In his inaugural address on 10 November 2024, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar emphasised the importance of forging a “natural alliance” with the Kurdish nation. While not specifying which segment of Kurdistan his office seeks to engage with, the statement raises an important question: how can a sovereign state establish an alliance with a non-state actor?
The Abraham Accords, which formalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, followed a top-down approach—primarily negotiated at the government level. Yet, these accords have not resolved widespread anti-Israel sentiments among Arab populations. In contrast, initiating an asymmetrical relationship with the Kurds would follow a bottom-up model. This is because the Kurds lack a fully sovereign state across their territories in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkiye, and the South Caucasus. Consequently, Kurdish leaders are unable to formalise such relationships at the state level. Any relationship would instead remain between two nations rather than two states. The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) has expressed its openness “to establish relations with Israel.”
Sa’ar’s statement raises an important question: how can a sovereign state establish an alliance with a non-state actor?
Currently, the Kurds enjoy de jure autonomy in Başûr (Southern Kurdistan in Iraq) under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with Hewlêr as its capital, which hosts 40 international diplomatic missions, including consulates and representatives. Israel, like any other nation-state, is free to establish a consulate or embassy in Hewlêr. However, this comes with significant risks due to widespread anti-Israel sentiment in in Arab-populated regions of Iraq.
Following a conference held in Hewlêr in September 2021 on normalising relations with Israel, the Iraqi parliament—under Iranian influence—criminalised such relations in May 2022, imposing severe penalties, including of the death sentence or life imprisonment. With no direct access to Israel, US premises in the region, as Israel’s ally, along with other Kurdish civilian buildings, have frequently been targeted by Iranian-backed militias in response. These dynamics may make the likelihood of Israel opening a mission there slim.
In the west of Kurdistan (Rojava in Syria), the situation differs. The Kurds control approximately one-third of Syrian territory, which has been administered by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria since 2012. Rojava’s forces, including the Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ) and Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG), now organised under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi, maintain disciplined structures. Opening a diplomatic mission or representative office in Rojava is plausible, though risks from Turkish drone strikes should be considered. However, Turkiye does not have the fortitude to target Israeli facilities.
Despite their lack of formal international recognition, the Kurds in both Kurdistani regions have played a critical role in the International Coalition Against Daesh, contributing decisively to the defeat of ISIS and other extremist and terrorist groups in the region. Establishing formal ties with Israel could align with the goals of the Abraham Accords Declaration, particularly fostering “peace, security, and prosperity in the Middle East” and combating “radicalisation and conflict.”
The Kurdish territories of Rojava and Başûr have demonstrated remarkable stability over the past three decades compared to their neighbours. These regions, with their democratic inclinations, possess significant potential for development in areas such as science, trade, medicine, and the arts. Moreover, military cooperation—including training, intelligence-sharing, and the provision of air defense systems like UAVs—would be crucial for the Kurds in countering Turkish and Iranian incursions. Humanitarian aid could also serve as a foundation for mutual engagement. The governments of Başûr and Rojava, as moderating structures with significant influence in the region, should not be seen merely as political entities born from the internal ethnic and legal challenges within the Iraqi and Syrian states. Rather, they represent an alternative approach to addressing regional issues. This is akin to Saudi Arabia’s transformation, which reshaped both its internal dynamics and the broader political framework of Arabs and Israel relations.
Cooperation with Israel would likely be limited to covert engagements, military training, diplomatic backchannel communications, and unofficial partnerships until they achieve de facto governance.
For the Kurds of Rojhilat (in Iran) and Bakûr (in Turkiye), such prospects are currently unrealistic. In Rojhilat, Kurds face intense repression under the Iranian regime, with little opportunity to establish independent governance structures. However, the weakening of Iran following the 2022-23 Jina Revolution and the collapse of its militia influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, has created a window of opportunity for Kurdish aspirations. Similarly, in Bakûr, Turkish state long-standing efforts and policies actively suppress Kurdish movements, making it difficult for Kurdish political entities to operate freely or establish control over territory. The shifting regional dynamics could eventually provide the Kurds in these segments with a chance to assert autonomy. Therefore, cooperation with Israel, or any external actor, would likely be limited to covert engagements, military training, diplomatic backchannel communications, and unofficial partnerships until they achieve de facto governance.
Israel has historically supported the Kurds, dating back to its establishment in 1948, though without any formal strategic long-term characteristics or tangible outcomes. Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkiye have weaponised Israel’s close ties with the Kurds as a strategic tool to suppress Kurdish aspirations for independence. This backing could be extended to the United Nations, with Israel potentially lobbying for observer status for Kurdistani entities, a goal that would require active Western support. Cooperation in international organisations such as UNICEF, UNIDO, WHO, UNESCO, and UNWTO could further bolster this relationship.
Although asymmetrical, this relationship must remain stable due to shared enemies and common interests in countering extremism, despite the lack of a shared border. However, real support from Israel is essential; superficial gestures would risk undermining the Kurds’ position, leading to what could be another “disservice with empty posturing.”
