, in return for 33 Israeli hostages.
It should be noted that exchanges of this kind are not a norm dating back to Israel’s earliest days. In its early years, Israel was noted for an unambiguous stance of non-negotiation with terrorists. The first major and massively lopsided exchange was carried out in 1985. It involved the release of 1,150 Palestinian security prisoners in exchange for three IDF soldiers who had fallen into enemy hands. This exchange, known in Israel as the ‘Jibril agreement,’ set the stage for everything which has followed.
In its early years, Israel was noted for an unambiguous stance of non-negotiation with terrorists.
The current exchange differs from others, however, in that it may represent the first time that an enemy of Israel has achieved a clear political and strategic goal (the survival of Hamas governance in Gaza) as a result of hostage taking. Previous exchanges, while one-sided, simply obtained the liberty of large numbers of Palestinians convicted of killing Israelis, rather than as now ensuring additional goals.
So why? Why the agreement to such apparently absurd deals?
Israeli society is small, and possesses a high level of social cohesion of a particular kind. Israelis are not, and do not feel themselves to be, strangers to one another. Strongly felt perceptions of national, communal and religious identity, along with shared experiences of conflict, contribute toward a powerful sense of shared destiny among Israel’s Jewish inhabitants and to a lesser degree also among its non-Jewish ones. This produces the high levels of solidarity and mutual commitment which have been very much on display over the last 14 months of war. But it also, paradoxically, leads to prisoner exchanges which by any measure make no strategic sense at all, enable enemies to achieve their goals, and for obvious reasons incentivise further hostage taking.
So was Israel prior to 1985 less cohesive, its citizens less concerned for one another? The answer, fairly obviously, is not. But prior to 1985, Israel possessed a far less pluralist and democratic political culture. It maintained an ethos according to which the notion that leaders would provide the public with what it ‘needed’ rather than what it ‘wanted’ had considerable purchase. This is no longer the case, though with regard to the current agreement it appears that prior to it Netanyahu was seeking to pursue something along these lines. Pressure from the new American administration, rather than Israeli public pressure, seems to have been the final factor which forced his hand.
The net result of the current deal will be to convince Israel’s enemies that they are on the right track, and that Hamas was right that it would achieve its strategic goal of regime survival by the taking of hostages.
Israel’s Islamist enemies see this desperate regard on the part of Israeli citizens to save the lives of their compatriots as a central weakness to be exploited. In their understanding, they are engaged in a long war intended to lead to Israel’s slow erosion and eventual collapse. They intend to leverage this Israeli concern in order to prevent Jerusalem from seeking decisive victory.
In other contexts, one can witness Islamist movements profiting from the weakness and lack of cohesion of western societies. Examples of this might be found in parts of Europe today. In the case of Israel, its Islamist enemies seek to and sometimes succeed in benefitting from Israeli social norms that are in most ways positive: a high level of mutual concern and commitment, a shared sense of destiny and identity, and so on. The net result of the current deal will be to convince Israel’s enemies that they are on the right track, and that Hamas was right that it would achieve its strategic goal of regime survival by the taking of hostages. One is reminded of Yeats’s lines, written for a very different context: ‘What if excess of love bewildered them till they died?’ Hamas and its allies intend to ensure that it will be so.
